Beaumont v. Paucek

CourtDistrict Court, D. Maryland
DecidedAugust 29, 2025
Docket8:24-cv-01723
StatusUnknown

This text of Beaumont v. Paucek (Beaumont v. Paucek) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Beaumont v. Paucek, (D. Md. 2025).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND MICHAEL BEAUMONT, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, Case No. 24-cv-1723-ABA v. CHRISTOPHER PAUCEK,et al., Defendants MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Peter Gysbers has brought a securities class action against three officers of 2U, Inc., an online education company that works with colleges and universities to deliver content to students seeking online degrees.2U filed for bankruptcy in July 2024. Plaintiff has sued on behalf of a putative class of investors who acquired 2U stock between February 9, 2022 and February 14, 2024 (the “Class Period”), alleging that Defendants Christopher Paucek, Paul Lalljie, and Matt Norden made materially false and/or misleading statements to shareholders and investors about 2U’s business. Defendants have moved to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim, which the Court will grant for the reasons that follow. I. BACKGROUND At the pleadings stage, the Court “must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 212 (4th Cir. 2016). Plaintiff alleges as follows. A. The Parties 2U is a publicly traded online education company incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in Maryland. ECF No. 41 ¶ 29.2U’s “stated objective is to work with [colleges and universities] to take their classes online and make high online learning accessible, scalable, and sustainable.” Id. ¶ 37. “For a time,” Plaintiff alleges, 2U “found

success operating through two segments”: (1) the Degree Program, which “delivers content, in partnership with established colleges and universities, to students seeking an online undergraduate or graduate degree,” and (2) the Alternative Credentials segment, which “offers online open courses, boot camps, and micro-credential programs, also in partnership with colleges and universities, for shorter duration and lower-priced non- degree offerings.” Id. ¶ 40. 2U went public in March 2014, raising $119 million at $13 per share. Id. ¶ 39. 2U went on to expand its offerings through strategic acquisitions of training programs and through partnerships with colleges and universities (“Partner Institutions”). Id. Part of 2U’s business model has been based on U.S. Department of Education guidance regarding revenue sharing between higher education institutions and “online-program

managers” (“OPMs”). Plaintiff alleges that although the Higher Education Act of 1965 prohibits “incentive compensation” for securing student enrollment or financial aid (other than with respect to international students), DOE guidance issued in 2011 “allow[ing] OPMs to bypass the ban [on incentive compensation based on enrollment] if they offer colleges additional services beyond recruitment, such as marketing or course design.” Id. ¶¶ 41, 43. Plaintiff alleges that although “the law still prohibits paying bonuses or commissions to recruiters for securing enrollments, the OPM for-profit business model relies on revenue-sharing with nonprofit universities in exchange for bundled services provided to students and the institution.” Id.¶ 43. 2U’s Degree Program “used a revenue sharing model where it typically took 60% of tuition fees from Partner Institutions.” Id. ¶ 44. Christopher Paucek (“Paucek”) was 2U’s co-founder and CEO from 2012 until November 16, 2023. Id. ¶ 26. Paul Lalljie (“Lalljie”) was 2U’s CFO from October 16, 2019

to November 16, 2023, at which point he replaced Paucek as CEO. Id. ¶ 27. Matt Norden (“Norden”) is 2U’s Chief Legal Officer, and has also served as CFO since replacing Lalljie when he became CEO. Id. ¶ 28. B. Factual Allegations On November 16, 2021, 2U acquired edX, a nonprofit online course provider that is considered “one of the world’s most comprehensive ‘free-to-degree’ online learning platforms,” for $800 million. Id.¶ 56-57.2U, in making this acquisition, purportedly “sought to leverage an industry-leading platform, to offer degrees, boot camps, professional certificates, and free courses, all in one place and easily accessible to millions of learners around the world.” Id. ¶ 58. By consolidating its offerings onto a single platform, 2U hoped to “reach a global audience and lower advertising costs.” Id. ¶

56. But to develop and build out the edX platform, 2U determined it would have to provide more flexibility to Partner Institutions. Id. ¶ 58. In 2022, 2U updated its revenue sharing model with a “Core Degree Bundle at 35% revenue share, which includes program design, management, mark[eting], and student support.” Id. ¶ 59. Partner Institutions could then add additional services for higher revenue shares. Id. 2U also “began to offer revenue sharing points for tuition reduction to encourage new and existing Partner Institutions to lower the cost of their online degree programs.” Id. “Defendants heralded edX as a revolutionary platform that would improve 2U’s business.” Id.¶ 62. For example, shortly after the edX acquisition in its FY 2021 Press Releaseon 2U’s fiscal results for the fourth quarter of 20211,2U stated that through“the addition of edX and our transition to a platform company, we have established a strategic and financial framework for achieving our midterm goals and creating

shareholder value.” Id. (emphasis omitted). And, at the time, “financial analysts were impressed by 2U and edX.” Id. ¶¶ 63-65. But Plaintiff alleges that, from early on after acquiring edX, “2U failed to invest the necessary resources to implement its platform strategy” and “edX had a challenging interface and generated poor prospects who had no intention of paying for any services.” Id. ¶ 102. Throughout the Class Period, “Partner Institutions expressed concerns with 2U about the quality of its programs, enrollment numbers, and marketing efforts.” Id. ¶ 85. 2U would hold weekly or bi-weekly meetings with its Partner Institutions, as well as quarterly and annual business reviews, “to monitor program enrollments.” Id. ¶ 86. According to former employees, the quarterly and annual business reviews “became an opportunity for schools to ‘air grievances,’” id., and “Partner Institutions were realizing

that they could provide online education programs on their own without 2U’s services.” Id. ¶ 87. In particular, Partner Institutions expressed dissatisfaction with 2U’s inability to increase enrollments as much as promised, and they were also concerned about 2U’s decision to decrease its budget for marketing campaigns. Id. ¶¶ 88-91. One such example of a dissatisfied Partner Institution was the University of Southern California

12U’s fiscal year appears to be aligned with the calendar year, e.g., FY2021 was January to December 2021. (“USC”), and a former employee made clear that Paucek “was a highly engaged executive who was very concerned about the USC program.” Id. ¶ 96. Partner Institutions allegedly were disappointed with edX because it did not provide easily digestible content and did not adequately differentiate one school’s offerings from another, id. ¶ 104,and the prospective students who were attracted to the edX platform were of “poor quality,”

id. ¶ 105. At the same time, the online education market,which had boomed during the COVID-19 pandemic, was changing. Id. ¶ 106. That, along with the Alternative Credential Segments starting to “cost[] too much to be profitable,” led to 2U’s alleged inability to be profitable. Id. 2U began to “sunset” contracts with Partner Institutions during 2023. Id. ¶¶ 123- 126. On November 9, 2023, “[w]ithout warning . . . 2U and USC announced that they would wind down their 15-year partnership.” Id. ¶ 118. USC agreed to pay almost $40 million for its withdrawal. Id. ¶ 119.

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