Bell v. Younger

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: May 19, 2026
• Docket: 26-3045
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 26-3045 Document: 20-1 Date Filed: 05/19/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT May 19, 2026 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court MARVA R. BELL,

Plaintiff - Appellant, No. 26-3045 v. (D.C. No. 5:26-CV-04007-HLT-BGS) (D. Kan.) COLEMAN YOUNGER,

Defendant - Appellee. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________

Before MATHESON, MURPHY, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

Marva Bell appeals the dismissal of her pro se complaint alleging legal

malpractice by her former counsel, Coleman Younger. We exercise jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm. 1

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 1 Because Ms. Bell appears pro se, “we liberally construe [her] filings, but we will not act as [her] advocate.” James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312, 1315 (10th Cir. 2013). Appellate Case: 26-3045 Document: 20-1 Date Filed: 05/19/2026 Page: 2

I. BACKGROUND

Ms. Bell alleged that Mr. Younger settled her personal injury case for an

amount that failed to cover her medical treatments. Her complaint included multiple

versions of the complaint forms provided for pro se litigants, and she attached more

than 150 pages of exhibits. The district court referred the case to a magistrate judge.

The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation (“R&R”) to dismiss

Ms. Bell’s complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a

claim that complies with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. She concluded that (1)

Ms. Bell did not allege “violations of any federally-protected rights or statutes” that

would implicate federal-question jurisdiction and (2) “both she and [Mr. Younger]

have addresses in Kansas,” defeating diversity jurisdiction. ROA at 197. And, even

if Ms. Bell could establish subject-matter jurisdiction, the magistrate judge concluded

the factual allegations in her 187-page complaint failed to comply with Rule 8, which

requires “a short and plain statement” of the claim for relief. Id. at 198-200 (quoting

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).

The magistrate judge’s R&R notified Ms. Bell that

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), Fed R. Civ. P. 72, and D. Kan. Rule 72.1.4, Plaintiff shall have fourteen (14) days after service of a copy of these proposed findings and recommendations to serve and file with the U.S. District Judge assigned to the case, any written objections to the findings of fact, conclusions of law, or recommendations of the undersigned Magistrate Judge. Plaintiff’s failure to file such written, specific objections within the 14-day period will bar appellate review of the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the recommended disposition.

2 Appellate Case: 26-3045 Document: 20-1 Date Filed: 05/19/2026 Page: 3

Id. at 201.

Ms. Bell did not file any objections, 2 so the district court concluded that she

waived her right to de novo review. The court adopted the R&R and dismissed

Ms. Bell’s complaint. She appeals the dismissal.

II. DISCUSSION

We review a district court’s dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction de

novo, Mukhtar v. Lambrecht, 172 F.4th 836, 841 (10th Cir. 2026), and for failure to

comply with Rule 8 for abuse of discretion, Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E.

Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1162 n.3 (10th Cir. 2007). We may affirm on any ground

supported by the record. Morphew v. Chaffee Cnty., 172 F.4th 802, 821 n.18 (10th

Cir. 2026).

Under the firm-waiver rule, “the failure to timely object to a magistrate

judge’s finding and recommendations waives appellate review of both factual and

legal questions.” Klein v. Harper, 777 F.3d 1144, 1147 (10th Cir. 2015) (quotations

omitted). “This rule does not apply, however, when (1) a pro se litigant has not been

informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences of failing to object,

or when (2) the interests of justice require review.” Morales-Fernandez v. INS, 418

F.3d 1116, 1119 (10th Cir. 2005) (quotations omitted). For the latter, we consider

“[1] a pro se litigant’s effort to comply, [2] the force and plausibility of the

2 Ms. Bell moved for appointment of counsel within the 14-day period but did not object to the magistrate judge’s R&R. The district court denied Ms. Bell’s motion.

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explanation for his failure to comply, and [3] the importance of the issues raised.”

Johnson v. Reyna, 57 F.4th 769, 778 (10th Cir. 2023) (quoting Casanova v. Ulibarri,

595 F.3d 1120, 1123 (10th Cir. 2010)). Neither exception applies here.

First, the magistrate judge informed Ms. Bell that she had 14 days to file

specific objections to the R&R and that failure to do so would waive appellate

review. Despite the clear warning, Ms. Bell filed no objections.

Second, as for the interests of justice, Ms. Bell does not argue she made any

efforts to object. Instead, she contends her “learning disabilities combined with the

lack of legal representation . . . prevented [her] from understanding or responding to

the [report and recommendation].” Aplt. Br. at 2. Her pro se status does not excuse

noncompliance with court rules and deadlines, see, e.g., Garrett v. Selby Connor

Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005), and if she had adequately

explained her failure to object to the R&R, the issues raised do not warrant ignoring

the firm waiver rule. Our review of the complaint confirms the district court properly

dismissed it for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Theede v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab.,

172 F.3d 1262, 1268 (10th Cir. 1999) (applying firm waiver rule because “after our

review of the record and the law, we are convinced that on the merits Theede’s

claims are suspect at best”); Saleh v. Kimo, 821 F. App’x 915, 918 (10th Cir. 2020)

(unpublished) (applying firm waiver rule because “[o]ur own review of the record

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reveals . . . the district court did not commit any plain error in its determination that it

lacked subject matter jurisdiction” (quotations omitted)). 3

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court’s judgment.

Entered for the Court

Scott M. Matheson, Jr. Circuit Judge

3 Unpublished cases are not binding precedent, but we may consider them for their persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).