Belongie v. Kluenker

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedFebruary 17, 2021
Docket2:20-cv-01742
StatusUnknown

This text of Belongie v. Kluenker (Belongie v. Kluenker) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Belongie v. Kluenker, (E.D. Wis. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN ______________________________________________________________________________ TIMOTHY M. BELONGIE,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 20-cv-1742-pp

CO KLUENKER, JA BRIXSUS, and MANITOWOC COUNTY JAIL,

Defendants. ______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING FILING FEE (DKT. NO. 2) AND SCREENING COMPLAINT ______________________________________________________________________________

Timothy M. Belongie, an inmate at the Manitowoc County Jail who is representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that the defendants inappropriately searched him and disregarded his PREA claims. This decision resolves the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, dkt. no. 2, and screens his complaint, dkt. no. 1. I. Motion for Leave to Proceed without Prepaying the Filing Fee (Dkt. No. 2)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applies to this case because the plaintiff was a prisoner when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(h). The PLRA allows the court to give a prisoner plaintiff the ability to proceed with his case without prepaying the civil case filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the prisoner must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). He then must pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account. Id. On November 23, 2020, the court ordered the plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $5.33. Dkt. No. 5. The court received that fee on December 18, 2020. The court will grant the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and require him to pay the remainder of the filing fee

over time in the manner explained at the end of this order. II. Screening the Complaint A. Federal Screening Standard Under the PLRA, the court must screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint if the prisoner raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the court applies the same standard that it applies when considering whether to dismiss a case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim, a complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege

that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. Cty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The court construes liberally complaints filed by plaintiffs who are representing themselves and holds such complaints to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)).

B. The Plaintiff’s Allegations The plaintiff asserts that “‘C.O. Kluenker’ violated [his] 5th 8th & 14th Amendment rights in the Manitowoc County Jail on Sept. 13th, by cup[p]ing [his] testicles individually with the both of his hands during a pat search.” Dkt. No. 1 at 2. He asserts that “‘JA Brixsus’ violated [his] 5th & 14th Amendment rights by disreguarding (sic) [his] prea [Prison Rape Elimination Act] claims from Sept. 14th through Oct. 24th in the Manitowoc County Jail.” Id. The

plaintiff requests “punishments handed out to the violaters (sic) & financial relief for the victums (sic).” Id. at 3. C. Analysis The plaintiff does not say whether he was a pretrial detainee or a prisoner at the time of the incidents he complains of. He does not even identify the year in which these events occurred. But the electronic docket of his

criminal case reveals that he has been a pretrial detainee at the Manitowoc County Jail since at least July 13, 2020, and remains there awaiting trial, currently scheduled for February 23, 2021. See https://wcca.wicourts.gov/ (Manitowoc County Case Number 2020CF000555). The court assumes that these events occurred in September and October 2020, while the plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the Manitowoc County Jail. The plaintiff’s claim that Kluenker inappropriately touched him during a search is similar to a claim of excessive force. Because the plaintiff was a

pretrial detainee at the time of the alleged search, the court analyzes his claim under the Fourteenth Amendment’s standard of objective reasonableness. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015). Under that standard, the plaintiff must show that the defendant acted “with purposeful, knowing, or reckless disregard of the consequences” of their actions. Miranda v. Cty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 354 (7th Cir. 2018). The plaintiff also must show that the defendant’s actions were objectively unreasonable; that is, that they were not

“‘rationally related to a legitimate non-punitive governmental purpose’” or that they were “‘excessive in relation to that purpose.’” Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816

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Bluebook (online)
Belongie v. Kluenker, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/belongie-v-kluenker-wied-2021.