Beitzel v. Ivey

• Court: District Court, D. Maryland
• Decided: May 29, 2024
• Docket: 1:23-cv-02594
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

STEVEN RAY BEITZEL,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No.: ELH-23-2594

MONTGOMERY COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM The self-represented plaintiff, Steven Ray Beitzel, filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Montgomery County Correctional Facility (“MCCF”), Corporal Derek Ivey, and Corporal Andrew Robinette. ECF 1 (the “Complaint”).1 He also submitted several exhibits. ECF 1-1, ECF 1-2, ECF 1-3. Liberally construed, Beitzel alleges that he was subjected to excessive force on June 18, 2023, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 4-5; ECF 13 at 1.2 Defendants have moved to dismiss the Complaint (ECF 9), which is supported by a memorandum of law (ECF 9-1) (collectively, the “Motion”). Beitzel opposes the Motion. ECF 11, ECF 13.3 He has also filed a request for appointment of counsel. ECF 14.

1 The Clerk is directed to amend the docket to reflect the full and complete names of the defendants. 2 Plaintiff also sued Dr. Josh Heller and Seth Carson, employees of Holy Cross Hospital, with regard to a separate occurrence on January 25, 2022. ECF 1. However, those claims were dismissed, without prejudice, on October 3, 2023. ECF 3. 3Initially, Beitzel indicated he had not received a copy of defendants’ dispositive motion. ECF 11. Beitzel’s second response (ECF 13) indicated he had received the Motion. No hearing is necessary to resolve the Motion. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2023). For the reasons that follow, I shall grant defendants’ Motion as to MCCF and deny the Motion as to Ivey and Robinette. I shall also grant Beitzel’s request to appoint counsel. I. Factual Allegations Beitzel alleges that on June 18, 2023, while he was detained at MCCF, Ivey and Robinette entered his cell and Ivey directed Beitzel to “hand over whatever is down your pants”. ECF 1 at 4.

Instead of complying, Beitzel flushed an item down the toilet. Id. Ivey and Robinette then “proceeded to beat” Beitzel. Id. Plaintiff reports that Ivey punched him mostly in the face while Robinette punched him in the kidneys. Id. Beitzel balled up into a fetal position to protect himself from the blows, and the officers yelled at him to stop resisting. Then, Ivey and Robinette pulled Beitzel’s hands from his face and continued to strike him. Id. Plaintiff claims that there is video footage of the encounter as well as photographs of the incident. Id. at 5. He has submitted with his Complaint photos of his injuries that he claims were taken three days after the occurrence. Id. at 4; ECF 1-3. Beitzel acknowledges that he “may have disobeyed a direct order,” but he asserts that Ivey and Robinette did not have the right to “beat on him.” ECF 1 at 5. In his Opposition, plaintiff

denies that he ever resisted the officers. ECF 13 at 1. Beitzel seeks the termination of the employment of Ivey and Robinette as well as monetary damages. ECF 1 at 6. II. Standard of Review As noted, defendants have moved to dismiss. A defendant may test the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff’s complaint by way of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Nadendla v. Wake Med, 24 F.4th 299, 304-05 (4th Cir. 2022); Fessler v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 959 F.3d 146, 152 (4th Cir. 2020); In re Birmingham, 846 F.3d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 2017); Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 165-66 (4th Cir. 2016); McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 408 (4th Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom., McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221 (2013); Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion constitutes an assertion by a defendant that, even if the facts alleged by a plaintiff are true, the complaint fails as a matter of law “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” See Venkatraman v. REI Sys., Inc., 417 F.3d 418, 420 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993)); Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 473 (4th Cir. 1997).

