Bender v. USAA General Indemnity Company

Opinion

THE HONORABLE JOHN C. COUGHENOUR 1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE 9 DYLAN BENDER and LINDSAY BENDER, CASE NO. C22-1765-JCC 10 Plaintiffs, ORDER 11 v. 12 USAA GENERAL INDEMNITY COMPANY, 13 Defendant. 14 15 This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration (Dkt. No. 16 60) of the Court’s order granting Defendant summary judgment (Dkt. No. 58). Having 17 considered the motion, the relevant record, and the applicable law, the Court DENIES the 18 motion. 19 Pursuant to the Local Rules, “[m]otions for reconsideration are disfavored,” and the 20 Court “will ordinarily deny such motions in the absence of a showing of manifest error in the 21 prior ruling or a showing of new facts or legal authority which could not have been brought to its 22 attention earlier with reasonable diligence.” LCR 7(h)(1). A manifest error is one that is “plain 23 and indisputable.” Unimax Commc’ns LLC v. T-Mobile USA Inc., 2024 WL 3431165, 24 slip op. at 1 (W.D. Wash. 2024). 25 Plaintiffs’ motion, however, makes no showing of manifest error in the Court’s prior 26 order. As the Court found, the key fact here is that Plaintiff was logged on to the DoorDash

ORDER 1 application and available as a delivery driver at the time of the automobile accident. (Dkt. No. 58 2 at 2) (see also Dkt. No. 42-4 at 3) (DoorDash time log). Plaintiffs misconstrue the meaning of 3 “availability” as a factual dispute. (Dkt. No. 60 at 2.) But interpretation of the insurance policy 4 and its terms is a legal question, McDonald v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 837 P.2d 1000, 5 1003 (Wash. 1992), and one the Court resolved against them. (See Dkt. No. 58 at 4–5.) Plaintiffs 6 cannot now invent factual disputes over the DoorDash application when these were resolved on 7 the record. (See Dkt. Nos. 43-2 at 17, 51 at 2.) And Plaintiffs certainly should not misquote the 8 Court. (See Dkt. No. 60 at 3) (misattributing the word “admitted” to the Court’s prior order). The 9 Court correctly found that the key facts were not in dispute, (Dkt. No. 58 at 1–3), and does not 10 find now that its prior order suffered from manifest factual errors. 11 This only leaves the possibility of a legal error, and Plaintiffs submit several. For one, 12 Plaintiffs contend that the policy was ambiguous as to the ride sharing exclusion. (Dkt. No. 60 at 13 5–7.) But the Court already considered these arguments, (see Dkt. No. 58 at 4) (finding that the 14 policy set an unambiguous, objective standard for availability), and will not “rethink what it 15 ha[s] already thought through.” Hill v. Xerox Bus. Srvs., LLC, 2024 WL 2943821, slip op. at 1 16 (W.D. Wash. 2024). Plaintiffs also try to relitigate the propriety of Defendant’s initial denial of 17 the insurance claim, (Dkt. No. 60 at 4), but it was supported by contemporary and subsequent 18 evidence, which Defendant reasonably investigated at each new submission. (See Dkt. No. 58 at 19 6.) Again, there was no “fail[ure] to investigate.” Aecon Bldgs., Inc. v. Zurich N. Am., 572 F. 20 Supp. 2d 1227, 1235 (W.D. Wash 2008). 21 Finally, Plaintiff argues that the Court did not address Defendant’s duty to defend against 22 another driver in the accident, Mr. Cruzan. (Dkt. No. 60 at 7–8.) However, the Court found that 23 “the insurance policy unambiguously excludes coverage here.” (Dkt. No. 58 at 5) (citing Nat’l 24 Sur. Corp. v. Immunex Corp., 297 P.3d 688, 691 (Wash. 2013) (the “duty to defend . . . is not 25 triggered by claims that clearly fall outside the policy”). And a court need only look to the “eight 26 corners” of the insurance policy and the demand letter against the insured to determine whether a

ORDER 1 duty to defend attaches. See Xia v. ProBuilders Specialty Ins. Co., 400 P.3d 1234, 1240 (Wash. 2 2017). Here, the policy was clear: it excludes from coverage drivers that are logged in and 3 available on applications like DoorDash. (Dkt. No. 44-2 at 12.) The demand letter from Mr. 4 Cruzan was also clear: the accident occurred at 9:45 AM on December 1, 2021, with a “Dasher.” 5 (Dkt. No. 55 at 27.) Plaintiff was logged on and available at the time of the accident. Therefore, 6 there are no facts under which Mr. Cruzan could have conceivably raised the duty to defend. See 7 Woo v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 164 P.3d 454, 459 (Wash. 2007). 8 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration (Dkt. No. 60). 9 10 DATED this 7th day of April 2025. A 11 12 13 John C. Coughenour 14 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

ORDER