1 WO JL 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Renalda Benally, No. CV-24-08049-PCT-MTL (MTM) 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER 12 Coconino County, et al., 13 Defendants.
15 Before the Court is Defendants Coconino County, Coconino County Jail District, 16 Navajo County, Navajo County Jail District, Axlund, Clouse, Driscoll, Garcia, and 17 O’Brien’s Motion for Entry of Judgment under Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 18 Procedure. (Doc. 132.) 19 I. Procedural History 20 On March 12, 2024, Plaintiff Renalda Benally, on her own behalf and on behalf of 21 the estate of Gibson Benally, filed a Complaint asserting claims under § 1983 and related 22 state-law claims regarding the death of her father, Gibson Benally (“Benally”), while he 23 was in the custody of Navajo and Coconino Counties. On July 12, 2024, certain Defendants 24 filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal 25 Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 58.) 26 On July 30, 2024, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) asserting § 1983 27 medical care claims and related state-law claims. (Doc. 65.) As relevant here, in Count 28 One, Plaintiff alleged that Benally’s injuries were caused by Navajo County policies and 1 widespread practices that “flourished” because Navajo County, Navajo County Jail 2 District, Clouse, and Garcia were indifferent to them. (Id.¶ 77.) 3 In Count Two, Plaintiff claimed Defendants James, Lawver, Cersosimo, Wolfe, 4 Fraser, and O’Brien were aware of Benally’s serious medical needs and the risk of harm to 5 Benally if he did not receive appropriate medical care, but despite that knowledge, 6 Defendants failed to provide Benally with proper medical care or access to medical care or 7 intervene to provide such care. (FAC ¶ 79.) Plaintiff alternatively alleged that Benally’s 8 injuries were caused by policies and practices of Defendants Coconino County, Coconino 9 County Jail District, Driscoll, Axlund, and Hirsch. (Id. ¶ 83.) 10 Defendants Coconino County, Coconino County Jail District, Navajo County, 11 Navajo County Jail District, Axlund, Cersosimo, Clouse, Driscoll, Fraser, Garcia, Hirsch, 12 James, Lawver, O’Brien, and Wolfe filed a Motion to Dismiss the FAC for failure to state 13 a claim. (Doc. 74.) After briefing, in a March 18, 2025 Order, the Court denied the Motion 14 to Dismiss the original Complaint as moot and granted the Motion to Dismiss the FAC in 15 part and denied it in part. (Doc. 100). As relevant here, the Court denied the Motion to 16 Dismiss as to the Fourteenth Amendment medical care claim in Count Two against 17 Defendants Fraser and James and granted the Motion in all other respects. (Id. at 26.) The 18 Court dismissed Count One and Defendants Navajo County, Navajo County Jail District, 19 Coconino County, Coconino County Jail District, Driscoll, Axlund, Clouse, Garcia, 20 Lawver, Cersosimo, Wolfe, O’Brien, and Hirsch without prejudice. (Id.) 21 On April 23, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend/Correct, seeking leave to file 22 a second amended complaint. (Doc. 102.) Defendants opposed the Motion. (Docs. 106, 23 107, 108, 109, 110.) In a July 24, 2025 Order, the Magistrate Judge denied Plaintiff’s 24 Motion to Amend/Correct. (Doc. 129.) Plaintiff did not object to the Order. 25 II. Defendants’ Motion 26 Defendants Coconino County, Coconino County Jail District, Navajo County, 27 Navajo County Jail District, Axlund, Clouse, Driscoll, Garcia, and O’Brien ask the Court 28 to enter final judgment as to the claims against them. (Doc. 132 at 1.) Defendants argue 1 that the Magistrate Judge’s denial of Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended 2 complaint “foreclosed any possibility of Plaintiff being able to bring or resurrect previously 3 dismissed claims against Dismissed Detention Defendants.” (Id. at 2.) They contend there 4 is “no just reason to delay” entry of judgment because the claims against them are 5 “separate, distinct, and separable from the [] claims against the remaining Defendants,” 6 which “all pertain to the provision of medical care by medical provider Defendants.” (Id. 7 at 3.) 