Whether a complaint states a claim for relief is assessed by reference to the pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). See Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009); Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int’l Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 325-26 (4th Cir. 2001); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002). That rule provides that a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The purpose of the rule is to provide the defendants with “fair notice” of the claims and the “grounds” for entitlement to relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007). To survive a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain facts sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (citation omitted) (“Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions’ . . . .”); see also Fauconier v. Clarke, 996 F.3d 265, 276 (4th Cir. 2020); Paradise Wire & Cable Defined Benefit Pension Plan v. Weil, 918 F.3d 312, 317-18 (4th Cir. 2019); Willner v. Dimon, 849 F.3d 93, 112 (4th Cir. 2017). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). To be sure, a plaintiff need not include “detailed factual allegations” in order to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2). Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Moreover, federal pleading rules “do not countenance dismissal of a complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted.” Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 10 (2014) (per curiam). But, mere “‘naked

assertions’ of wrongdoing” are generally insufficient to state a claim for relief. Francis, 588 F.3d at 193 (citation omitted). Indeed, the rule demands more than bald accusations or mere speculation. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see Painter’s Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown, 716 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir. 2013). If a complaint provides no more than “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,” it is insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see Morrow v. Navy Federal Credit Union, 2022 WL 2526676, at *2 (4th Cir. July 7, 2022) (“Mere recitals of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory statements, are insufficient to survive” a Rule 12(b)(6) motion). Thus, “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” does not state a plausible claim of relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Instead, to satisfy the minimal requirements of

Rule 8(a)(2), the complaint must set forth “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest” a cognizable cause of action, “even if . . . [the] actual proof of those facts is improbable, and . . . recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (internal quotation marks omitted). In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a court ‘must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,’ and must ‘draw all reasonable inferences [from those facts] in favor of the plaintiff.’” Retfalvi v. United States, 930 F.3d 600, 605 (4th Cir. 2019) (alteration in Retfalvi) (quoting E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011)); see Semenova v. Md. Transit Admin., 845 F.3d 564, 567 (4th Cir. 2017); Houck v. Substitute Tr. Servs., Inc., 791 F.3d 473, 484 (4th Cir. 2015). However, “a court is not required to accept legal conclusions drawn from the facts.” Retfalvi, 930 F.3d at 605 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)); see Glassman v. Arlington Cty., 628 F.3d 140, 146 (4th Cir. 2010). “A court decides whether [the pleading] standard is met by separating the legal conclusions from the factual allegations, assuming the truth of only the factual allegations, and then determining whether

those allegations allow the court to reasonably infer” that the plaintiff is entitled to the legal remedy sought. A Society Without a Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 937 (2012). In connection with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff may not cure a defect in a complaint or otherwise amend a complaint by way of opposition briefing. See, e.g., De Simone v. VSL Pharmaceuticals, 36 F.4th 518, 531 (4th Cir. 2022) (recognizing that, generally, new arguments cannot be raised in a reply brief); Henderson v. City of Roanoke, 2022 WL 704351, at *3 (4th Cir. Mar. 9, 2022) (per curiam) (“[N]o litigant is exempt from the well-established rule ‘that parties cannot amend their complaints through briefing or oral advocacy.’”) (quoting So. Walk at Broadlands Homeowner’s Ass’n, Inc. v. OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC, 713 F.3d 175, 184 (4th

Cir. 2013)); Glenn v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., DKC-15-3058, 2016 WL 3570274, at *3 (D. Md. July 1, 2016) (declining to consider declaration attached to brief opposing motion to dismiss because, among other things, it included allegations not included in the suit); Zachair Ltd. v. Driggs, 965 F. Supp. 741, 748 n.4 (D. Md. 1997) (stating that a plaintiff “is bound by the allegations contained in its complaint and cannot, through the use of motion briefs, amend the complaint”), aff’d, 141 F.3d 1162 (4th Cir. 1998). Moreover, courts ordinarily do not “‘resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.’” King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted); see Bing v. Brio Sys., LLC, 959 F.3d 605, 616 (4th Cir. 2020). But, “in the relatively rare circumstances where facts sufficient to rule on an affirmative defense are alleged in the complaint, the defense may be reached by a motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(6).” Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 464 (4th Cir. 2007) (en banc); accord Pressley v. Tupperware Long Term Disability Plan, 553 F.3d 334, 336 (4th Cir. 2009). Because Rule 12(b)(6) “is intended [only] to test the legal adequacy of the complaint,” Richmond, Fredericksburg &

