Bello-Naranjo v. Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 23, 2026
• Docket: 24-4135
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 23 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

EDGAR BELLO-NARANJO, No. 24-4135 Agency No. Petitioner, A240-741-882 v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted March 2, 2026** Pasadena, California

Before: WARDLAW and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges, and BROWN, District Judge.***

Edgar Bello-Naranjo petitions for review of a decision of the Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying his motion to reopen removal proceedings.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Jeffrey Vincent Brown, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition for review.

1. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Bello-Naranjo’s motion to

reopen. See Agonafer v. Sessions, 859 F.3d 1198, 1203 (9th Cir. 2017). Generally,

a motion to reopen must be filed within ninety days of the entry of a final

administrative order of removal. Bonilla v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 575, 582 (9th Cir.

2016) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i)). “However, the ninety-day

deadline . . . do[es] not apply if the motion to reopen is based on changed country

conditions.” Agonafer, 859 F.3d at 1203. To escape the time-bar, a petitioner

must:

(1) produce evidence of changed conditions in the country of removal;

(2) demonstrate that the evidence is material;

(3) show that the evidence was previously unavailable and could not have

been discovered or presented at the prior hearing; and

(4) establish prima facie eligibility for the underlying relief.

See Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996 (9th Cir. 2008).

In support of his motion, Bello-Naranjo provided evidence that the

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia continued to threaten and extort him.

However, this evidence largely corroborates claims already presented at his merits

hearing before the Immigration Judge. Agonafer, 859 F.3d at 1204 (“Evidence that

simply recounts previous conditions presented at a previous hearing or that is

2 24-4135 voluminous but redundant is not sufficient to show a change in country

conditions.”). Nor does the evidence presented constitute new evidence,

previously unavailable to Petitioner. Thus, Bello-Naranjo has not shown that

country conditions have worsened sufficiently so as to provide prima facie

eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, or protection under the Convention

Against Torture. Id. at 1204 (“‘The critical question is . . . whether circumstances

have changed sufficiently that a petitioner who previously did not have a legitimate

claim’ now does.” (quoting Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir. 2004))).

2. Petitioner also argues that the BIA abused its discretion and committed

legal error in not sua sponte reopening his case after the U.S. Department of

Homeland Security (“DHS”) failed to file a response to his motion to reopen. “We

ordinarily lack jurisdiction to review a Board decision denying sua sponte

reopening,” with the limited exception of a review for “legal or constitutional

error.” Bonilla, 840 F.3d at 588. Petitioner has not alleged any colorable legal or

constitutional issues in the BIA’s decision-making. Accordingly, we lack

jurisdiction to review this claim. Id.

PETITION DENIED.1

1 Petitioner’s Motion to Stay Removal (Dkt. 22) is DENIED. Additionally, Petitioner Bello-Naranjo’s Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw (Dkt. 38) is DENIED as moot.

3 24-4135