Bell Ex Rel. Henderson v. Lone Oak Independent School District

507 S.W.2d 636

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: February 26, 1974
• Docket: 8208
• Status: Published

Opinions

RAY, Justice.

This is a suit to enjoin the enforcement of a school regulation that prohibits married students from participating in extra-curricular activities. Edward Ray Bell, appellant (petitioner), brought suit against the Lone Oak Independent School District and the Board of Trustees of Lone Oak Independent School District, appellees (respondents), seeking a temporary restraining order and injunction against the school and its Board of Trustees to prevent the enforcement of the “married-student rule” so that Bell could play on the local football team. A hearing was held by the trial court and it denied the temporary injunction. Appellant filed his appeal to this court and also filed his application here for a temporary restraining order and temporary injunction to prevent his cause from becoming moot and to preserve the jurisdiction of this court. We granted the temporary restraining order and, after hearing, granted the temporary injunction pending the final disposition of the case.

Appellant Bell submits five points of error for our consideration. Appellant contends that the temporary injunction should have been granted by the trial court because the school regulation concerning married students sets up an arbitrary and unreasonable classification that is invalid under 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; that the school regulation was applied in an arbitrary manner; that the regulation infringes upon the right to marry; that the trial court should have applied federal statutes and decisions in making its decision, rather than applying state statutes and decisions; that appellant was denied the right to participate in school activities paid for out of school funds provided under Art. 2902, Tex.Rev.Civ.Statuies.

The Board of Trustees has the following general powers as set out in Sec, 23.26 of the Texas Education Code, V.T.C.A. :

“(b) The trustees shall have the exclusive power to manage and govern the public free schools of the district.

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“(d) The trustees may adopt such rules, regulations, and by-laws as they may deem proper.”

Basically, we feel that local school officials are in the best position to manage the affairs of the local school district and the local schools. “The quicker judges get out of the business of running schools the better.” Passel v. Fort Worth Independent School District, 453 S.W.2d 888 (Tex.Civ.App. Fort Worth 1970, writ ref’d, n. r. e.); Texarkana Independent School District v. Lewis, 470 S.W.2d 727, 734 (Tex.Civ.App.Texarkana 1971, no writ).

A portion of the rule here questioned is as follows:

“The married student cannot be elected to an office, or if already elected, must resign; cannot be appointed to an office; cannot participate in athletics, pep squad, class plays, social events such as junior-senior banquet, football banquet, etc; must take a full schedule and participate in classroom activities without undue absences.”

The quoted rule of the Lone Oak Independent School District sets up a classification of individuals to be treated differently from the remainder of the school students without being designed to promote a compelling state interest. As such, the rule violates 42 U.S.C.A., Sec. 1983, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. There can be no doubt in anyone’s mind that if the same rule provided that a particular race or col- or of person would be ineligible to play football, the state courts and federal courts would promptly strike the rule down as being discriminatory towards a class of individuals. The same logic applies to married students’ participation in extra-curricular activities. Appellees have not shown a clear and present danger to the other students’ physical or emotional safety and well-being, or any other danger to the students, faculty, or school property, nor any substantial or material danger to the operation of the public schools by allowing married students to participate in athletics. The burden of proof is upon the school district to show that its rule should be upheld as a necessary restraint to promote a compelling state interest.

It is the public policy of this state to encourage marriage rather than living together unmarried. To promote that public policy, we have sanctioned by statute the marriage ceremony (Secs. 1.81 et seq., Texas Family Code) and through the years have jealously guarded the bonds of matrimony. It therefore seems illogical to say that a school district can make a rule punishing a student for entering into a status authorized and sanctioned by the laws of this state. We find no logical basis for such rule. We are not unmindful of the decision in Kissick v. Garland Independent School District, 330 S.W.2d 708 (Tex.Civ.App.Dallas 1959, writ ref’d, n. r. e.), involving a situation very similar to the one in this case. There the court held that it was not arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory or unreasonable to bar married students from participating in athletics or other extracurricular activities. Our holding in this case is in direct opposition to Kissick, supra.

It may be that an education is not a guaranteed right under our Federal Constitution. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973). It may further be that a school cannot constitutionally be required to provide a student with an athletic program, but if the state and the local school provide free public education and an athletic program, it must do so in a manner not calculated to discriminate against a class of individuals who will be treated differently from the remainder of the students, unless the school district can show that such rule is a necessary restraint to promote a compelling state interest. In the present case, the evidence is legally insufficient to establish that the rule in question is a necessary restraint to promote a compelling state interest, that is, the prevention of drop-outs from secondary schools.

We have chosen not to follow the decision in Kissick v. Garland Independent School District, supra, because we feel that the rule there should be abandoned for one that is non-discriminatory and which does not violate constitutionally guaranteed rights. This court has concluded that the injunctive relief sought by appellant Bell should have been granted by the trial court because the appellees did not establish that the rule against married students participating in extra-curricular activities was a necessary restraint to promote a compelling state interest. We hold as a matter of law that as to married students the questioned rule is on its face discriminatory and in violation of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Moran v. School District No. 7, Yellowstone County, 350 F. Supp. 1180 (D.C.Montana 1973); Davis v. Meek, 344 F.Supp. 298 (D.C.Ohio 1972) Holt v. Shelton, 341 F.Supp. 821 (Middle District of Tennessee, 1972).

The trial court erred in failing to issue the temporary injunction sought by appellant. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded with instructions to issue a temporary injunction enjoining the Lone Oak Independent School District and its Board of Trustees from enforcing the rule prohibiting Edward Ray Bell from participating in football activities of the Lone Oak Independent School District and from excluding him from membership on the school football team because of his marital status.