Potomac R.R. Co. v. Forst, 4 F.3d 244, 250 (4th Cir. 1993), “[t]his principle only applies . . . if all facts necessary to the affirmative defense ‘clearly appear[ ] on the face of the complaint.’” Goodman, 494 F.3d at 464 (emphasis in Goodman) (quoting Forst, 4 F.3d at 250). “Generally, when a defendant moves to dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), courts are limited to considering the sufficiency of allegations set forth in the complaint and the ‘documents attached or incorporated into the complaint.’” Zak v. Chelsea Therapeutics Int’l, Ltd., 780 F.3d 597, 606 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 637 F.3d at 448); see Goines, 822 F.3d at 166 (a court may properly consider documents that are “explicitly incorporated into the complaint by reference and those attached to the complaint as exhibits”); see Pendleton v. Jividen, 96 F.4th 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2024); Fusaro v. Cogan, 930 F.3d 241, 248 (4th Cir. 2019);

Six v. Generations Fed. Credit Union, 891 F.3d 508, 512 (4th Cir. 2018); Goldfarb v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 791 F.3d 500, 508 (4th Cir. 2015); Anand v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 754 F.3d 195, 198 (4th Cir. 2014); U.S. ex rel. Oberg v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, 745 F.3d 131, 136 (4th Cir. 2014); Phillips v. LCI Int’l Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 618 (4th Cir. 1999). In contrast, the court “may not consider any documents that are outside of the complaint, or not expressly incorporated therein[.]” Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville, 708 F.3d 549, 557 (4th Cir. 2013), abrogated on other grounds by Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015); see Bosiger v. U.S. Airways, 510 F.3d 442, 450 (4th Cir. 2007). A court may also “consider a document submitted by the movant that [is] not attached to or expressly incorporated in a complaint, so long as the document was integral to the complaint and there is no dispute about the document’s authenticity.” Goines, 822 F.3d at 166 (citations omitted). To be “integral,” a document must be one “that by its ‘very existence, and not the mere information it contains, gives rise to the legal rights asserted.’” Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Severstal Sparrows Point, LLC, 794 F. Supp. 2d 602, 611 (D. Md. 2011) (citation omitted)

(emphasis in original). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (“A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes.”). In addition, “a court may properly take judicial notice of ‘matters of public record’ and other information that, under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, constitute ‘adjudicative facts.’” Goldfarb, 791 F.3d at 508; see also Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007); Katyle v. Penn Nat’l Gaming, Inc., 637 F.3d 462, 466 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 825 (2011); Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009). However, under Fed. R. Evid. 201, a court may take judicial notice of adjudicative facts only if they are “not subject to reasonable dispute,” in that they are “(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort

to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Because plaintiff is self-represented, his submissions are liberally construed. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(f) (“All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice”); see also Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (stating that claims of self-represented litigants are held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”); accord Bala v. Cmm’w of Va. Dep't of Conservation & Recreation, 532 F. App’x 332, 334 (4th Cir. 2013). But, the court must also abide by the “‘affirmative obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial.’” Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 526 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th Cir. 1993), and citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986)). III. Section 1983 Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code provides that a plaintiff may file suit against any person who, acting under color of state law, “subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see, e.g., Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377 (2012); see also Owens v. Balt. City State’s Attorney’s Office, 767 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Balt. City Police Dep’t v. Owens, 575 U.S. 983 (2015). However, § 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)); see Safar v. Tingle, 859 F.3d 241, 245 (4th Cir. 2017). In other words, § 1983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a “person acting under the color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); see Davison v. Randall, 912 F.3d 666, 679 (4th Cir. 2019); Crosby v. City of Gastonia, 635 F.3d 634, 639 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 823 (2011); Wahi v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 562 F.3d 599, 615 (4th Cir. 2009); Jenkins v. Medford, 119 F.3d 1156, 1159-60 (4th Cir. 1997). “The first step in any such claim is to pinpoint the specific right that has been infringed.” Safar, 859 F.3d at 245. The phrase “under color of state law” is an element that “is synonymous with the more familiar state-action requirement—and the analysis for each is identical.” Philips, 572 F.3d at 180 (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 929 (1982)); see also Davison, 912 F.3d at 679. A person acts under color of state law “only when exercising power ‘possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.’” Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317–18 (1981) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313

