Becker v. Bishop

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Becker v. Bishop

259 S.E.2d 209, 151 Ga. App. 224, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2505

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedSeptember 5, 1979

Docket58136

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 259 S.E.2d 209 (Becker v. Bishop) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Becker v. Bishop, 259 S.E.2d 209, 151 Ga. App. 224, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2505 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979).

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Opinion

Carley, Judge.

Plaintiff appeals from an order setting aside a previously entered default judgment and granting defendant’s motion for a new trial. The order allowed defendant to answer, counterclaim and proceed to trial as soon as possible and the effect is to continue the pendency of the case in the trial court. The judgment is not final as contemplated by Code Ann. § 6-701 (a) 1 (Ga. L . 1965, p. 18; 1968, pp. 1072, 1073; 1975, pp. 757, 758). The judgment was not final and is not of the type from which direct appeal may be taken pursuant to Code Ann. § 6-701 (a) 3. An interlocutory appeal is cognizable only if the trial judge issues a certificate of immediate review pursuant to Code Ann. § 6-701 (a) 2 (A) and the appellate court grants permission for direct appeal pursuant to an application filed in accordance with the provisions of Code Ann. § 6-701 (a) 2 (B). Since plaintiff neither obtained a certificate of immediate review nor applied to this court for permission for direct appeal, the appeal is premature and must be dismissed. Notrica v. Southern Bell Tel. &c. Co., 147 Ga. App. 737 (250 SE2d 196) (1978); First Nat. Bank v. Hudson, 139 Ga. App. 629 (229 SE2d 109) (1976); Bouldin v. Mote, 136 Ga. App. 73 (220 SE2d 79) (1975).

Appeal dismissed.

Deen, C. J., and Shulman, J., concur.

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Carley, Judge.

Plaintiff appeals from an order setting aside a previously entered default judgment and granting defendant’s motion for a new trial. The order allowed defendant to answer, counterclaim and proceed to trial as soon as possible and the effect is to continue the pendency of the case in the trial court. The judgment is not final as contemplated by Code Ann. § 6-701 (a) 1 (Ga. L . 1965, p. 18; 1968, pp. 1072, 1073; 1975, pp. 757, 758). The judgment was not final and is not of the type from which direct appeal may be taken pursuant to Code Ann. § 6-701 (a) 3. An interlocutory appeal is cognizable only if the trial judge issues a certificate of immediate review pursuant to Code Ann. § 6-701 (a) 2 (A) and the appellate court grants permission for direct appeal pursuant to an application filed in accordance with the provisions of Code Ann. § 6-701 (a) 2 (B). Since plaintiff neither obtained a certificate of immediate review nor applied to this court for permission for direct appeal, the appeal is premature and must be dismissed. Notrica v. Southern Bell Tel. &c. Co., 147 Ga. App. 737 (250 SE2d 196) (1978); First Nat. Bank v. Hudson, 139 Ga. App. 629 (229 SE2d 109) (1976); Bouldin v. Mote, 136 Ga. App. 73 (220 SE2d 79) (1975).

Appeal dismissed.

Deen, C. J., and Shulman, J., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

259 S.E.2d 209, 151 Ga. App. 224, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2505, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/becker-v-bishop-gactapp-1979.

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