8 III. Legal Standard 9 Pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[w]hen an action 10 presents more than one claim for relief . . . or when multiple parties are involved, the court 11 may direct entry of final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties 12 only if the court determines there is no just reason for delay.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Rule 13 54(b) “was adopted ‘specifically to avoid the possible injustice of delay[ing] judgment o[n] 14 a distinctly separate claim [pending] adjudication of the entire case . . . . The Rule thus 15 aimed to augment, not diminish, appeal opportunity.’” Jewel v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 810 16 F.3d 622, 628 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp., 574 U.S. 405, 409 17 (2015)). Nonetheless, “whether a final decision on a claim is ready for appeal is a different 18 inquiry from the equities involved, for consideration of judicial administrative interests ‘is 19 necessary to assure that application of the Rule effectively ‘preserves the historic federal 20 policy against piecemeal appeals.’” Wood v. GCC Bend, LLC, 422 F.3d 873, 878 (9th Cir. 21 2005) (citation omitted). 22 The Court must determine (1) whether it has rendered a judgment that is “an ultimate 23 disposition of an individual claim entered in the course of a multiple claims action”; and 24 (2) whether there is no just reason for delay. Id. at 878. “It is left to the sound judicial 25 discretion of the district court to determine the ‘appropriate time’ when each final decision 26 in a multiple claims action is ready for appeal.” Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 27 446 U.S. 1, 8 (1980) (internal citation omitted). In making this determination, it is proper 28 for courts to consider “whether the claims under review were separable from the others 1 remaining to be adjudicated and whether the nature of the claims already determined was 2 such that no appellate court would have to decide the same issues more than once even if 3 there were subsequent appeals.” Id.; see also Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Archer, 655 F.2d 4 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1981) (“A similarity of legal or factual issues will weigh heavily against 5 entry of judgment under the rule, and in such cases a Rule 54(b) order will be proper only 6 where necessary to avoid a harsh and unjust result, documented by further and specific 7 findings”). 8 IV. Discussion 9 Even if Plaintiff cannot revive the dismissed claims against Defendants, that does 10 not end the Court’s inquiry. Defendants contend that because they are “detention 11 employees,” they are unlike the remaining Defendants and claims, “which all pertain to the 12 provision of medical care by medical provider Defendants.” (Doc. 132 at 3.) Defendants’ 13 argument is unpersuasive. Although there are some distinct reasons for the dismissal of 14 some of the claims that may not overlap with the remaining claims in this action, all the 15 claims in this action arise from the same set of facts, the legal issues are similar, and none 16 of the claims are complicated. Indeed, counsel for these Defendants also represent 17 Defendants Hirsch, Lawver, and Wolfe, medical care providers who were also dismissed 18 but who are not among the Defendants seeking entry of judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) 19 in this Motion.
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1 WO JL 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Renalda Benally, No. CV-24-08049-PCT-MTL (MTM) 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER 12 Coconino County, et al., 13 Defendants.
