Benjamin Scott Legg v. Commonwealth of Virginia

• Court: Court of Appeals of Virginia
• Decided: March 24, 2026
• Docket: 1007253
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Malveaux, Athey and Frucci UNPUBLISHED

BENJAMIN SCOTT LEGG MEMORANDUM OPINION* v. Record No. 1007-25-3 PER CURIAM MARCH 24, 2026 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF STAUNTON Anne F. Reed, Judge

(Varinder S. Dhillon; Thomes Weidner IV PLLC, on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting on brief.

(Jason S. Miyares,1 Attorney General; David A. Stock, Senior Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Upon his guilty pleas, the Circuit Court of the City of Staunton (“trial court”) convicted

Benjamin Scott Legg (“Legg”) of 5 counts of aggravated sexual battery of a minor less than 13

years old and 5 counts of taking indecent liberties with a minor. The trial court then sentenced

Legg to 50 years’ incarceration, with 40 years suspended. On appeal, Legg contends that the

trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. Finding no

error, we affirm.2

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A). 1 Jay C. Jones succeeded Jason S. Miyares as Attorney General on January 17, 2026. 2 Having examined the briefs and record in this case, the panel unanimously agrees that oral argument is unnecessary because “the dispositive issue or issues have been authoritatively decided, and the appellant has not argued that the case law should be overturned, extended, modified, or reversed.” See Code § 17.1-403(ii)(b); Rule 5A:27(b). I. BACKGROUND3

Legg was charged with 10 counts of aggravated sexual battery of a minor less than 13 years

of age, in violation of Code § 18.2-67.3; 10 counts of abduction with intent to defile, in violation of

Code § 18.2-48; and 10 counts of taking indecent liberties with a minor, in violation of Code

§ 18.2-370.1. Under the terms of a written plea agreement, Legg pleaded guilty to 5 counts of

aggravated sexual battery and 5 counts of custodial indecent liberties. In exchange, the

Commonwealth agreed to nolle prosequi his remaining 20 charges.

The plea agreement was executed by Legg and the Commonwealth before the trial court on

October 3, 2024. Before accepting Legg’s pleas of guilty to the various charges, the trial court

conducted a colloquy with Legg to ensure that his guilty pleas were entered freely and voluntarily.

During the colloquy, Legg confirmed that he understood the charges against him and what the

Commonwealth would have to prove in order to convict him. He also confirmed that he had been

given enough time to discuss the charges against him, the elements of the charges, and any possible

defenses to the charges with his attorney. He also confirmed that after discussing whether to plead

guilty or not guilty with his counsel, he decided for himself to plead guilty. He assured the trial

court that he was pleading guilty freely and voluntarily because he was, in fact, guilty. Legg also

represented to the trial court that although he was taking medications, the medications did not hinder

his ability to understand or participate in the proceedings.

Legg further acknowledged that his guilty pleas waived several of his constitutional rights,

including his right to a trial by jury, his right to confront any witnesses testifying against him, as

3 We recite the facts “in the ‘light most favorable’ to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the trial court.” Hammer v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 225, 231 (2022) (quoting Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021)). In doing so, we discard any evidence that conflicts with the Commonwealth’s evidence and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all inferences that can be fairly drawn from that evidence. Cady, 300 Va. at 329. -2- well as his right to not incriminate himself. Legg also confirmed that no one had threatened or

forced him to enter his guilty pleas. Legg represented that he understood that the maximum

punishment for the charges, if the sentences ran consecutively, was 125 years’ incarceration. He

further stated that he was aware that the discretionary sentencing guidelines did not bind the trial

court in imposing a sentence. Legg further recognized that his guilty pleas “waive[d] certain rights

of appeal.” Legg also agreed that he had read and understood the plea agreement and had discussed

the plea agreement with his attorney. Finally, Legg confirmed that he understood all the questions

asked of him by the trial court and had answered all the trial court’s questions truthfully. He also

indicated that he had no questions for the trial court.

