Ben E. Marenco Versus State of Louisiana
This text of Ben E. Marenco Versus State of Louisiana (Ben E. Marenco Versus State of Louisiana) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
BEN E. MARENCO NO. 24-KH-579
VERSUS FIFTH CIRCUIT
STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF LOUISIANA
February 14, 2025
Linda Wiseman First Deputy Clerk
IN RE BEN E. MARENCO
APPLYING FOR SUPERVISORY WRIT FROM THE TWENTY-FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF JEFFERSON, STATE OF LOUISIANA, DIRECTED TO THE HONORABLE E. ADRIAN ADAMS, DIVISION "G", NUMBER 14-5074
Panel composed of Judges Fredericka Homberg Wicker, John J. Molaison, Jr., and Scott U. Schlegel
WRIT DENIED
This matter is before us on an Application for Supervisory Writ (the
“Application”) filed herein by Ben E. Marenco, wherein he requests that we reverse
the district court’s ruling denying Mr. Marenco’s Motion to Set Aside Guilty Plea
Pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. 926.2 and La. C.Cr.P. 559 (the “Motion”). This is the second
time Mr. Marenco has come before this Court challenging his plea of guilty to the
charge of forcible rape (La. R.S. 14:42.1), entered under United States v. Alford, 400
U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed. 2d 162 (1970)1 on March 25, 2015.2 On June 17,
2017, more than two years after his guilty plea and sentence, Mr. Marenco filed an
1 An Alford plea is one in which the defendant pleads guilty while maintaining his innocence because he believes it to be in his best interest. See State v. McCoil, 05-658 (La. App, 5 Cir. 2/27/00), 924 So.2d 1120, 1122-23. 2 Mr., Marenco was sentenced to 20 years at hard labor without benefits of parole, probation or suspension of sentence on his conviction on the forcible rape charge. He had not challenged this sentence in the instant writ application.
24-KH-579 Ex Parte Motion for Special Proceeding, asking the district court to reinstate his
appeal rights and was granted an out of time appeal.
On direct appeal, Mr. Marenco appealed only his conviction and sentence
resulting from his guilty plea to the charge of forcible rape under Alford, although
he had also entered guilty pleas at the same time to charges of cyberstalking (La.
R.S. 14:40.3), simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling (La. R.S. 14:62.2), and being
a convicted felon in possession of a firearm (La. R.S. 14:95.1). Appellate counsel
was appointed to represent him and filed a brief under State v. Bradford, 95-929 (La.
App. 5 Cir. 6/25/96), 676 So.2d1108, 1110-11, asserting that counsel had thoroughly
reviewed the record and found no non-frivolous issues for appeal. See State v.
Marenco, 17-418, p.1 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/27/17), 236 So.3d 784, 786. This Court,
after careful review of the record agreed with Mr. Marenco’s appellate counsel and
affirmed his conviction and sentence for forcible rape. 17-418, p. 11, 236 So.2d at
792.3 Mr. Marenco did not seek further appellate review.
On June 17, 2024, Mr. Marenco filed the Motion in the district court,
contending therein that: (1) his guilty plea to the charge of forcible rape was
involuntary because his counsel did not inform the district court that his plea was
being entered under Alford, prior to his admission of guilt; and (2) that the State had
failed to provide a sufficient factual basis for his plea. Finding the Motion, in
substance, to be an untimely application for post-conviction relief, the district court
denied the Motion by Order entered September 20, 2024. The district court further
noted that Mr. Marenco’s guilty plea had been made pursuant to Alford, as reflected
in the minute entry/hard labor commitment and in the opinion of this Court on Mr.
Marenco’s direct appeal.
3 We also granted appellate counsel’s request to withdraw pursuant to State v. Jyles, 96-2669 (La. 12/12/97), 704 So.2d 241 (per curiam) and remanded the matter for the correction of an error patent in the minute entry/commitment and the Uniform Commitment Order. Id. 2 Mr. Marenco has not attached any notice of intent to seek supervisory writs
and documentation of a return date to his Application, as required by Uniform Rules
– Courts of Appeal, Rule 4-3 and 4-5(C)(11). Under Rule 4-3, any application for
writs that does not contain documentation of the return date and any extension
thereof may not be considered by the Court of Appeal.4
Nevertheless, after reviewing Mr. Marenco’s Application we find, as did the
district court, that the Motion, in substance, was an untimely application for post-
conviction relief. Under La. C.Cr.P. art. 930(A), an application for post-conviction
relief must be filed within two years after the defendant’s conviction and sentence
become final. Mr. Marenco’s conviction and sentence became final in January,
2018, after he failed to seek further appellate relief following this Court’s judgment
on his direct appeal, rendered December 27, 2017.
Mr. Marenco contends that he is entitled to pursue his claims under La.
C.Cr.P. art. 930.8(A)(1) based on newly discovered facts, i.e., that he was unaware
that he had “inadvertently” admitted guilt to charge as to which he intended to
maintain his innocence until he was so informed by Inmate Counsel Substitute after
his incarceration. Mr. Marenco’s reliance on Article 930.8(A) may be construed as
an admission on his part that the Motion is an application for post-conviction relief.5
Mr. Marenco’s is not entitled to submit an out-of-time application for post-
conviction relief under Article 930.8(A)(1) on the stated grounds, which were
considered and rejected in Mr. Marenco’s direct appeal to this Court, wherein this
Court has found that: (1) Mr. Marenco’s guilty plea to the charge of forcible rape
was made and accepted pursuant to Alford; (2) was entered into voluntarily and
4 See State v. Niolais, 24-408 (La. App. 5th Cir. 9/5/24), 2024 WL 4063885 (writ considered by this Court despite failure of applicant to attach notice of intent and return date, as well as other pleadings required under Rule 4-5(C)). 5 In his Conclusion, Mr. Marenco admits that the district court “correctly stated that no relief may be considered if it is filed more than two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final unless one of four very restricted exceptions apply in which the Defendant respectfully stresses is the case in this matter pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8(A)(1).” 3 intelligently, (3) the factual basis provided by the State to the district court was
sufficient; and (4) his sentence was within the range provided by La. R.S. 14:42.1.
Marenco, 17-418, pp. 7-10; 236 So.3d at 788-792.
Even if Mr. Marenco could claim newly discovered facts that would entitle
him to an out-of-time application for post-conviction relief, Article 930.8(A)(1)
provides, in pertinent part:
If the petitioner pled guilty or nolo contendere to the offense of conviction and is seeking relief pursuant to Article 926.2 and five years or more have elapsed since the petitioner pled guilty or nolo contendere to the offense of conviction, the petitioner shall not be eligible for the exception provided for by this Subparagraph. (Emphasis added).
Mr. Marenco pled guilty under Alford to the charge of forcible rape on March
25, 2015, more than five years before he filed the Motion and, under the quoted
provision, is not entitled to seek post-conviction relief at this juncture. Accordingly,
for all of these reasons the Application is denied.
Gretna, Louisiana, this 14th day of February, 2025.
FHW JJM SUS
4 SUSAN M. CHEHARDY CURTIS B. PURSELL
CHIEF JUDGE CLERK OF COURT
SUSAN S. BUCHHOLZ FREDERICKA H. WICKER CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK JUDE G. GRAVOIS MARC E.
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