Bender v. State, No. Cv 98-0575747 (Nov. 30, 2000)

2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 14691
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedNovember 30, 2000
DocketNo. CV 98-0575747
StatusUnpublished

This text of 2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 14691 (Bender v. State, No. Cv 98-0575747 (Nov. 30, 2000)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bender v. State, No. Cv 98-0575747 (Nov. 30, 2000), 2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 14691 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000).

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: CONTEMPT
FACTS
The parties have filed a stipulation of facts and an additional stipulation of facts, both of which the court accepts. They are both attached hereto as Exhibits A and B respectively. In connection with those stipulations the parties have introduced exhibits and at the hearing more were introduced.

LAW
I. JURISDICTION
A. Sovereign Immunity
As the question of sovereign immunity addresses this court's jurisdiction it must be answered whenever raised. Practice Book § CT Page 1469210-33.

The basic rule is that the state may not be sued without its consent.Shay v. Rossi, 253 Conn. 134, 168. For our purposes there are three Connecticut exceptions to that rule. First, the state may consent to such a suit by legislation; Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Assn. v.State, 209 Conn. 679, 684-685; Berger, Lehman Association, Inc. v.State, 178 Conn. 352, 356; second where the claim is for an injunction and it has a constitutional basis, Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615; and third where the claim is for an injunction with factual claims that the state acted in excess of its statutory authority. Id.

It is only with the first exception that we are involved.

The state has consented to participate in arbitration and be bound by the awards. C.G.S. § 52-408.

The state has by legislation agreed that parties to arbitration may apply to this court to vacate, confirm or modify such an award. C.G.S. §§ 52-417, 418, 419, 420 423.

Once such a matter comes to this court the legislature has given this court authority to enter a judgment vacating, confirming, or modifying such an award. C.G.S. §§ 52-417, 418, 419 and 420 and 421. Such judgment is enforceable as if it had been rendered in any civil action.Kolenberg v. Board of Education of the City of Stamford, 206 Conn. 113,122.

Going to our particular action we find that in C.G.S. Chap. 68 employer means the State of Connecticut. C.G.S. § 5-270 (a). Sub-paragraph (b) of that section provides for legislative approval of the Agreement, which was had. It also provides for legislative approval of the award, which was had. Up to this point there is clear legislative intent to bind the state to the terms of the Agreement and to the award.

Finally we come to the question of whether the state can be liable for the enforcement of the award. It is so liable because the legislation makes it clear that the state has approved the award and allowed the law to provide that judgments enforcing awards may be entered against it.

B. Exhaustion of Remedies
We are not involved with the judgment itself but only compliance therewith. Thus we are not involved with a grievance or a failure to comply with an arbitration award. We are only involved with a claim of contempt for failure to comply with a court order. Thus the idea that CT Page 14693 this matter is simply a violation of the award and thus must be sent back to the arbitrators as a violation of the collective bargaining agreement is misdirected.

There is no forum for a remedy for plaintiff other than this court.

This court has jurisdiction.

II. VIOLATION OF COURT ORDER
The award which the court ordered enforced reads as follows:

The Grievant's discharge is rescinded; all references to the discharge will be expunged from the Grievant's personnel files; the Grievant will be reinstated to his former position with full back pay; and the Grievant will be made whole for any and all other earnings or benefits lost as a result of his discharge.

The parties have stipulated that all references to his discharge have been expunged; he has been paid all of his lost wages, given lost leave times, sick time, vacation time and personal days. He has been given pay for all medical and health insurance expenses and proper retirement credits and benefits.

In addition he has been reinstated to his former position as an RTS1. What he claims is that he has not been reinstated to his "status quo ante" of the time of his termination.

The court finds that he has his title back; that he is not in as full control of the people in the Therapeutic Rehabilitation Department as he was; and is not the sole RTS1.

Since the time he left until his return another RTS1 (Martinez) has been put in place.

The job description for RTS1 is, in pertinent part, as of June 23, 1995 as follows:

PURPOSE OF CLASS:

This class is accountable for supervising Rehabilitation Therapists and staff or administration of a professional habilitation/rehabilitation therapy program for physically, mentally and/or emotionally CT Page 14694 handicapped clients in a State facility or institution.

GUIDELINES FOR CLASS USE:

This class may be used in the following ways:

1. In a facility that has no Director or Rehabilitation Therapy Supervisor 2, this class has programmatic and administrative responsibility for a therapy program. Supervision of other employees is not necessary, provided there is supervision of a program in the absence of a Director or Supervisor 2. There may be only one (1) supervisor for the rehabilitation program.

2. When there is a Director or Rehabilitation Therapy Supervisor 2, this class must supervise two (2) or more filled professional therapist positions.

SUPERVISION RECEIVED:

Receives general direction from a Rehabilitation Therapy Supervisor 2, Director of Rehabilitation Therapies or other employee of higher grade.

The parties provided that that job description was in place when plaintiff was separated from state service. The court received no evidence that the description ever changed.

In Exhibit 5 we find that the organizational chart of the Therapeutic Recreation staff at the time of Mr. Bender's termination did not include either a Director of Rehabilitation Therapy Supervisor 2. This is further suggested by Exhibit 13. Thus we are called back to the language of the job description that, "there may be only one (1) supervisor for the rehabilitation program." We now have two.

Plaintiff was on paid leave of absence from April 17, 1996 until he was terminated from his job with defendant on May 1, 1996. He later filed the grievance. The award was issued on October 22, 1997. After plaintiff's discharge Martinez was made a temporary RTS1 for the periods from April 17, 1996 to December 2, 1996 and from May 1, 1997 to October 31, 1997. The defendant claims that she was a permanent RTS1 from November 1, 1997 to date.

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Related

Horton v. Meskill
376 A.2d 359 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1977)
Adams v. Vaill
262 A.2d 169 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1969)
Berger, Lehman Associates, Inc. v. State
422 A.2d 268 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1979)
Blaydes v. Blaydes
446 A.2d 825 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1982)
Kolenberg v. Board of Education
536 A.2d 577 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1988)
Owner-Operators Independent Drivers Ass'n of America v. State
553 A.2d 1104 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1989)
Shay v. Rossi
749 A.2d 1147 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 2000)

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Bluebook (online)
2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 14691, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bender-v-state-no-cv-98-0575747-nov-30-2000-connsuperct-2000.