Behr v. Commissioner

30 B.T.A. 1291, 1934 BTA LEXIS 1191
CourtUnited States Board of Tax Appeals
DecidedJuly 27, 1934
DocketDocket Nos. 39534, 39538, 39568, 39569.
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 30 B.T.A. 1291 (Behr v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Board of Tax Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Behr v. Commissioner, 30 B.T.A. 1291, 1934 BTA LEXIS 1191 (bta 1934).

Opinion

OPINION.

Seawell :

These proceedings, which were consolidated for hearing and report, involve the liability of the petitioners as transferees for unpaid income tax of the Lou Anger Oil Syndicate for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1924. The liability being asserted against each petitioner is $8,336.13, the amount of tax determined to be due from the Syndicate.

The petitions filed by Adolph Ramish and Adolph Ramish, Inc., allege as error the failure of the respondent to find that the trans-feror was taxable as a trust, and, in the alternative, failure to allow the Syndicate certain amounts as deductions for depreciation and depletion, and to apportion the tax among the holders of certificates of beneficial interest in the Syndicate. Gore Brothers, Inc., alleges in its petition that the respondent erred in determining that the Syndicate was taxable as a corporation and that it made any profit from its investment in the Syndicate, and that the respondent incorrectly computed the net income of the Syndicate. The petitions of Adolph [1292]*1292Eamisb and Adolph Ramish, Inc., contain allegations that the Syndicate disposed of its property in July 1926, and that during August 1926 it distributed the proceeds of the sale ratably among its certificate holders, Adolph Ramish receiving $46,032.17 and Adolph Ramish, Inc., $20,000. These allegations of fact the respondent admitted in his answers. The petition filed by Gore Brothers, Inc., contains no like allegations of fact, but in his answer the respondent alleged that subsequent to June 30, 1924, the Syndicate disposed of its assets and distributed the proceeds thereof ratably among its members, the petitioner receiving an amount in excess of the tax due from the Syndicate. The petitions filed by Adolph Ramish and Adolph Ramish, Inc., contain a prayer asking the Board to find that there is no liability at law or in equity on the part of the petitioner for any deficiency in tax of the Syndicate. The petition filed by Gore Brothers, Inc., contains a prayer asking the Board to “ herein redetermine the deficiency herein complained of.”

At the conclusion o.f the hearing counsel for the petitioners moved to amend the petitions to conform to the proof, and at a date set therefor amendments to the petitions were received over objection by the respondent. Each of the amendments alleges as error the respondent’s determination that the petitioner is a transferee of the Syndicate under section 280 of the Revenue Act of 1926, “ for the reason that at all times material to the issue the said Syndicate was solvent and had sufficient assets to meet all alleged assessments for proposed deficiencies against the taxpayer,” and that the respondent had not exhausted his remedies against the Syndicate for the collection o,f the tax alleged to be due. Each amendment contains a prayer asking the Board to determine that the petitioner is not liable at law or in equity for any deficiency in tax of the Syndicate. The amendment made to the petition filed in the case of Adolph Ramish also alleges as an additional error the respondent’s finding that the petitioner received any distribution from the Syndicate.

The respondent has moved to strike the several amendments to the petitions, claiming that their effect is to shift to him the burden of the proof as to questions not theretofore in issue. In other words, he says that at the time proof was received the petitions raised no question as to the liability of the petitioners as transferees.

Section 602 of the Revenue Act of 1928, under which the hearings were had, places on the respondent the burden of proof that a petitioner is liable as a transferee of property of a taxpayer.

We have heretofore held that where a petitioner admits the receipt of assets in liquidation of a corporation, the amount of tax alleged to be due from the petitioner’s transferor may not be [1293]*1293asserted against him in the absence of proof by the Commissioner of the value of the assets received. Ludwig Vogelstein, 16 B.T.A. 947; Willard H. Ashton, 28 B.T.A. 582. The statute also places on the Commissioner the burden of proving that the assets transferred to the transferee rendered the transferor insolvent. Samuel Keller, 21 B.T.A. 84; aff'd., 59 Fed. (2d) 499; Mrs. J. F. Alexander, 27 B.T.A. 1210; Willard H. Ashton, supra.

In the stipulation of facts filed at the hearing the parties agree that the Syndicate is taxable as a corporation, and that certain distributions, as set forth therein, were made in 1926 to the holders of certificates of beneficial interest in the Syndicate. The pleadings and stipulation both show that Adolph Famish, Inc., received a distribution of $20,000. The pleadings show that Adolph Famish received $46,032.17, but the stipulation contains no agreement as to a distribution to him in his individual capacity. In the case of Gore Brothers, Inc., the pleadings contain no admission of a distribution, whereas the stipulation shows that it received $34,767.50. There are no allegations and admissions in the pleadings or agreements in the stipulation that the distributions resulted in insolvency of the Syndicate.

That the respondent recognized the burden placed upon him by the statute to prove transferee liability of the petitioners seems clear from the record. In addition to the facts respecting distributions, the stipulation sets forth the net amount received by the Syndicate from the sale of its working interest in a certain oil and gas lease, including the improvements on the leased property; the balance sheet of the Syndicate as of June 30, 1926, and the condition of its accounts on September 2, 1926; the time when the Syndicate ceased drilling operations and operation of oil wells; the issuance of a distraint warrant for the collection of the tax alleged to be due from the Syndicate; and the holders of certificates of beneficial interest in the Syndicate as of May 1, 1926, and at all times thereafter important to the question, and the distributions received by them in June, August, and September 1926. The stipulation of facts would not have been necessary had there been no issue as to the liability of the petitioners as transferees of the Syndicate, and the extent of that liability.

The opening statement of counsel for the petitioners shows that the claims of the respondent were being resisted on the grounds, among others affecting the tax liability of the Syndicate, that the Syndicate was solvent after the distributions were made, and that the respondent had not exhausted his remedies against the transferor for the collection of the tax. Counsel for the respondent did not challenge this statement of the issues, and in his opening statement [1294]*1294said that, “As to question of transferee liability, I expect to show that this syndicate sold .its oil lease and property used in connection therewith, to the Julian Petroleum Corporation, in the year 1926, and that soon thereafter th.e proceeds of this sale were distributed to the unit holders.” All of the facts necessary to redetermine the tax liability of the Syndicate were stipulated, and all of the testimony taken and documents received in evidence at the hearing related to the liability of petitioners as transferees. The respondent subpoenaed four former trustees of the Syndicate to testify in his behalf and was the moving party at the hearing.

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Related

Taylor v. Commissioner
1970 T.C. Memo. 109 (U.S. Tax Court, 1970)
Behr v. Commissioner
30 B.T.A. 1291 (Board of Tax Appeals, 1934)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
30 B.T.A. 1291, 1934 BTA LEXIS 1191, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/behr-v-commissioner-bta-1934.