The trial court found that Legg’s guilty pleas had been entered freely and voluntarily and

that Legg understood the nature and consequences of his guilty pleas pursuant to the written plea

agreement. The Commonwealth then proffered to the trial court that when A.C.4 was between five

and six years old, she occasionally stayed overnight with her aunt and the aunt’s fiancé, Legg. On

several of these nights, Legg sexually assaulted A.C. by touching her vagina and breasts. When she

was in fourth grade, A.C. told her school counselor about the abuse, which led to police becoming

involved and A.C. conducting a forensic interview that corroborated her account of the abuse. Legg

did not object to the proffer and agreed that the proffered evidence was sufficient to convict him.

Based on Legg’s guilty pleas and the Commonwealth’s proffer, the trial court accepted his

guilty pleas and convicted him of the ten offenses outlined in the written plea agreement. The

Commonwealth then moved to nolle prosequi the remaining charges pursuant to the terms of the

written plea agreement without objection and the trial court dismissed without prejudice the

remaining charges. The trial court then ordered a presentence investigation report and continued for

sentencing the ten cases in which Legg was convicted. Although the parties did not dispute the

4 We use initials to protect the victim’s privacy. -3- imposition of sentence pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, the matter was continued for

sentencing because the parties asked for a pre-sentence report and psycho-sexual evaluation

concerning the issue of whether Legg could be in the presence of his grandchildren and great-

grandchildren despite his convictions for crimes against minors.

Following the hearing, Legg fired his attorney and acquired new counsel. Prior to

sentencing, Legg moved to withdraw his guilty pleas. In support, Legg asserted that his guilty pleas

were not knowingly and voluntarily entered because he had not been properly medicated as ordered

by his doctor when he entered his guilty pleas.5

At a hearing on the motion to withdraw the pleas, Dr. Timothy Jana (“Dr. Jana”), a

psychiatrist employed at Middle River Regional Jail (“Middle River”), testified that he had

previously diagnosed Legg with major depressive disorder and prescribed Legg Prozac and Zyprexa

in December of 2023. He further testified that Legg was taking both medications as prescribed until

September 27, 2024, when Middle River’s supply of Prozac ran low. Legg continued taking

Zyprexa but did not receive Prozac again until October 19, 2024. Dr. Jana opined that because of

Prozac’s long period of effectiveness, about half of the medication Legg ingested a week prior to the

October 3, 2024 plea hearing would still have been in his system when he entered his guilty pleas.

Dr. Jana further opined that the Prozac remaining in Legg’s system, along with the Zyprexa that

Legg had continued taking, would have ameliorated his depressive symptoms. Dr. Jana further

testified that he had not seen Legg between September 27 and October 3 because Legg had been

missing appointments. Dr. Jana was unaware of any psychotic symptoms, episodes, or other recent

concerns regarding Legg’s mental health. He also opined that it was “unlikely” that a week-long

lapse in taking anti-depressant medication “would have a significant effect” on someone taking it.

5 Legg also claimed that his previous attorney had threatened to withdraw as counsel if he did not accept the plea agreement, but he later withdrew that contention. -4- Legg testified that he started taking medication in January of 2023 while at Middle River.

He stated that he pleaded guilty after not receiving Prozac but “[didn’t] know the exact dates” of

when he stopped receiving the medication. Legg asserted that he wanted a jury trial because “the

allegations simply didn’t happen.” But Legg acknowledged talking with his wife after the plea

hearing and telling her that he pleaded guilty because he was worried about receiving lengthy prison

sentences. He also acknowledged that he did not mention anything to her about missing his

medication, his appointments, or not thinking clearly. Nor had he reported any concerns about his

mental health to jail staff. In fact, he did not remember ever mentioning the lapse in medication to

anyone. Legg also conceded that he had begun discussing the plea agreement with his attorney

weeks before the interruption in his medication. Legg further agreed that he did not “report any

concern about [his] medication” to the trial court at the time of the guilty plea hearing.6

