Belcher v. Johnson

427 A.2d 436, 1981 D.C. App. LEXIS 222
CourtDistrict of Columbia Court of Appeals
DecidedFebruary 11, 1981
Docket79-1172
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 427 A.2d 436 (Belcher v. Johnson) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District of Columbia Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Belcher v. Johnson, 427 A.2d 436, 1981 D.C. App. LEXIS 222 (D.C. 1981).

Opinions

PER CURIAM:

This case involved a suit for an accounting brought by members of the Mount Jezreel Baptist Church. The complaint was filed June 20, 1977. On June 11, 1979, the trial court sua sponte dismissed the complaint for failure to prosecute. This appeal resulted.

Normally a dismissal for failure to prosecute results from a motion filed by the opposing party. The Supreme Court in Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1961) had this to say, however, on the matter of a sua sponte dismissal of this ground:

Neither the permissive language of the Rule — which merely authorizes a motion by the defendant — nor its policy requires us to conclude that it was the purpose of the Rule to abrogate the power of courts, acting on their own initiative, to clear their calendars of cases that have remained dormant because of the inaction or dilatoriness of the parties seeking relief. The authority of a court to dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution has generally been considered an “inherent power,” governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases. That it has long gone unquestioned is apparent ... from the many state court decisions sustaining such dismissals .... [Id. at 630-31, 82 S.Ct. at 1388-89 (footnote omitted).]

In entering its ruling, the trial judge here referred to an early opinion of this court in Steele v. General Baking Co., D.C.Mun.App., 101 A.2d 845 (1954) which stated:

A party should not be forced to defend himself against a claim which arose more than three years ago, when with a little effort on the plaintiff’s part the case could have been adjudicated within a few months. [Id. at 846.]

The trial court in this case then stated:

This Court likewise concludes that a little effort on plaintiffs’ part would have brought a speedy adjudication of this action. Accordingly, it appears to the Court that plaintiffs have failed to comply with this Court’s orders, as noted herein; and it further appears that despite this Court’s admonition to avoid delays, plaintiffs have shown no diligence in prosecuting this action.

[437]*437Our test on review is not whether we would necessarily have acted sua sponte to dismiss the complaint in the circumstances of this case but whether we conclude the trial court abused its discretion in so ruling. Steele v. General Baking Co., supra at 846.

In this case, on March 7, 1978 the trial court set a “fixed trial date” for June 7, 1979 and ordered the parties to pursue discovery. Plaintiff-appellants took depositions on May 3 and 16, 1978, and again on October 13, 1978, but literally did nothing for the next nine months (whereupon the case was dismissed).

Appellants complain that their efforts for discovery were frustrated because appellees did not authorize inspection of church records, in contrast with day care center records, at the Internal Revenue Service. Assuming that the IRS did have such records, appellants did nothing to specify on the record what kinds of church documents at the IRS would have been helpful to their cause. Further, appellants should have filed a motion to compel discovery if defendants were, in fact, thwarting the court discovery order of March 7, 1978.

In addition, appellants did not comply with the Super.Ct.Civ.R. 23-I(c)(l) requirement of a statement concerning notice to the class. Appellants complain that appel-lees did not turn over a complete list of church members to permit such notice. Under the rule, plaintiffs could have saved their rights by including this complaint as part of the Rule 23 statement. Again, plaintiffs did not follow through.

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Related

Ripalda v. American Operations Corp.
673 A.2d 659 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 1996)
Brown v. Cohen
505 A.2d 77 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 1986)
Hackney v. Sheeskin
503 A.2d 1249 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 1986)
Belcher v. Johnson
427 A.2d 436 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 1981)

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Bluebook (online)
427 A.2d 436, 1981 D.C. App. LEXIS 222, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/belcher-v-johnson-dc-1981.