Bender v. City of St. Ann

36 F.3d 57, 1994 WL 530294
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedOctober 3, 1994
DocketNo. 93-2690
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 36 F.3d 57 (Bender v. City of St. Ann) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bender v. City of St. Ann, 36 F.3d 57, 1994 WL 530294 (8th Cir. 1994).

Opinion

HENLEY, Senior Circuit Judge.

Michael Bender, individually and doing business as Betty’s Deli & Package Liquor (Betty’s Deli), appeals from the district court’s1 order, granting summary judgment in favor of the City of St. Ann, its mayor and budding commissioner, and members of the city’s Board of Aldermen (Board), in this civil rights action. 816 F.Supp. 1372. Bender challenged the constitutionality of the city ordinance regulating commercial signs, and asserted that he was denied procedural due process. We affirm.

Betty’s Deli is located in a small strip shopping center in St. Ann, Missouri. The front of the store faces south, with a parking lot in front of the store. To the north, at the rear of the store, is a parking lot for St. Ann’s Market. A small alley separates Betty’s Deli from the St. Ann’s Market parking lot. Betty’s Deli customers use only the front entrance on the south side of the building. In 1986, the St. Ann Board of Aldermen (Board) passed local Ordinance No. 1212, regulating the number, size, and location of commercial and non-commercial signs. The ordinance provides, in part, that “[e]ach business may have no more than one (1) wall sign on one (1) exterior wall of the building in which the business is located.” St. Ann, Mo., Code of Ordinances § 17-10(2)(a)(2). The ordinance also provides an exception that “[a] business located on a corner lot or a lot with double frontage may have one (1) wall sign on any two (2) exterior walls of the building in which the business is located.” Id. § 17-10(2)(b)(l).2

In September and October 1989, Bender requested the Board’s approval to place additional signs on his business, and he sought a determination that his business premises had double frontage entitling him to two exterior wall signs. His requests were denied. Bender then placed a 3' x 5' readerboard sign, “Busch $5.49,” on the rear of the building. On January 15, 1990, the building commissioner issued Bender a municipal court summons, citing a violation of Ordinance No. [59]*591212. Bender was found guilty of the violation, and appealed to the Circuit Court of St. Louis County, which dismissed the charge on a technicality. Bender then filed this action.

In his complaint, Bender alleged that, despite his requests for a determination that Betty’s Deli had double frontage, he was told that there was no way to appeal St. Ann’s denial of his requests. He claimed a denial of procedural due process.3 He sought compensatory damages, and injunctive and declaratory relief. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing (as to the due process claim) that Bender received notice of the charge by way of a summons issued to him for violating the ordinance, and that he had an opportunity to be heard before the St. Ann’s municipal court.

The district court concluded that the may- or and the Board members were entitled to legislative (i.e., absolute) immunity for their actions in enacting the ordinance. As for the due process claim, the district court concluded that Bender failed to allege what property interest he had, and how this property interest was grounded in state law. The district concluded that, even had Bender established a protected interest, he received all the process he was due, in that he had both notice of his violation and an opportunity to be heard. The district court granted defendants summary judgment, and denied Bender’s subsequent Rule 59(e) motion. On appeal, Bender argues that defending an ordinance violation is not a proper means for determining whether a business owner has a double frontage.

We conclude that a business owner with double frontage has a property interest in having two signs, under section 17-10(2)(b)(1). See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972) (property interests are created by state law); Littlefield v. City of Afton, 785 F.2d 596, 600-02 (8th Cir.1986). Finding a property interest, however, does not end the inquiry. If Bender has double frontage, the next question is what process was Bender due before St. Ann could deny him the right to display a second sign. The Fourteenth Amendment requires “ ‘an opportunity ... granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,’ ‘for [a] hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.’ ” Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 437, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 1159, 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982) (internal citations omitted).

Here, the ordinance requires the building commissioner to issue sign permits upon application, and to seek enforcement of the ordinance by way of notice to owners of their alleged nonconforming status. St. Ann, Mo., Code of Ordinances §§ 17—5(d), 17-11. Bender received written and verbal notice of the alleged violation, and had an opportunity to assert his rights before a neutral decision-maker, before the ordinance was enforced against him. Thus, due process was satisfied.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of. the district court.

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Bender v. City of St. Ann
36 F.3d 57 (Eighth Circuit, 1994)

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Bluebook (online)
36 F.3d 57, 1994 WL 530294, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bender-v-city-of-st-ann-ca8-1994.