The trial court denied Legg’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. The court noted that the

plea colloquy had been “an extended one” because of the question about Legg potentially having

contact with his grandchildren and that the trial court “went to special pains to ensure that everyone,

especially [Legg], understood what was involved” before the trial court accepted the plea. The trial

court noted that it “did not hear any testimony from anyone regarding what negative impact the gap

in [Legg’s] medication had on [his] mental state and how that might have inhibited [Legg’s]

abilities at the time of the plea hearing.” In addition, the trial court noted that Legg did not object to

the Commonwealth’s proffer of evidence at the plea hearing and had not offered any defense

“beyond what would be a challenge solely” to the victim’s credibility and the Commonwealth’s

other evidence. The trial court then reset the matter for sentencing and subsequently sentenced

6 Legg asserted to the trial court that he was “not saying that he was incompetent or he didn’t understand” but that the lack of proper medication “materially affected him in his ability to feel that he could stand up and defend himself.” -5- Legg to 50 years’ incarceration, with 40 years suspended, consistent with the plea agreement. Legg

appealed.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

“[W]hether to grant or deny the withdrawal of a plea ‘is a matter that rests within the sound

discretion of the trial court and is to be determined by the facts and circumstances of each case.’”

Commonwealth v. Holland, 304 Va. 34, 46-47 (2025) (quoting Parris v. Commonwealth, 189 Va.

321, 324 (1949)). “Only when reasonable jurists could not differ can we say an abuse of discretion

has occurred.” Bista v. Commonwealth, 303 Va. 354, 370 (2024) (quoting Commonwealth v.

Swann, 290 Va. 194, 197 (2015)).

B. The trial court did not err in denying Legg’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.

Legg asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas

because “the deprivation of [his] psychotropic medication along with [his] desire to defend himself

and proceed to a jury trial is a reasonable basis” for withdrawal of his guilty pleas. We disagree.

Under a “long line of cases” that have “refined the standard” for withdrawing a guilty plea, a

“pre-sentencing plea-withdrawal motion should be granted in one of two situations: either when the

defendant’s guilty plea was ‘made involuntarily,’ or it was ‘entered inadvisedly, if any reasonable

ground is offered for going to the jury.’” Holland, 304 Va. at 48 (quoting Brown v. Commonwealth,

297 Va. 295, 299 (2019)). “Whether the guilty plea was voluntary and counseled are thus central

considerations.” Brown, 297 Va. at 299; see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (noting that

“[t]he standard as to the voluntariness of [a] guilty plea[]” is that it be “entered by one fully aware of

the direct consequences” of the plea and that such plea “must stand unless induced by threats . . .

[or] misrepresentation”). Legg bears the burden of proving that his guilty plea “was submitted in

good faith under an honest mistake of material fact or facts,” that he had evidence that showed “a

-6- reasonable defense to be presented to the charge,” that the Commonwealth would not suffer

“undu[e] prejudice,” and that “the motion to withdraw the plea was not filed merely to cause undue

delay in the administration of justice or [otherwise represents] bad faith or misconduct by or on

behalf of the defendant.” Holland, 304 Va. at 48-49 (second alteration in original) (quoting DeLuca

v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 567, 579 (2021), aff’d per curiam, 302 Va. 171 (2023)).

A defendant must “show that his motion was made in good faith and premised upon a

reasonable basis.” Velazquez v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 603, 616 (2016). “A reasonable basis

must include a proffer of evidence showing a reasonable basis for contesting guilt.” Brown, 297 Va.

at 299 (quoting Cobbins v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 28, 34 (2008)). Hence, Legg had to show

that he had a “reasonable defense” to the charges, either based on a proposition of law or “credible

testimony, supported by affidavit.” Williams v. Commonwealth, 59 Va. App. 238, 249 (2011).

“Moreover, the asserted defense must be ‘substantive.’” Brown, 297 Va. at 301. Bare assertions

that a defendant has a defense are not sufficient, and a trial court’s “discretion [to grant the motion]

will rarely, if ever, be exercised in aid of an attempt to rely upon a merely dilatory or formal

defense.” Parris, 189 Va. at 324-25 (quoting Early v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. 921, 924 (1890)).