15 Before the Court is Defendants Coconino County, Coconino County Jail District, 16 Navajo County, Navajo County Jail District, Axlund, Clouse, Driscoll, Garcia, and 17 O’Brien’s Motion for Entry of Judgment under Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 18 Procedure. (Doc. 132.) 19 I. Procedural History 20 On March 12, 2024, Plaintiff Renalda Benally, on her own behalf and on behalf of 21 the estate of Gibson Benally, filed a Complaint asserting claims under § 1983 and related 22 state-law claims regarding the death of her father, Gibson Benally (“Benally”), while he 23 was in the custody of Navajo and Coconino Counties. On July 12, 2024, certain Defendants 24 filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal 25 Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 58.) 26 On July 30, 2024, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) asserting § 1983 27 medical care claims and related state-law claims. (Doc. 65.) As relevant here, in Count 28 One, Plaintiff alleged that Benally’s injuries were caused by Navajo County policies and 1 widespread practices that “flourished” because Navajo County, Navajo County Jail 2 District, Clouse, and Garcia were indifferent to them. (Id.¶ 77.) 3 In Count Two, Plaintiff claimed Defendants James, Lawver, Cersosimo, Wolfe, 4 Fraser, and O’Brien were aware of Benally’s serious medical needs and the risk of harm to 5 Benally if he did not receive appropriate medical care, but despite that knowledge, 6 Defendants failed to provide Benally with proper medical care or access to medical care or 7 intervene to provide such care. (FAC ¶ 79.) Plaintiff alternatively alleged that Benally’s 8 injuries were caused by policies and practices of Defendants Coconino County, Coconino 9 County Jail District, Driscoll, Axlund, and Hirsch. (Id. ¶ 83.) 10 Defendants Coconino County, Coconino County Jail District, Navajo County, 11 Navajo County Jail District, Axlund, Cersosimo, Clouse, Driscoll, Fraser, Garcia, Hirsch, 12 James, Lawver, O’Brien, and Wolfe filed a Motion to Dismiss the FAC for failure to state 13 a claim. (Doc. 74.) After briefing, in a March 18, 2025 Order, the Court denied the Motion 14 to Dismiss the original Complaint as moot and granted the Motion to Dismiss the FAC in 15 part and denied it in part. (Doc. 100). As relevant here, the Court denied the Motion to 16 Dismiss as to the Fourteenth Amendment medical care claim in Count Two against 17 Defendants Fraser and James and granted the Motion in all other respects. (Id. at 26.) The 18 Court dismissed Count One and Defendants Navajo County, Navajo County Jail District, 19 Coconino County, Coconino County Jail District, Driscoll, Axlund, Clouse, Garcia, 20 Lawver, Cersosimo, Wolfe, O’Brien, and Hirsch without prejudice. (Id.) 21 On April 23, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend/Correct, seeking leave to file 22 a second amended complaint. (Doc. 102.) Defendants opposed the Motion. (Docs. 106, 23 107, 108, 109, 110.) In a July 24, 2025 Order, the Magistrate Judge denied Plaintiff’s 24 Motion to Amend/Correct. (Doc. 129.) Plaintiff did not object to the Order. 25 II. Defendants’ Motion 26 Defendants Coconino County, Coconino County Jail District, Navajo County, 27 Navajo County Jail District, Axlund, Clouse, Driscoll, Garcia, and O’Brien ask the Court 28 to enter final judgment as to the claims against them. (Doc. 132 at 1.) Defendants argue 1 that the Magistrate Judge’s denial of Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended 2 complaint “foreclosed any possibility of Plaintiff being able to bring or resurrect previously 3 dismissed claims against Dismissed Detention Defendants.” (Id. at 2.) They contend there 4 is “no just reason to delay” entry of judgment because the claims against them are 5 “separate, distinct, and separable from the [] claims against the remaining Defendants,” 6 which “all pertain to the provision of medical care by medical provider Defendants.” (Id. 7 at 3.) 8 III. Legal Standard 9 Pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[w]hen an action 10 presents more than one claim for relief . . . or when multiple parties are involved, the court 11 may direct entry of final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties 12 only if the court determines there is no just reason for delay.