[835]*835JOSEPH, C. J.
This is an appeal by an insured party from judgments in favor of its insurers, Royal Globe Insurance Company (Royal Globe) and St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company (St. Paul), in an action to recover insurance proceeds for insured fire losses. Defendants asserted that plaintiffs action is barred by the one-year limitation period in the defendants’ policies and ORS 743.660.1 Plaintiff asserted an estoppel against the insurers’ reliance on the limitation. The trial court found for the insurers on both issues. We affirm.
On February 7, 1977, plaintiffs place of business was damaged by fire. Immediately after the fire and on demand by the plaintiff, St. Paul made a $7,500 “advance payment” to plaintiff; Royal Globe made an “advance payment” of the same amount in March, 1977. Extensive correspondence and deliberations among adjusters, agents and attorneys for the parties took place concerning the amounts of defendants’ liabilities. In its proofs of loss filed with the insurers in June and July, 1977,2 plaintiff claimed from each insurer one-half of $112,182 for stock and inventory loss, $13,580 for equipment loss, and $44,000 for “business interruption.” The insurers contended that recovery for the inventory and equipment losses was limited under the policies’ terms to the amounts reflected in the most recent monthly report filed by plaintiff and, therefore, could not exceed the $44,850 amount shown on plaintiffs December, 1976, report. Plaintiff disagreed. The attorneys for the parties considered the possibility of a proceeding under ORS chapter 27 to resolve the controversy [836]*836over the limit on compensation for the inventory and equipment losses. Also, the insurers considered the claim for business interruption to be excessive. St. Paul clearly demanded an appraisal. ORS 743.648. The parties disagree about whether Royal Globe also demanded an appraisal and whether St. Paul’s demand pertained only to the business interruption claim or to all claims. On September 7, 1977, and December 13, 1977, respectively, St. Paul and Royal Globe, again at the request of plaintiff, transmitted payments of $30,540.68 to plaintiffs attorney, and both insurers then asserted that those payments, together with their earlier advances, constituted full payment of all sums owed plaintiff for its losses.
Plaintiff filed this action on the insurance contract on June 5, 1978 — more than one year after the fire.3 St. Paul and Royal Globe interposed the limitation period as an affirmative defense. Plaintiff argued that the running of the limitation period was suspended under ORS 12.1554 by the insurers’ tender of the advance payments and also that the insurers were estopped by their conduct to assert the limitation. Plaintiff assigns error to the trial court’s rejection of both contentions.5
[837]*837Defendants do not contend that they notified plaintiff “of the date of expiration of the period of limitation” at any time which would have permitted that period to expire under ORS 12.155(2) before the action was brought. They do contend that the limitation period expired, notwithstanding their failure to so notify plaintiff, because ORS 12.155 is not applicble to this kind of case. All parties acknowledge that the statute applies to advance payments made by insurers upon claims by third parties against insureds. See Duncan v. Dubin, 276 Or 631, 556 P2d 105 (1976). However, defendants argue that ORS 12.155 does not extend to payments made by insurers to their own insureds who have sustained injury or loss. Plaintiff argues that ORS 12.155 is clear and unambiguous and, on its face, applies to both situations. The question is one of first impression.
In Duncan v. Dubin, supra, the only case in which ORS 12.155 has previously been interpreted,6 the insurer made an advance payment to the plaintiff for property damage which resulted from an automobile accident between plaintiff and the defendant insured. Although the payment was made only on the property damage claim, the Supreme Court held that the tolling effect of ORS 12.155 also extended to plaintiffs claim for personal injuries. In Duncan, the Court said:
“A review of the legislative history and an examination of the language of ORS 12.155 and 41.950 reveals that the legislation had a two-fold purpose. One was to allow an insurer to make advance payments without admitting liability for a claim and to encourage such payments by eliminating any apprehension on the part of the insurer that evidence of advance payments could be admissible in court to prove liability. The other objective, which is clearly discernible, was to protect an injured party from being misled into believing that a limitation period upon his [838]*838claim is no longer applicable because the insurer has, in effect, acknowledged that its insured is liable for the claim. See Hearings on House Bill 1299 before the Subcommittee on Financial Affairs of the House State and Federal Affairs Committee, February 24, 1971. Insurance Commissioner Bateson testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee on May 10, 1971, as follows:
“ ‘Section 5 deals with a problem inherent in a complicated and extensive personal injury case where the insurance company makes advance disability payments. In that situation it would be entirely possible for the statute to run and then the company could say, “That’s too bad; you didn’t file suit and the statute of limitations has expired.” House Bill 1299 therefore required that within 30 days after advance payment is made, there must be a notification to the payee that the statute may be running and the making of the advance payments does not suspend it. If there is no such notice, the statute is tolled between the time of the first payment and the time the first notice is actually given.’
“The final bill passed by the legislature and codified in ORS 12.155 provides that an advance payment for personal injury, death, or property damages tolls the applicable statute of limitation when written notice of the expiration date of the statute is not given by the insurer within 30 days after the payment is made.