Here, the record demonstrates that Legg kept taking one of his two required mental health

medications as prescribed before his plea hearing while still retaining half of the effectiveness of the

other drug. Dr. Jana testified that about half of the Prozac Legg took a week before the plea hearing

would still have been in Legg’s system. During the plea colloquy, Legg said that his medications

did not prevent him from understanding the proceedings. Legg also stated that he understood the

plea agreement as well as the trial court’s questions and further did not have any questions regarding

the plea agreement. Legg told the trial court that he decided for himself whether to plead guilty and

was doing so freely and voluntarily because he was in fact guilty of the offenses. Legg also

confirmed that no one had threatened or forced him to enter his guilty pleas. And after the hearing,

-7- Legg told his wife that he pleaded guilty to receive a lighter sentence. Legg had also discussed the

terms of the plea agreement with his attorney weeks before he temporarily stopped receiving

Prozac. The trial court also noted the extensive colloquy with Legg and how it took “special pains”

to ensure that Legg knew what was happening during the plea hearing on October 3, 2024. Legg

also subsequently admitted that he did not mention anything to his wife, jail staff, or anyone else

about any mental health concerns regarding missing his medication, his appointments, or not

thinking clearly. The trial court noted that it “did not hear any testimony from anyone” about how

Legg not taking one of his medications “might have inhibited [Legg’s] abilities at the time of the

plea hearing” to understand what was going on at the hearing. There also was no testimony about

Legg not being aware of the consequences of his guilty pleas. Accordingly, the trial court

reasonably found that Legg’s guilty pleas were not entered involuntarily and that Legg did not

suffer from a mistake of material facts. See Holland, 304 Va. at 49 (“Unless plainly wrong or

without evidence to support it, a trial court’s finding on the issue of good faith is a finding of fact to

which appellate courts defer.”).

Furthermore, Legg did not present a reasonable defense to the charges based on principles of

law or “credible testimony, supported by affidavit.” Williams, 59 Va. App. at 249. In fact, Legg

only proffered in support of withdrawing his pleas that he denied committing the crimes against

A.C. Such a summary assertion merely contradicted the Commonwealth’s proffered evidence,

which is insufficient to demonstrate that Legg had a reasonable defense. See, e.g., Ramsey v.

Commonwealth, 65 Va. App. 593, 602 (2015) (holding that defendant’s mere proffer of testimony

that contradicted the Commonwealth’s witness was not a reasonable defense); Bottoms v.

Commonwealth, 281 Va. 23, 33 (2011) (holding that a motion to withdraw must be “premised upon

a reasonable basis that the defendant can present substantive . . . defenses to the charges”). Legg did

not directly challenge any of the assertions within the Commonwealth’s proffer, submit any

-8- evidence that he had a reasonable defense to the charges, or present any case law in support of such

a defense. Rather, he only asserted that he wished to defend himself against the charges in front of a

jury, which does not constitute a reasonable defense. See Coleman v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. App.

284, 293 (2008) (holding that appellant did not present a “reasonable basis for [a] substantive

defense” when he “claimed that he wanted a chance to prove that he was not guilty” at trial); Booker

v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 323, 337 (2012) (noting that “the bare possibility that a juror or jury

would find in favor of appellant at trial, by itself, does not require a trial court to set aside a guilty

plea” (quoting United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 677 (1997))). Likewise, his claim that the

events did not occur, standing alone, is not the basis for a substantive defense. See, e.g., Booker, 61

Va. App. at 335 (noting that the appellant’s statement “without elaboration that ‘it was others’” who

possessed the drugs was insufficient because he “offered no evidence to support anything other than

an insubstantial or ‘formal’ defense”); Williams, 59 Va. at 249 (holding that a reasonable defense “is

not a defense that is based solely upon a challenge to the credibility of a victim’s testimony”).

Accordingly, Legg failed to present a reasonable defense to the charges. Hence, the trial court did

not abuse its discretion in denying Legg’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.

III. CONCLUSION

The record supports the trial court’s denial of Legg’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Affirmed.

-9-