Beatriz Vielma-Benavides v. Kristi Noem, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: June 12, 2026
• Docket: 2:26-cv-01598
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Beatriz Vielma-Benavides, No. CV-26-01598-PHX-RM

10 Petitioner, ORDER

11 v.

12 Kristi Noem, et al.,

13 Respondents. 14 15 Petitioner Beatriz Vielma-Benavides challenges her immigration detention under 28 16 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1.) For the following reasons, the § 2241 Petition will be granted to 17 the extent Petitioner requests a bond hearing at which the Government bears the burden of 18 proving by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner is a flight risk or a danger to the 19 community. 20 I. Background 21 Petitioner is a native and citizen of Venezuela who entered the United States without 22 inspection on December 6, 2023, and was apprehended by the United States Border Patrol. 23 (Doc. 1 at 3, 5; Doc. 8-1 at 1-2.) On December 8, 2023, Petitioner was issued a Notice to 24 Appear that charged her with violating Section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and 25 Nationality Act. (Doc. 8-1 at 2.) Petitioner was then released on her own recognizance. 26 (Id.) On November 21, 2025, Petitioner was arrested in Utah for unlawful detention and 27 domestic violence in the presence of a child. (Id.) Immigration and Customs Enforcement 28 (“ICE”) took Petitioner into custody on February 10, 2026. (Id.) Petitioner alleges in her 1 § 2241 Petition that her prolonged detention violates Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 2 (2001), and that her detention—including her re-detention without a pre-deprivation 3 hearing—violates due process. (Doc. 1.) 4 In their Response to the § 2241 Petition, Respondents argue that Petitioner is subject 5 to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225, and that she was not entitled to a pre- 6 deprivation hearing prior to her re-arrest and re-detention. (Doc. 8.) On April 16, 2026, 7 Magistrate Judge Deborah M. Fine issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) (Doc. 8 18), recommending that the § 2241 Petition be granted and Petitioner be provided a bond 9 hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). On April 21, 2026—prior to the expiration of the 10 period for filing objections to the R&R—an immigration judge held a bond hearing. (Doc. 11 21 at 2; Doc. 21-1.) The immigration judge noted that the R&R is not a final order of the 12 United States District Court; denied bond for lack of jurisdiction based on a finding that 13 Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention; and in the alternative stated that he would 14 deny bond on the grounds of both dangerousness and flight risk. (Doc. 21-1.) 15 Petitioner then filed a Motion to Enforce Judgment, asking the Court to order her 16 release or to require a new bond hearing in front of a different immigration judge at which 17 the Government would bear the burden of proving dangerousness or flight risk by clear 18 and convincing evidence. (Doc. 19.) Respondents filed a Response (Doc. 21), and 19 Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 22).1 In their Response, Respondents argue that placing the 20 burden of proof upon the alien in § 1226 bond hearings facially satisfies due process, and 21 this Court has no authority to shift the burden to the government. (Doc. 21 at 2-3.) 22 Respondents further argue that this Court has no authority to second guess the immigration 23 judge’s weighing of the evidence during Petitioner’s bond hearing. (Id. at 4-5.) 24 II. Discussion 25 A district judge “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 26 recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). As discussed 27 below, the Court accepts the R&R’s finding that Petitioner’s detention is governed by 8 28 1 The Reply was erroneously titled and docketed as a second Motion to Enforce Judgment. 1 U.S.C. § 1226 rather than § 1225 (Doc. 18), but the Court modifies the R&R’s 2 recommended relief. 3 A. Detention Under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 4 Respondents did not object to the R&R, instead providing Petitioner with a bond 5 hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226—as recommended in the R&R—prior to the expiration of 6 the period for filing R&R objections. The Court therefore finds that Respondents have 7 abandoned and waived any argument that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention 8 under 8 U.S.C. § 1225, and the Court accepts and adopts the R&R’s finding that 9 Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1226. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985) 10 (“It does not appear that Congress intended to require district court review of a magistrate’s 11 factual or legal conclusions, under a de novo or any other standard, when neither party 12 objects to those findings.”). 13 Even if Respondents had not abandoned their prior contention that Petitioner is 14 subject to mandatory detention under § 1225, the Court would find under de novo review 15 that Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1226, based on the reasoning set forth in 16 Echevarria v. Bondi, CV-25-03252-PHX-DWL (ESW), 2025 WL 2821282 (D. Ariz. 17 2025). 18 B. Zadvydas and Detention Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 19 Petitioner alleges in her Petition that her detention violates Zadvydas, but the Court 20 agrees with the R&R that Zadvydas is inapplicable. After the entry of a final removal 21 order, there is a 90-day period during which the alien ordered removed must be detained. 22 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(A). If removal does not occur during the 90-day period, further 23 detention is statutorily authorized under certain circumstances. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). In 24 Zadvydas, the Court held that detention beyond the 90-day removal period is presumptively 25 reasonable for 6 months; if an alien shows after the conclusion of the 6-month period that 26 there is no significant likelihood of his removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, 27 however, she should be released. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.2 The Supreme Court’s

