Bellwhether Renton Sage LLC v. Brin

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: May 28, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-00946
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3

4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 BELLWHETHER RENTON SAGE LLC,1 CASE NO. 2:25-cv-00946-JHC 8

ORDER 9 Plaintiff, 10 v. 11 DARREN MICHAEL BRIN,

12 Defendant. 13

14 On May 19, 2025, the Court ordered pro se Defendant Darren Michael Brin to show 15 cause why this matter should not be remanded to the Superior Court of Washington for King 16 County. Dkt. # 6. Brin contends that this Court has federal question jurisdiction over this matter 17 under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Dkt. # 1 at 1. But the Complaint does not present any federal questions 18 and only states a state-law unlawful detainer claim. Dkt. # 1-1. 19 On May 23, 2025, Brin responded to the Court’s Order to Show Cause. Dkt. # 16. He 20 asserts that he is bringing several federal counterclaims against Plaintiff, including for Federal 21 22

23 1 The Complaint filed in King County state court names the Plaintiff as “Bellwether Renton Sage LLC.” Dkt. # 1-1. But the Docket lists Plaintiff’s name as “Bellwhether Renton Sage, LLC.” See 24 generally Dkt. For consistency, the Court uses the latter. 1 Debt Collection Practices violations. Dkt. # 16 at 8. But removability “cannot be created by [a] 2 defendant pleading a counter-claim presenting a federal question.” Takeda v. Nw. Nat’l Life Ins. 3 Co., 765 F.2d 815, 821–22 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Duckson, Carlson, Bassinger, LLC v. Lake

4 Bank, N.A., 139 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1118 (D. Minn. 2001) (“The well-pleaded complaint rule . . . 5 requires that a federal cause of action be stated on the face of the complaint before a defendant 6 may remove the action based on federal question jurisdiction.”). Plaintiff’s complaint does not 7 plead any claims arising under federal law. Dkt. # 1-1. Thus, there is no federal question 8 jurisdiction. 9 And even if a counterclaim could serve as the basis for removability, Brin’s “allegations” 10 that purportedly “present multiple substantial federal questions” do not state a federal claim. For 11 example, he contends that the Court has jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(8) because 12 Plaintiff misused his Social Security Number. Id. at 1. But § 408 is a statute that criminalizes

13 Social Security fraud and does not provide a private right of action. See Johnson Bene v. Wells 14 Fargo, No. 22-CV-06782-LB, 2023 WL 4332388, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 3, 2023); see also 15 Thomas v. Dep’t of Child Support Servs., No. 18-3236, 2019 WL 1371150, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 16 18, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 1364969 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2019), 17 aff’d sub nom. Thomas v. Div. of Child Support Servs., 19-55454, 2019 WL 5390030 (9th Cir. 18 Sept. 19, 2019) (“Courts, thus, have found Section 408 only establishes criminal penalties and 19 does not provide a basis for a private civil cause of action.”) (collecting cases). 20 Brin also contends that Plaintiff violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3). But § 1983 21 concerns state actors and private entities can only be held liable under the statute if “the conduct 22 allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right [was] fairly attributable to the State.” Tsao v.

23 Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 24 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)) (alteration in original); Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 1 F.3d 826, 835 (9th Cir. 1999). (“Only in rare circumstances” will a court view a private party as 2 a state actor for § 1983 purposes). Brin’s response does not explain how Plaintiff’s unlawful- 3 detainer claim constitutes state action, nor does there appear to be a conceivable basis for treating

4 Plaintiff as a state actor for § 1983 purposes. 5 Furthermore, for a cause of action to exist under § 1985, a party must show “(1) some 6 racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus [lay] behind the 7 conspirators’ action, and (2) the conspiracy was aimed at interfering with rights that are 8 protected against private, as well as official encroachment.” Khalid v. Microsoft Corp., 409 F. 9 Supp. 3d 1023, 1037 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (quoting Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 10 506 U.S. 263, 267–68 (1993)) (alteration in original). Brin only cursorily asserts that the state 11 court proceedings involve “racial and economic discrimination.”2 12 Based on the above, the Court REMANDS this case to King County Superior Court for 13 all further proceedings. The Court STRIKES as moot all pending motions, including those at 14 Dkt. ## 2, 8, 22, 24. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to mail a certified copy of this Order to the 15 Clerk of the state court under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 16 Dated this 28th day of May, 2025. 17 18 A John H. Chun 19 United States District Judge 20 21

22 2 Brin also asserts that this matter raises substantial federal issues including (1) forgery and unauthorized filing of court pleadings in his name; (2) denial of procedural and substantive due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; (3) fraud on the court; and (4) “unrebutted commercial 23 discharge of the alleged debt via bonded instrument.” Dkt. # 16 at 1. But these cursory allegations fail to state a federal claim. See California Equity Mgmt., Grp., Inc. v. Hammer, No. 1: 12-CV-01204-AWI, 24 2012 WL 3069954, at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 26, 2012).