U.S. 299, 326, (1941)); see also Philips, 572 F.3d at 181 (“[P]rivate activity will generally not be deemed state action unless the state has so dominated such activity as to convert it to state action: Mere approval of or acquiescence in the initiatives of a private party is insufficient.”) . Section 1983 also requires a showing of personal fault based upon a defendant’s own conduct. See Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977) (stating that for an individual defendant to be held liable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must affirmatively show that the official acted personally to deprive the plaintiff of his rights). Thus, the doctrine of respondeat superior liability does not apply in § 1983 cases. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”); see also

Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017); Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 782 (4th Cir. 2004); Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 402 (4th Cir. 2001). Indeed, “‘[i]n a § 1983 suit . . . each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.’” Younger v. Crowder, 79 F.4th 373, 381 n.12 (4th Cir. 2023) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677) (alteration in Younger). If a plaintiff has not alleged any personal connection between a defendant and a denial of constitutional rights, the claim against that defendant must fail. Vinnedge, 550 F.2d at 928; see also Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 171 (4th Cir. 2018) (same); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) (same). But, as the Fourth Circuit articulated in Green v. Beck, 539 F. App’x 78, 80 (4th Cir. 2013), a supervisor may be held liable “for the failings of a subordinate under certain narrow circumstances.” Pursuant to § 1983, liability for supervisory officials “is premised on ‘a recognition that supervisory indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates’ misconduct may be a causative factor in the constitutional injuries they inflict on those committed to their care.’” Baynard v. Malone, 268 F.3d 228, 235 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368,

372 (4th Cir. 1984)); see Campbell v. Florian, 972 F.3d 385, 398 (4th Cir. 2020); Wilkins v. Montgomery, 751 F.3d 214, 226 (4th Cir. 2014). This requires a plaintiff to allege, Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 813 (1994): (1) That the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to . . . the plaintiff; (2) that the supervisor’s response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices; and (3) that there was an affirmative causal link between the supervisor’s inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff. To qualify as “pervasive,” the challenged conduct must be “widespread, or at least . . . used on several different occasions.” Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799. Therefore, it is insufficient to point “to a single incident or isolated incidents, for a supervisor cannot be expected to promulgate rules and procedures covering every conceivable occurrence . . . nor can he reasonably be expected to guard against the deliberate [unlawful] acts of his properly trained employees when he has no basis upon which to anticipate the misconduct.” Id. (quoting Slakan, 737 F.2d at 373) (alteration inserted). But, a supervisor’s “continued inaction in the face of documented widespread abuses . . . provides an independent basis” for § 1983 liability against that official for his deliberate indifference or acquiescence to “the constitutionally offensive conduct of his subordinates.” Slakan, 737 F.2d at 373; see Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799. IV. Discussion A. Montgomery County Correctional Facility Defendants argue that MCCF, as a county agency, is non sui juris, meaning that it is not an entity subject to suit; it cannot be sued independently from Montgomery County. ECF 9-1 at 3-4. As MCCF is simply an agency of Montgomery County and Beitzel does not allege any wrongdoing by Montgomery County, the suit shall be dismissed as to MCCF. See Borkowski v. Balt. Cty., 414