28 2 The 6-month presumptively reasonable period includes the 90-day statutory removal period. Ma v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095, 1102 n.5 (9th Cir. 2001). 1 holding in Zadvydas is confined to § 1231(a)(6). Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 298 2 (2018). 3 Here, there is no indication that Petitioner is subject to a final removal order, and 4 therefore she is not being detained under § 1231. Accordingly, Zadvydas does not apply. 5 C. Due Process 6 Many district courts have held that individuals like Petitioner who were released 7 from immigration detention are entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing prior to any re-arrest 8 or re-detention as a matter of due process. See, e.g., Guillermo M. R. v. Kaiser, 791 F. 9 Supp. 3d 1021 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (holding that petitioner released on bond had protected 10 liberty interest in continued release); Tinoco v. Noem, 818 F. Supp. 3d 1141 (E.D. Cal. 11 Dec. 14, 2025) (granting petitioner’s temporary restraining order for immediate release 12 from custody where petitioner was released on an order of release on recognizance and 13 later re-detained without a bond hearing); Rico-Tapia v. Smith, 806 F. Supp. 3d 1166, 1182- 14 84 (D. Haw. 2025) (same); Aguirre Solis v. Noem, 2:26-cv-00053-RFB-EJY, 2026 WL 15 396432, at *2, *5-8 (D. Nev. Feb. 12, 2026) (concluding petitioner’s re-detention after 16 release on recognizance without a hearing and opportunity for release was unlawful under 17 the Immigration and Nationality Act and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 18 and ordering his immediate release from detention). 19 The three-pronged test articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge explains “[t]he 20 fundamental requirement of [procedural] due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a 21 meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” 424 U.S. 319, 332, 333 (1976) (quoting 22 Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). To determine whether procedural 23 protections satisfy the Due Process Clause, courts consider three factors: (1) “the private 24 interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation 25 of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional 26 or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the 27 function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 28 procedural requirement would entail.” Id. at 335. 1 As to the first factor, being free from physical detention is “the most elemental of 2 liberty interests.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529-30 (2004) (directing courts, when 3 assessing the first Mathews factor, to consider only the petitioner’s interests at stake in 4 ongoing detention without consideration of the respondents’ justifications for the 5 detention). An individual’s interest in being free from detention “lies at the heart of the 6 liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (citing Foucha 7 v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (“Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at 8 the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.”)); see also Hernandez v. 9 Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 2017) (“the government’s discretion to incarcerate 10 non-citizens is always constrained by the requirements of due process”). Here, Petitioner 11 has been detained for approximately four months, and she was detained for over two 12 months before receiving a bond hearing. Although “the longer the duration of detention, 13 the greater the deprivation of a noncitizen’s private interest,” L.G. v. Choate, 744 F. Supp. 14 3d 1172, 1183 (D. Colo. 2024), courts have found that the private interest in freedom from 15 detention is so weighty that even detention of less than three months without § 1226(a) 16 process means that the first Mathews factor must cut in a detainee’s favor. See Velasquez 17 Salazar v. Dedos, 806 F. Supp. 3d 1231, 1243 (D.N.M. 2025); see also Colmenares-Pinto 18 v. Warden of Golden State Annex Ice Det. Facility, No. 1:26-CV-00812 DAD SCR, 2026 19 WL 923804 at *5 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2026), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:26- 20 CV-00812-DAD-SCR, 2026 WL 1430913 (E.D. Cal. May 21, 2026). Given that Petitioner 21 was detained for over two months without receiving any § 1226(a) process, the Court finds 22 that the first Mathews factor favors Petitioner. 23 As to the second factor, “the risk of an erroneous deprivation [of liberty] is high” 24 when a noncitizen is re-detained without “any bond or custody redetermination hearing.” 25 Dushyant v. Albarran, No. 1:26-cv-00502-JLT-SKO (HC), 2026 WL 682887, at *4 (E.D. 26 Cal. Mar. 11, 2026), report & recommendation adopted in relevant part, 2026 WL 785831 27 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2026) (ordering immediate release). “Civil immigration detention, 28 which is ‘nonpunitive in purpose and effect[,]’ is justified when a noncitizen presents a risk 1 of flight or danger to the community.” Id. (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; Padilla v. 2 ICE, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2023)). 