LINDE, J.
Claimant, a licensed jockey, was injured in a fall during a race at Portland Meadows Race Track. Pursuing a possible recovery under the Workers’ Compensation Law, ORS 656.001 - 656.794, he made claims against a number of alleged employers and the State Accident Insurance Fund, including the registered and the actual owners of the horse, its trainer, the owner of the track, and the Oregon Racing Commission, on the theory that one or more of them were his employers for purposes of coverage under the act. After a hearing, a referee found that claimant was an independent contractor and not an employee of any of the employers, and this conclusion was reaffirmed by the Workers’ Compensation Board and the Court of Appeals.
However, Bell also claimed compensation, and statutory penalties and attorney fees for failure to pay it, for the interim period preceding the denials of his claim. This claim was also rejected by the Board.
The Court of Appeals, by a divided vote, reversed this part of the decision and remanded the case to the Board for a determination of the amounts due. 44 Or App 21, 604 P2d 1273 (1980). We allowed review to determine whether the statute requires these payments to a claimant who proves not to be an employee covered by the compensation law. We decide that it does not.
The obligation to pay compensation pending the determination of a claim is stated in ORS 656.262,
relevant parts of which are set out in the margin.
In brief, processing of claims and providing compensation is the responsibility of the State Accident Insurance Fund Corporation (before 1979, the State Accident
Insurance Fund) and of those employers who retain direct responsibility for compensation. Compensation "due” shall be paid promptly upon notice or knowledge of a claim unless the employer or the corporation denies the claim, the first instalment being payable no later than the 14th day after notice or knowledge. Within 60 days the employer or corporation must give the claimant notice of acceptance or denial of the claim and of the claimant’s right to a Board hearing on a denial. If either the acceptance or denial or the payment of the claim is unreasonably delayed, the corporation or employer is liable for a 25 percent penalty and attorney fees. From the difference between the 60 days allowed to accept or deny a claim and the 14 days when the first instalment must be paid, it results that the employer or the corporation often must begin payments before deciding to admit or deny that compensation is due.
See Jones v. Emanuel Hospital,
280 Or 147, 570 P2d 70 (1977). The question is whether this obligation applies when the enterprise and SAIF successfully maintain that the claimant is not a "subject worker” and that they therefore are not liable either as, or in lieu of, his "employer” under the act.
In
Jones v. Emanuel Hospital, supra,
this court held that compensation in advance of acceptance or denial of a claim, called "interim compensation” for convenience, was payable no later than the 14th day after notice or knowledge of the claim even if the claimant’s injury ultimately proved noncompensable. This was held to follow from the scheme of ORS 656.262 even though ORS 656.005(9) appeared to limit "compensation” to benefits provided for a "compensable injury.” The majority of the Court of Appeals in the present case read
Jones
to require the same result when the issue is whether the claimant is an employee rather than whether his injury is compensable. The dissent considered that these two issues of coverage call for different results because the Workers’ Compensation Law is designed solely to cover the responsibility of employers toward their employees. Perhaps
this distinction is not wholly logical, since the act also is designed to provide compensation only for job-related injuries and
Jones
read the "interim” obligation of ORS 656.262 to extend beyond that. Nevertheless, we agree with the distinction.
That the law means to anchor the compensation scheme to the employment relation is evident throughout the statute. The key term in the statutory scheme is "subject worker.” An employer is bound to assure payment of compensation only for "subject workers,” ORS 656.017,
cf.
ORS 656.052. In return for the right to compensation, the subject worker and his beneficiaries are deprived of the legal remedies for injuries which they might otherwise have against his employer. ORS 656.018. The statute’s coverage of an employer is derivative of its coverage of a worker: A "subject employer” is one who employs one or more subject workers. ORS 656.005(28), ORS 656.023,
cf.
656.035. The definitions of the employment relationship, ORS 656.005(16) and (31), and inclusions in and exclusions from coverage, ORS 656.027, 656.029 have been central issues in the evolution of the law.
See, e.g., Louvring v. Excel Logging Co.,
280 Or 463, 573 P2d 266 (1977);
Woody v. Waibel,
276 Or 189, 554 P2d 492 (1976);
Bowser v. State Indus. Accident Comm.,
182 Or 42, 185 P2d 891 (1947). ORS 656.262 itself begins by describing the responsibility for processing claims and providing compensation "for a worker in the employ of a contributing employer” or a "direct responsibility employer,” and its subsequent provisions spell out that responsibility.
In the light of the statute as a whole, therefore, we conclude that one who is not a "worker” within the definition of ORS 656.005(31) also is not entitled to "interim” compensation pending denial of his claim under ORS 656.262
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LINDE, J.
Claimant, a licensed jockey, was injured in a fall during a race at Portland Meadows Race Track. Pursuing a possible recovery under the Workers’ Compensation Law, ORS 656.001 - 656.794, he made claims against a number of alleged employers and the State Accident Insurance Fund, including the registered and the actual owners of the horse, its trainer, the owner of the track, and the Oregon Racing Commission, on the theory that one or more of them were his employers for purposes of coverage under the act. After a hearing, a referee found that claimant was an independent contractor and not an employee of any of the employers, and this conclusion was reaffirmed by the Workers’ Compensation Board and the Court of Appeals.