F.Supp. 3d 788, 804 (D. Md. 2019) (finding the Baltimore County Police Department is non sui juris because it is an agency of Baltimore County) (quoting James v. Frederick Cty. Pub. Schs., 441 F.Supp.2d 755, 758 (D. Md. 2006) (internal citations omitted)). B. Corporal Ivey and Corporal Robinette At the time of the events in question, it appears that Beitzel was a pretrial detainee at MCCF.4 Accordingly, his claims are analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Young v. City of Mt. Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 575 (4th Cir. 2001); Hill v. Nicodemus, 979 F.2d 987, 991-92 (4th Cir. 1992). Liberally construed, Beitzel asserts that Ivey and Robinette used excessive force, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. “The constitutional protections afforded a pre-trial

detainee as provided by the Fourteenth Amendment are co-extensive with those provided by the Eighth Amendment.” Barnes v. Wilson, 110 F.Supp.3d 624, 629 (D. Md. 2015) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979)). In turn, the Eighth Amendment proscribes “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” by virtue of its guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. Const, amend. VIII; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976); see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 218 (4th Cir. 2016).

4 In their Motion, defendants refer to Beitzel as a pretrial detainee. See ECF 9-1 at 2. To prevail, Beitzel must show that “the use of force is deliberate – i.e., purposeful or knowing.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396 (2015). Beitzel need not detail his alleged assailant’s subjective state of mind. Rather, “a pretrial detainee must show only that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 396-97; see also Dilworth v. Adams, 841 F.3d 246, 255 (4th Cir. 2016). Objective reasonableness “turns on the ‘facts and circumstances of each particular case.’” Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397 (quoting Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). The court must “make this determination from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at the time, not with 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. at 397. Whether force used by prison officials was excessive is determined by inquiring if “force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U. S. 1, 6-7 (1992). The court must look at the need for application of force; the relationship between that need and the amount of force applied; the extent of the injury inflicted; the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates as reasonably perceived by prison officials; and any efforts made to temper the severity of the response. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986).

The absence of significant injury alone is not dispositive of a claim of excessive force, however. Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010). The extent of injury incurred is one factor indicative of whether the force used was necessary in a particular situation. But, if force is applied maliciously and sadistically liability is not avoided simply because the prisoner had the good fortune to escape serious harm. Id. at 38. Defendants contend that the force used was legally justified. They recount that Beitzel’s description of the altercation includes his intentional violation of the officer’s orders. ECF 9-1 at 4. Further, they argue that “the officers at the time reasonably took precautions that the hidden items Plaintiff was concealing would have been make-shift weapons that would harm either other inmates or themselves.” Id. They offer that they told Beitzel to “’stop resisting’” in an attempt to gain control of the situation and avoid any further hiding of contraband, or make-shift weapons, that could have been deadly to other inmates or the officers themselves.” Id. Defendants characterize Beitzel’s efforts to protect his head and body from the blows as resistance to being handcuffed and a possible effort to hide other contraband. Id.

In defendants’ view, “it is clear that the officers were using only the force necessary to gain compliance from Plaintiff” and the altercation terminated once Beitzel was secured. Id. Defendants may have believed that, when Beitzel curled into a fetal position on the floor, he was attempting to conceal contraband. But, that evidence is not before the court at this juncture. Rather, Beitzel’s allegation is simply that he disobeyed an order by flushing something down the toilet and then defendants Ivey and Robinette proceeded to kick and punch him while he lay on the floor. They then continued to strike him after removing his hands from protecting his head. Put another way, defendants ignore Beitzel’s contention that he submitted to authority when he curled up in a fetal position, yet the officers lifted his hands from his head and continued to beat him in the face. Liberally construing Beitzel’s pleadings, as I must, Beitzel has stated a plausible claim for

relief as to defendants Ivey and Robinette. V. Conclusion I shall grant the Motion as to MCCF and deny it as to Ivey and Robinette. Presumably, discovery will be necessary to elucidate the factual record. Therefore, Beitzel’s request for appointment of counsel is granted. An Order follows.

May 29, 2024 /s/ Date Ellen L. Hollander United States District Judge