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[835]*835JOSEPH, C. J.
This is an appeal by an insured party from judgments in favor of its insurers, Royal Globe Insurance Company (Royal Globe) and St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company (St. Paul), in an action to recover insurance proceeds for insured fire losses. Defendants asserted that plaintiffs action is barred by the one-year limitation period in the defendants’ policies and ORS 743.660.1 Plaintiff asserted an estoppel against the insurers’ reliance on the limitation. The trial court found for the insurers on both issues. We affirm.
On February 7, 1977, plaintiffs place of business was damaged by fire. Immediately after the fire and on demand by the plaintiff, St. Paul made a $7,500 “advance payment” to plaintiff; Royal Globe made an “advance payment” of the same amount in March, 1977. Extensive correspondence and deliberations among adjusters, agents and attorneys for the parties took place concerning the amounts of defendants’ liabilities. In its proofs of loss filed with the insurers in June and July, 1977,2 plaintiff claimed from each insurer one-half of $112,182 for stock and inventory loss, $13,580 for equipment loss, and $44,000 for “business interruption.” The insurers contended that recovery for the inventory and equipment losses was limited under the policies’ terms to the amounts reflected in the most recent monthly report filed by plaintiff and, therefore, could not exceed the $44,850 amount shown on plaintiffs December, 1976, report. Plaintiff disagreed. The attorneys for the parties considered the possibility of a proceeding under ORS chapter 27 to resolve the controversy [836]*836over the limit on compensation for the inventory and equipment losses. Also, the insurers considered the claim for business interruption to be excessive. St. Paul clearly demanded an appraisal. ORS 743.648. The parties disagree about whether Royal Globe also demanded an appraisal and whether St. Paul’s demand pertained only to the business interruption claim or to all claims. On September 7, 1977, and December 13, 1977, respectively, St. Paul and Royal Globe, again at the request of plaintiff, transmitted payments of $30,540.68 to plaintiffs attorney, and both insurers then asserted that those payments, together with their earlier advances, constituted full payment of all sums owed plaintiff for its losses.
Plaintiff filed this action on the insurance contract on June 5, 1978 — more than one year after the fire.3 St. Paul and Royal Globe interposed the limitation period as an affirmative defense. Plaintiff argued that the running of the limitation period was suspended under ORS 12.1554 by the insurers’ tender of the advance payments and also that the insurers were estopped by their conduct to assert the limitation. Plaintiff assigns error to the trial court’s rejection of both contentions.5
[837]*837Defendants do not contend that they notified plaintiff “of the date of expiration of the period of limitation” at any time which would have permitted that period to expire under ORS 12.155(2) before the action was brought. They do contend that the limitation period expired, notwithstanding their failure to so notify plaintiff, because ORS 12.155 is not applicble to this kind of case. All parties acknowledge that the statute applies to advance payments made by insurers upon claims by third parties against insureds. See Duncan v. Dubin, 276 Or 631, 556 P2d 105 (1976). However, defendants argue that ORS 12.155 does not extend to payments made by insurers to their own insureds who have sustained injury or loss. Plaintiff argues that ORS 12.155 is clear and unambiguous and, on its face, applies to both situations. The question is one of first impression.
In Duncan v. Dubin, supra, the only case in which ORS 12.155 has previously been interpreted,6 the insurer made an advance payment to the plaintiff for property damage which resulted from an automobile accident between plaintiff and the defendant insured. Although the payment was made only on the property damage claim, the Supreme Court held that the tolling effect of ORS 12.155 also extended to plaintiffs claim for personal injuries. In Duncan, the Court said:
“A review of the legislative history and an examination of the language of ORS 12.155 and 41.950 reveals that the legislation had a two-fold purpose. One was to allow an insurer to make advance payments without admitting liability for a claim and to encourage such payments by eliminating any apprehension on the part of the insurer that evidence of advance payments could be admissible in court to prove liability. The other objective, which is clearly discernible, was to protect an injured party from being misled into believing that a limitation period upon his [838]*838claim is no longer applicable because the insurer has, in effect, acknowledged that its insured is liable for the claim. See Hearings on House Bill 1299 before the Subcommittee on Financial Affairs of the House State and Federal Affairs Committee, February 24, 1971. Insurance Commissioner Bateson testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee on May 10, 1971, as follows:
“ ‘Section 5 deals with a problem inherent in a complicated and extensive personal injury case where the insurance company makes advance disability payments. In that situation it would be entirely possible for the statute to run and then the company could say, “That’s too bad; you didn’t file suit and the statute of limitations has expired.” House Bill 1299 therefore required that within 30 days after advance payment is made, there must be a notification to the payee that the statute may be running and the making of the advance payments does not suspend it. If there is no such notice, the statute is tolled between the time of the first payment and the time the first notice is actually given.’
