Beene v. St. Vincent Mercy Medical Center

111 F. Supp. 2d 931, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11981, 2000 WL 1182437
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Ohio
DecidedJune 20, 2000
Docket3:99CV7114
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 111 F. Supp. 2d 931 (Beene v. St. Vincent Mercy Medical Center) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Beene v. St. Vincent Mercy Medical Center, 111 F. Supp. 2d 931, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11981, 2000 WL 1182437 (N.D. Ohio 2000).

Opinion

*933 ORDER

CARR, District Judge.

This is an employment discrimination case in which plaintiff Debra Beene alleges she was discriminated against at her job with St. Vincent Mercy Medical Center (St. Vincent). This Court has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1381. Pending is defendants’ motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 19). For the following reasons, defendants’ motion shall be granted.

BACKGROUND

St. Vincent hired Ms. Beene in November 1985 to work as a registered nurse. Ms. Beene is African American. On May 22,1998, St. Vincent discharged Ms. Beene after 13 years of service.

Prior to her discharge, Ms. Beene was assigned to the Cardiac ICU, known as Unit IB, where she provided nursing care to seriously ill cardiac patients. Linda Baumgartner, the nurse manager of Unit IB, was responsible for supervising Ms. Beene and other registered nurses in the ICU. As part of her supervisory duties, Ms. Baumgartner, who is white, ensured that all nurses in her charge treated patients with the requisite degree of care. If they did not, Ms. Baumgartner was responsible for disciplining them in accordance with St. Vincent’s policy on poor work performance.

St. Vincent’s work performance policy sets forth five categories of disciplinary infractions. With each increase in level, the infraction at issue becomes more serious and the discipline more severe. At Level I, the employee receives coaching so that she learns not to repeat her mistake in the future. At Level II, the employee is issued a written warning. At Level III, the employee is suspended for the first time. At Level IV, the employee receives a second, longer suspension, Finally, at Level V, the employee is discharged.

The seriousness of an infraction is determined by a point system. In cases where the infraction involves the incorrect administration of medication, St. Vincent has created a Medication Error Analysis Tool that values such errors numerically. Factors such as the type of drug, drug dosage, reporting and discovery time, and the intervention required to fix an error all contribute to the number of points counted. If multiple errors are made, the points are added up, and the employee’s supervisor metes out punishment in accordance with a grid that demarcates the five levels:

Points Seriousness Discipline
1-15 Level I Error Coaching
16-28 Level II Error Written Warning
29-40 Level III Error First Suspension
41-50 Level IV Error Second Suspension
50+ Level V Error Discharge

A. First Suspension

On January 17, 1996, Ms. Baumgartner suspended Ms. Beene. The circumstances surrounding this suspension began when Ms. Baumgartner received a complaint from Debra Longstreet, the nurse-manager of the Department of Oncology at St. Vincent. According to Ms. Longstreet, a patient transferred into her department from Unit IB had very high potassium levels in his blood. After reviewing the patient’s medical chart, Ms. Longstreet discovered that 1) the patient had a high potassium reading of 5.5 while on Unit IB before being transferred, 2) the patient’s Unit IB nurse had taken no action (such as informing the patient’s doctor), resulting in a dangerously high potassium count of 6.2, and 3) the patient’s medical chart had not been completed by the Unit IB nurse.

Ms. Longstreet deemed the potassium error so serious that she filled out an incident report. In her report, Ms. Longstreet observed that the patient in question was suffering from kidney dysfunction, and that elevated potassium levels in kidney patients is particularly dangerous.

Ms. Baumgartner later identified Ms. Beene as the nurse who had cared for the patient before he was transferred to the Department of Oncology. Because Ms. Beene was under Ms. Baumgartner’s su *934 pervision, Ms. Baumgartner conducted a full investigation. Dui-ing this investigation, additional medication errors involving three other patients in Ms. Beene’s care were uncovered.

In a meeting with Ms. Baumgartner, Ms. Beene denied that the Oncology patient’s potassium levels reached 5.5. She acknowledged, however, that she had observed a reading of at least 5.0. Ms. Beene further claimed that she did, in fact, notify the patient’s doctor of the high potassium levels, contrary to Ms. Longstreet’s conclusion that no action had been taken. Ms. Baumgartner responded that there was no documentation to support Ms. Beene’s alleged call to the doctor, and that the 5.5 reading clearly was noted in the laboratory section of the medical chart.

In another case involving another patient, Ms. Baumgartner learned that Ms. Beene failed to document that she had administered Lasix, a diuretic drug. Ms. Beene did not dispute this error.

A medication error involving yet another patient related to Ms. Beene’s failure to verify that a PTT lab test had been ordered from the laboratory. Ms. Beene did not dispute that the doctor’s PTT order had not been implemented, but claimed that she had instructed a clerk to follow through on the test, and the clerk was at fault for not doing so. Ms. Baumgartner responded that it was Ms. Beene’s responsibility to confirm that the test was, in fact, ordered by the clerk.

In accordance with the Medication Error Analysis Tool, Ms. Baumgartner assigned 18 points to Ms. Beene’s failure to take action on the high potassium reading, 17 points to the Lasix error, and 17 points to the PTT^error. Two other medication errors resulted in an additional 18 points.

After completing her investigation, Ms. Baumgartner consulted Kimberly Edwards, a human resources representative at St. Vincent, to determine the level of discipline to impose on Ms. Beene. Although the point total (80) exceeded the highest level of seriousness, and could have resulted in Ms. Beene’s discharge, Ms. Edwards recommended a lesser punishment: “first suspension.” Ms. Beene was given a first suspension in view of her many years of employment.

Ms. Beene appealed her suspension in accordance with St. Vincent’s grievance procedure. A hearing was held. After the hearing, points for two of the medication errors were dropped and the points for the Lasix error were reduced. But Ms. Baumgartner’s findings with regard to the PTT and potassium errors were upheld. The new number of points totaled 43, enough to warrant a Level III “second suspension,” and thus the first suspension was allowed to stand.

Ms. Beene did not file a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regarding her first suspension.

B. Second Suspension

On October 1, 1997, Ms. Beene received a second suspension. This suspension arose out of the death of a patient under Ms. Beene’s care. The patient had a heart attack, but the alarms on his cardiac monitor, intended to alert the hospital staff in the event of an attack, were disengaged. Thus, no audible alarm was sounded when the patient went into arrest. The patient later died.

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Bluebook (online)
111 F. Supp. 2d 931, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11981, 2000 WL 1182437, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/beene-v-st-vincent-mercy-medical-center-ohnd-2000.