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Rule 13 54(b) “was adopted ‘specifically to avoid the possible injustice of delay[ing] judgment o[n] 14 a distinctly separate claim [pending] adjudication of the entire case . . . . The Rule thus 15 aimed to augment, not diminish, appeal opportunity.’” Jewel v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 810 16 F.3d 622, 628 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp., 574 U.S. 405, 409 17 (2015)). Nonetheless, “whether a final decision on a claim is ready for appeal is a different 18 inquiry from the equities involved, for consideration of judicial administrative interests ‘is 19 necessary to assure that application of the Rule effectively ‘preserves the historic federal 20 policy against piecemeal appeals.’” Wood v. GCC Bend, LLC, 422 F.3d 873, 878 (9th Cir. 21 2005) (citation omitted). 22 The Court must determine (1) whether it has rendered a judgment that is “an ultimate 23 disposition of an individual claim entered in the course of a multiple claims action”; and 24 (2) whether there is no just reason for delay. Id. at 878. “It is left to the sound judicial 25 discretion of the district court to determine the ‘appropriate time’ when each final decision 26 in a multiple claims action is ready for appeal.” Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 27 446 U.S. 1, 8 (1980) (internal citation omitted). In making this determination, it is proper 28 for courts to consider “whether the claims under review were separable from the others 1 remaining to be adjudicated and whether the nature of the claims already determined was 2 such that no appellate court would have to decide the same issues more than once even if 3 there were subsequent appeals.” Id.; see also Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Archer, 655 F.2d 4 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1981) (“A similarity of legal or factual issues will weigh heavily against 5 entry of judgment under the rule, and in such cases a Rule 54(b) order will be proper only 6 where necessary to avoid a harsh and unjust result, documented by further and specific 7 findings”). 8 IV. Discussion 9 Even if Plaintiff cannot revive the dismissed claims against Defendants, that does 10 not end the Court’s inquiry. Defendants contend that because they are “detention 11 employees,” they are unlike the remaining Defendants and claims, “which all pertain to the 12 provision of medical care by medical provider Defendants.” (Doc. 132 at 3.) Defendants’ 13 argument is unpersuasive. Although there are some distinct reasons for the dismissal of 14 some of the claims that may not overlap with the remaining claims in this action, all the 15 claims in this action arise from the same set of facts, the legal issues are similar, and none 16 of the claims are complicated. Indeed, counsel for these Defendants also represent 17 Defendants Hirsch, Lawver, and Wolfe, medical care providers who were also dismissed 18 but who are not among the Defendants seeking entry of judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) 19 in this Motion. Furthermore, Coconino County and Navajo County are not “detention 20 employees,” and the claims against them are intertwined with the medical care claims. 21 In determining whether Rule 54(b) certification is appropriate and in the interests of 22 sound judicial administration, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has repeatedly cautioned 23 district courts not to enter Rule 54(b) certification in “ordinary situations.” See, e.g., Wood, 24 422 F.3d at 879; Jewel, 810 F.3d at 628-29. As the Ninth Circuit in Wood observed, in 25 “routine” civil rights actions such as this, “it is typical for several claims to be made, based 26 on both state and federal law, and for several theories . . . to be pursued.” Id. In such cases, 27 requesting or granting a request for certification under Rule 54(b) “is not routine [and] 28 should not become so.” 422 F.3d at 879. This is an ordinary situation in which a court “trim[s] and prune[s] a case to focus on what really is at issue for trial,” id., and Defendants 2| have not shown they will suffer a “harsh and unjust result” if the Court does not enter Judgment, see Morrison-Knudsen, 655 F.2d at 965. The Court cannot conclude there is no 4] just reason for delay. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion will be denied. 5| ITIS ORDERED: 6 (1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Defendants 7 | Coconino County, Coconino County Jail District, Navajo County, Navajo County Jail 8 | District, Axlund, Clouse, Driscoll, Garcia, and O’Brien’s Motion for Entry of Judgment under Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 132). 10 (2) Defendants Coconino County, Coconino County Jail District, Navajo 11 | County, Navajo County Jail District, Axlund, Clouse, Driscoll, Garcia, and O’Brien’s 12 | Motion for Entry of Judgment under Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 13 | (Doc. 132) is denied. 14 Dated this 2nd day of September, 2025. 15 Micha T. Sihurde Michael T. Liburdi 18 United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28