However, Bell also claimed compensation, and statutory penalties and attorney fees for failure to pay it, for the interim period preceding the denials of his claim. This claim was also rejected by the Board.
The Court of Appeals, by a divided vote, reversed this part of the decision and remanded the case to the Board for a determination of the amounts due. 44 Or App 21, 604 P2d 1273 (1980). We allowed review to determine whether the statute requires these payments to a claimant who proves not to be an employee covered by the compensation law. We decide that it does not.
The obligation to pay compensation pending the determination of a claim is stated in ORS 656.262,
relevant parts of which are set out in the margin.
In brief, processing of claims and providing compensation is the responsibility of the State Accident Insurance Fund Corporation (before 1979, the State Accident
Insurance Fund) and of those employers who retain direct responsibility for compensation. Compensation "due” shall be paid promptly upon notice or knowledge of a claim unless the employer or the corporation denies the claim, the first instalment being payable no later than the 14th day after notice or knowledge. Within 60 days the employer or corporation must give the claimant notice of acceptance or denial of the claim and of the claimant’s right to a Board hearing on a denial. If either the acceptance or denial or the payment of the claim is unreasonably delayed, the corporation or employer is liable for a 25 percent penalty and attorney fees. From the difference between the 60 days allowed to accept or deny a claim and the 14 days when the first instalment must be paid, it results that the employer or the corporation often must begin payments before deciding to admit or deny that compensation is due.
See Jones v. Emanuel Hospital,
280 Or 147, 570 P2d 70 (1977). The question is whether this obligation applies when the enterprise and SAIF successfully maintain that the claimant is not a "subject worker” and that they therefore are not liable either as, or in lieu of, his "employer” under the act.
In
Jones v. Emanuel Hospital, supra,
this court held that compensation in advance of acceptance or denial of a claim, called "interim compensation” for convenience, was payable no later than the 14th day after notice or knowledge of the claim even if the claimant’s injury ultimately proved noncompensable. This was held to follow from the scheme of ORS 656.262 even though ORS 656.005(9) appeared to limit "compensation” to benefits provided for a "compensable injury.” The majority of the Court of Appeals in the present case read
Jones
to require the same result when the issue is whether the claimant is an employee rather than whether his injury is compensable. The dissent considered that these two issues of coverage call for different results because the Workers’ Compensation Law is designed solely to cover the responsibility of employers toward their employees. Perhaps
this distinction is not wholly logical, since the act also is designed to provide compensation only for job-related injuries and
Jones
read the "interim” obligation of ORS 656.262 to extend beyond that. Nevertheless, we agree with the distinction.
That the law means to anchor the compensation scheme to the employment relation is evident throughout the statute. The key term in the statutory scheme is "subject worker.” An employer is bound to assure payment of compensation only for "subject workers,” ORS 656.017,
cf.
ORS 656.052. In return for the right to compensation, the subject worker and his beneficiaries are deprived of the legal remedies for injuries which they might otherwise have against his employer. ORS 656.018. The statute’s coverage of an employer is derivative of its coverage of a worker: A "subject employer” is one who employs one or more subject workers. ORS 656.005(28), ORS 656.023,
cf.
656.035. The definitions of the employment relationship, ORS 656.005(16) and (31), and inclusions in and exclusions from coverage, ORS 656.027, 656.029 have been central issues in the evolution of the law.
See, e.g., Louvring v. Excel Logging Co.,
280 Or 463, 573 P2d 266 (1977);
Woody v. Waibel,
276 Or 189, 554 P2d 492 (1976);
Bowser v. State Indus. Accident Comm.,
182 Or 42, 185 P2d 891 (1947). ORS 656.262 itself begins by describing the responsibility for processing claims and providing compensation "for a worker in the employ of a contributing employer” or a "direct responsibility employer,” and its subsequent provisions spell out that responsibility.
In the light of the statute as a whole, therefore, we conclude that one who is not a "worker” within the definition of ORS 656.005(31) also is not entitled to "interim” compensation pending denial of his claim under ORS 656.262.
It is true, as mentioned
above, that the Workers’ Compensation Law in principle also provides compensation only for "compensable,”
i.e.,
job-related, injuries, and that "interim” compensation under ORS 656.262 is an exception to that principle. But that exception arises in a situation in which a covered employer concededly would be responsible for compensation to the employee if the employee’s injury in fact is compensable, and we concluded in
Jones v. Emanuel Hospital, supra,
that in this situation the legislature intended the worker to have to wait no more than 14 days for compensation to begin. We are not prepared to attribute to the legislature the same policy choice when the putative employee claiming "interim” compensation in fact is not a "worker” covered by the statute at all. The words "compensation due under this chapter from the corporation or direct responsibility employer” in ORS 656.262,
supra
note 3, do not stretch that far. Accordingly, since the Court of Appeals affirmed the Board’s finding that claimant was not a covered worker, the court’s decision remanding his claim for interim compensation plus penalty and attorney fees must be reversed.
Reversed.