Bell v. BOARD OF ED., AKRON PUBLIC SCHOOLS

491 F. Supp. 916, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17797
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Ohio
DecidedApril 7, 1980
DocketCiv. A. C78-20A
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 491 F. Supp. 916 (Bell v. BOARD OF ED., AKRON PUBLIC SCHOOLS) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bell v. BOARD OF ED., AKRON PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 491 F. Supp. 916, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17797 (N.D. Ohio 1980).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

CONTIE, District Judge.

On January 13, 1978 the plaintiffs, Doris and Maynard Bell, Ann and Cecil Benoit, and Paulette and Jacques McGregor, sueing on behalf of themselves and their minor children, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, filed this action alleging a deprivation of their constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. This Court has jurisdiction of the controversy under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, and 1343.

Count I of the complaint alleged that the racial segregation in the Akron public schools was caused by the intentionally discriminatory actions of the defendant Board of Education of the Akron Public Schools and Superintendent Conrad Ott. Count II of the complaint alleged that the defendant City of Akron, Mayor John S. Ballard, the Akron Metropolitan Housing Authority and its director, and the President of the Ohio Real Estate Commission Paul J. Everson 1 caused the residential racial segregation in Akron by intentional discriminatory acts. In addition to a declaration of rights, the *918 plaintiffs sought a remedy that would eliminate the effects of any discrimination found by the Court. Under Count I they asked the Court to desegregate the schools in west Akron. Alleging that the city-wide discrimination in housing caused segregation in the schools, the plaintiffs asked the Court to desegregate the entire school system if they prevailed on Count II.

On October 6,1978 the Court certified the case as a class action, defining two subclasses:

1. All white students and parents of white students now attending or in the future eligible to attend the Akron Public Schools.
2. All non-white students and parents of non-white students now attending or in the future eligible to attend the Akron Public Schools.

The final allegations pressed at trial were contained in plaintiffs’ second, third, and final updates, filed on August 1, September 1, and September 15,1978. The Court duly heard testimony and received exhibits on October 16 through 20, 23, and 27, 30, 31, and November 1 through 3, 1978. The following shall constitute the Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, in accordance with Rule 52, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

COUNT I: THE SCHOOL CASE

A. Applicable Legal Principles

The Akron schools were never segregated by statute, and the plaintiffs in this action do not claim that the Akron schools are operated as a completely dual school system with separate schools for white and black students. Consequently, before the school authorities can be found liable for the de facto separation of the races in the Akron schools, the plaintiffs must show that race was a factor in the decisionmaking process. Proof of racially discriminatory purpose is required to show a violation of the equal protection clause. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2048, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976). 2 It is not necessary, however, to show that racial concerns were the dominant or primary factors in the decisionmaking process. If race was a factor in the decisionmaking process, the actions of the school authorities are unconstitutional. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66, 97 S.Ct. 555, 563, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976).

As it is rare to find direct evidence of discriminatory purpose, the Court must look to other evidence to determine the factors which entered into the decisionmaking. Quoting Oliver v. Michigan State Board of Education, 508 F.2d 178, 182 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963, 95 S.Ct. 1950, 44 L.Ed.2d 449 (1974), the plaintiffs say that:

A presumption of segregative purpose arises when plaintiffs establish that the natural, probable, and foreseeable result of public officials’ action or inaction was an increase or perpetuation of public school segregation. The presumption becomes proof unless defendants affirmatively establish that their action or inaction was a consistent and resolute application of racially neutral policies.

Trial Brief for Plaintiffs at 16 (emphasis omitted).

Considering this language from Oliver the Supreme Court recently said:

We have never held that as a general proposition the foreseeability of segregative consequences makes out a prima facie case of purposeful racial discrimination and shifts the burden of producing evidence to the defendants if they are to escape judgment; and even more clearly there is no warrant in our cases for holding that such foreseeability routinely shifts the burden of persuasion to the *919 defendants. Of course, . . proof of foreseeable consequences is one type of quite relevant evidence of racially discriminatory purpose .

Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman (Dayton II), 443 U.S. 526, 536 n. 9, 99 S.Ct. 2971, 2978 n. 9, 61 L.Ed.2d 720 (1979). The Supreme Court has elsewhere described the nature of the district court’s 'factual investigation:

Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such ehv cumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available. The impact of official action . may provide an important starting point. Sometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race emerges from the effect of the state action even when the governing legislation appears neutral on its face. But such cases are rare. Absent a pat- ' tern as stark as that in Gomillion [v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960),] or Yick Wo [v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886),] im- ' pact alone is not determinative, and the Court must look to other evidence.
The historical background of the decision is one evidentiary source, particularly if it reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious purposes. Departures from the normal procedural sequence also might afford evidence that improper purposes are playing a role.

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Related

Equal Open Enrollment Ass'n v. Board of Education
937 F. Supp. 700 (N.D. Ohio, 1996)
United States v. Yonkers Board of Education
624 F. Supp. 1276 (S.D. New York, 1985)
Bell v. Board of Education
683 F.2d 963 (Sixth Circuit, 1982)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
491 F. Supp. 916, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17797, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bell-v-board-of-ed-akron-public-schools-ohnd-1980.