Beleson v. Schwartz

599 F. Supp. 2d 519, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18050, 2009 WL 508988
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedFebruary 24, 2009
Docket03 CV 6051 (VM)
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 599 F. Supp. 2d 519 (Beleson v. Schwartz) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Beleson v. Schwartz, 599 F. Supp. 2d 519, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18050, 2009 WL 508988 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).

Opinion

DECISION AND ORDER

VICTOR MARRERO, District Judge.

Lead plaintiffs Robert Beleson and Harvey Matcovsky, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), brought this class action against defendant Bernard Schwartz (“Schwartz” or “Defendant”), alleging violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) and 78t(a) (the “Exchange Act”), and Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (“Rule 10b-5”). Schwartz filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment on the issues pertaining to Schwartz’s liability. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Schwartz’s motion for summary judgment, and DENIES Plaintiffs’ cross-motion for partial summary judgment.

I. BACKGROUND 1

Plaintiffs represent a class of individuals who purchased securities of Loral Space & Communications, Ltd. (“Loral” or the “Company”) from June 30, 2003 through July 15, 2003 (the “Class Period”). Loral was a satellite communications company with substantial activities in manufacturing and satellite-based communications services. 2 Schwartz was Loral’s Chief Execu *521 tive Officer and the Chairman of its Board of Directors in 2002 and 2003.

In early 2003, Loral was experiencing severe financial difficulties and had approximately $2.2 billion in outstanding debt, including $1 billion in bank loans from syndicates headed by Bank of America (the “Syndicates”) and $1 billion in bonds from its subsidiary, Loral Orion, Inc. (“Orion”). In the beginning of 2003, Loral began exploring a variety of ways to improve its struggling financial condition. To this end, Loral hired the investment bank Greenhill & Co. (“Greenhill”) to help restructure its bank debt and to find possible merger partners. Harvey Miller (“Miller”), who was then the Managing Director and Vice Chairman at Greenhill, was part of the Greenhill team. Although Miller had previously created the Business Finance and Restructuring department at Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (“Weil Gotshal”), the terms of Loral’s retention of Greenhill made no reference to bankruptcy-

In early 2003, Intelsat Ltd. (“Intelsat”) surfaced as a potential buyer of at least some of Loral’s satellites. In March 2003, Loral personnel met with Intelsat’s financial advisor to discuss the due diligence required for Intelsat to consider purchasing six of Loral’s North American satellites (the “Intelsat Satellite Sale”). Initially, Intelsat’s internal analysis of a potential deal with Loral did not require Loral to file for bankruptcy. In May 2003, however, Intelsat began demanding a bankruptcy filing to assure the safe passage of title to the satellites. By May 12, 2003, Schwartz understood that in order for the Intelsat Satellite Sale to proceed, “Intelsat required a bankruptcy.” (Affidavit of Francis J. Menton, Jr., dated July 21, 2008 (“Menton Aff.”), Ex. 2 at 151-52.) At a special meeting of Loral’s Board of Directors on May 27, 2003, Schwartz discussed the possibility of completing the Intelsat Satellite Sale as part of a prepackaged bankruptcy. On May 30, 2003, Loral and Intelsat agreed that the Intelsat Satellite Sale, if finalized, would be completed through a sale of property pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363(b). Loral retained Weil Gotshal; KPMG; and Conway, Del Genio, Gries & Co., LLC to assist, in the event that Loral did, in fact, file for bankruptcy. Loral, however, hoped to avoid filing for bankruptcy and actively pursued alternatives to the Intelsat Satellite Sale. 3

On June 24, 2003, Loral provided the Syndicates with a cash flow forecast that “assume[d] the potential commencement of reorganization cases within the next 7-30 days.” (Affidavit of Julia J. Sun, dated September 22, 2008 (“Sun Aff.”), Ex. 15.) In addition, Loral settled its outstanding arbitration claims with Alcatel Space Industries and Alcatel Space (collectively, “Alcatel”), and Loral informed Alcatel on June 25, 2003, that Alcatel should “go forward with the settlement ... on the assumption that the Loral entities would file for bankruptcy within the next ninety days.” (Id., Ex. 16.) Despite these representations, it was unclear at this time whether Loral and Intelsat would reach an agreement. As of June 30, 2003, the first day of the Class Period, “there remain[ed] *522 outstanding items” for due diligence. (Menton Aff., Ex. 40 at IN 000137.)

From June 30, 2003 through July 12, 2003, Intelsat continued to raise questions about various Loral assets and sought changes to fundamental aspects of the proposed deal, including the price that Intelsat would pay for the satellites. Although Intelsat had initially offered $1.1 billion, as a result of its due diligence it lowered its offer price to $950 million, which according to Richard Townsend, Loral’s Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer during the Class Period, Loral would not have accepted because that amount would not have been enough to pay the Syndicates in full. By July 8, 2003, the parties were still $150 million apart on the purchase price of the satellites.

On July 12, 2003 and July 13, 2003, Loral and Intelsat executives, including Schwartz, participated directly in a series of face-to-face negotiations. According to Intelsat’s Chairman, the negotiations were characterized by “intense and still sometimes contentious discussions to the very end.” (Id., Ex. 5 at 116.) At the close of the negotiations, Intelsat raised its offer price above $1 billion, and the parties finally reached an agreement. On July 14, 2003, Loral’s Board of Directors approved the Intelsat Satellite Sale along with the bankruptcy filing. On July 15, 2003, Loral and Intelsat signed an Asset Purchase Agreement in which Intelsat ultimately agreed to pay $1.06 billion for the satellites, and Loral filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Before the market opened that day, Loral announced the Intelsat Satellite Sale and its Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing, a precondition to the sale. Plaintiffs allege that, as a result of the bankruptcy filing, the price of Loral common stock dropped from its closing price of $3.01 per share on July 14, 2003, the day before the bankruptcy announcement, to a low of just 30 cents on July 16, 2003, when the stock resumed trading on the over-the-counter market.

On August 11, 2003, Plaintiffs filed this class action asserting claims under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5. Plaintiffs allege that four fraudulent statements were made during the Class Period, giving rise to their claims 4 :

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Bluebook (online)
599 F. Supp. 2d 519, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18050, 2009 WL 508988, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/beleson-v-schwartz-nysd-2009.