“The final bill passed by the legislature and codified in ORS 12.155 provides that an advance payment for personal injury, death, or property damages tolls the applicable statute of limitation when written notice of the expiration date of the statute is not given by the insurer within 30 days after the payment is made. Thus, it is clear that the legislature intended to protect a person from being ‘lulled’ into falsely believing there is no limitation on when he can commence an action for property damage has been made. However, whether the legislature intended that an advance payment for property damage operates to suspend the statute of limitations applicable to an action for personal injury under the circumstances presented in this case cannot be ascertained with certainty from the legislative history of ORS 12.144 or 41.950 or from any additional aids in statutory construction.
“It is very likely that the legislature did not anticipate the problem presented in this case. We are of the opinion that the legislative objective of protecting injured parties who receive advance payments from being misled into not timely pressing a claim until the statute of limitations period has expired equally applies to an injured party receiving an advance payment for property damage while a claim for personal injury is pending against the same [839]*839party as a result of the same accident. Had the legislature anticipated this problem, we believe it would have required that notice of both periods of limitation be given under the circumstances here presented. A contrary holding would be at odds with the legislative intent that advance payment not mislead an injured party into believing that he need not diligently press his claim.” 276 Or at 636-38.
The whole thrust of that quotation is that the statute was designed to protect third-party payees and liability insurers, while at the same time encouraging payments in advance of the determination of the extent of ultimte liability, if any. That is peculiarly a third-party situation. That is to say, the public policy considerations for encouraging advance payments to persons injured by or suffering property damage from the actions of insureds are quite different from the public policy considerations that might be involved in encouraging settlements of disputes between insurers and their insureds. The language in Duncan is pregnant with the former sort of considerations; it has no bearing on the latter sort of considerations. The language of Duncan is relevant to this case, however, even though it involved only a third-party claim, because it contains the substance of the legislative history that indicates the limited reach of the statutes.
The language of ORS 12.155 and the other related advance payment statutes7 clearly indicates that the legislation applies when an advance payment is made by an [840]*840insurer to a person making a claim against its insured. If the words in the statute were not themselves clear on that point, the legislative history quoted in Duncan effectively demonstrates that the legislation was designed with only the insurer third-party situation in mind. The issue then is whether the words used will sustain a broader application of the statute.
[841]*841We note, first, that ORS 12.155 contains a cross-reference to ORS 41.960 and 41.970 and refers “to each person entitled to recover damages for the death, injury or destruction * * * .” ORS 41.970 refers to “damages arising from injury or destruction of property” and “admission of liability for the injury or destruction.” The definition of “advance payment” in ORS 41.950 is “compensation for the injury or death of a person or the injury or destruction of propety prior to the determination of legal liability therefor.” All of the terminology “sounds in tort.” Moreover ORS 18.510 has only a tort damage claim context.8 Plaintiffs action here is an action on the insurance contract; it is not an action “for damages arising from injury or destruction of property” as between this plaintiff and its insurer.
We hold that the payments made by the insurers here are not subject to the provisions of ORS 12.155.
Plaintiff maintains that it is entitled to a de novo review of the trial court’s disposition of its claim that the defendants are estopped by their conduct to assert the limitation of action defense. They rely primarily on Coldiron v. McKenzie, 260 Or 237, 241, 490 P2d 976 (1971), and Nedry v. Morgan, 284 Or 65, 584 P2d 1381 (1978). In Coldiron the issue was whether a notice of appeal from a judgment in a law action was sufficient to give the Supreme COurt jurisdiction to review a decree issued earlier in the same case on an equitable affirmative defense of estoppel and from which no appeal was taken. The Supreme Court held that the former requirement that a party appeal from a decree and separately appeal from a judgment rendered in the same cause should be abrogated. The [842]*842case has no bearing on the current problem. In Nedry the appeal was limited to defendants’ equitable counterclaim in the nature of a suit to quiet title. De novo review was appropriate because only the equity side of the case was pursued on appeal. That case is wholly unlike the instant one. Instead, this case is controlled by the holding in Holman Transfer Co. v. PNB Telephone Co., 287 Or 387, 391-92, 599 P2d 1115 (1979). There, as here, the plaintiff in a law action alleged that the defendant was estopped to rely on the statute of limitations. There, unlike here, the trial court sustained the claim of estoppel. On appeal the defendant argued that the trial court’s decision on the estoppel was subject to de novo review. The court said:
“Bell’s position is not correct. Although the concept of estoppel is equitable in origin, it may be relied upon in an action at law without the interposition of a court of equity. ‡ ‡ ‡ »
The court went on to hold that in the absence of an objection to the sufficiency of the evidence, there was nothing before the court to review. Findings of fact by a trial court sitting as the trier of fact have the same legal effect as a jury verdict. ORCP 62F; former ORS 17.435. In its memorandum opinion the trial court here said:
¡<* * * jsgues herein, however, must be decided upon the basis of the burden of proof. It is axiomatic that when the evidence is equally balanced the proponent has failed to carry the burden.
“* * * [Pjlaintiff has not established the affirmative defenses raised by its reply.”
That general finding cannot be reviewed by us.9
Affirmed.