3 Here, Petitioner was released on her own recognizance after immigration officials 4 necessarily determined that she was not a flight risk or a danger to the community, and she 5 was then re-arrested without a pre-deprivation hearing and detained for over two months 6 without any bond hearing at which a neutral arbiter could determine whether changed 7 circumstances had rendered her a flight risk or a danger to the community. When 8 Petitioner was afforded a bond hearing on April 21, 2026, the immigration judge found 9 Petitioner subject to mandatory detention and accordingly denied bond for lack of 10 jurisdiction. (Doc. 21-1 at 1.) Although the immigration judge made an alternative finding 11 that Petitioner is a flight risk and a danger to the community (id.), the risk of erroneous 12 deprivation of liberty remains high because that finding was made post hoc and as an 13 alternative finding to the immigration judge’s primary conclusion that Petitioner was not 14 entitled to a bond hearing at all. Ordering a new bond hearing at which the Government 15 bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner is a flight risk 16 or a danger or the community will reduce the risk of the continuing erroneous deprivation 17 of Petitioner’s liberty interests. The second Mathews factor weighs in favor of Petitioner. 18 Finally, as to the third Mathews factor, “[i]f the government wishes to re-arrest [a 19 petitioner] at any point, it has the power to take steps toward doing so; but its interest in 20 doing so without a hearing is low.” Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. 21 2019). Further, detention hearings in immigration courts are commonplace and impose 22 minimal cost. Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1094 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2025). 23 Respondents’ interest here is lower because Petitioner was previously released on bond 24 after immigration officials necessarily determined that she was not a flight risk or a danger 25 to the community. See Pinchi v. Noem, No. 25-cv-05632-RMI (RFL), 2025 WL 1853763, 26 at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 4, 2025); see also Singh v. Andrews, 803 F. Supp. 3d 1035, 1048 27 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2025) (“On balance, the Mathews factors show that petitioner is entitled 28 to process, and that process should have been provided before petitioner was detained.”); 1 Telenchana v. Hermosillo, 2:26-cv-00363-GJL, 2026 WL 696806, at *7-9 (W.D. Wash. 2 Mar. 12, 2026) (concluding that re-detention of petitioners who had been released on their 3 own recognizance violated due process under the Mathews framework because petitioners 4 had “established liberty interests,” “the absence of pre-deprivation procedures in their re- 5 detentions created an unacceptably high risk of erroneous deprivations,” and “the 6 governmental interest in their re-detention without adequate process [was] minimal or non- 7 existent”). 8 As discussed above, the immigration judge at Petitioner’s April 21, 2026 bond 9 hearing made an alternative finding that Petitioner is a flight risk and a danger to the 10 community. (Doc. 21-1 at 1.) The Government’s interest in detaining a noncitizen subject 11 to 8 U.S.C. § 1226 outweighs the noncitizen’s liberty interests if the noncitizen “is a flight 12 risk or a danger to the community.” Velasquez Salazar, 806 F. Supp. 3d at 1244. However, 13 shifting the burden of proof “to the Government to justify detention may actually promote 14 the Government’s separate interest in managing overcrowding at [Department of 15 Homeland Security] detention facilities.” Id. Furthermore, shifting the burden of proof 16 does not “impose an unreasonable administrative or fiscal burden on the Government,” in 17 light of the vast resources at the Government’s disposal to gather information about 18 individuals’ eligibility for bond. Id. 19 Weighing the Mathews factors, the Court finds that the procedures so far afforded 20 to Petitioner have not been sufficient to comport with due process. 21 D. Remedy 22 In general, during a bond hearing conducted under § 1226(a), “the burden is on the 23 noncitizen to demonstrate that their ‘release would not pose a danger to property or persons, 24 and that the [noncitizen] is likely to appear for any future proceeding.’” Velasquez Salazar, 25 806 F. Supp. 3d at 1242 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8)). The Ninth Circuit held in 26 Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland that placing the burden of proof upon a noncitizen during a § 27 1226(a) bond hearing is facially constitutional. 53 F.4th 1189, 1213 (9th Cir. 2022). 28 However, “in so holding, [the Rodriguez Diaz court] [did] not foreclose all as-applied 1 challenges to § 1226(a)’s procedures.” Id. “Individualized circumstances” may “warrant[] 2 additional procedures[.]” Id. 3 Given that Petitioner had a liberty interest in her release, was re-arrested without a 4 pre-deprivation hearing, and was held in custody without any bond hearing for over two 5 months, the Court finds that the individualized circumstances of Petitioner’s case warrant 6 additional procedures beyond those provided for by §1226(a). Specifically, the Court finds 7 that due process requires the Government to bear the burden of proving by clear and 8 convincing evidence that Petitioner is a flight risk or a danger to the community. Singh v. 9 Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203–05 (9th Cir. 2011), abrogated in part as recognized by 10 Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th 1189; Aleman Gonzalez v. Barr, 955 F.3d 762, 781 (9th Cir. 11 2020), rev’d and remanded on other grounds, 596 U.S. 543 (2022). 12 IT IS ORDERED: 13 1. Magistrate Judge Fine’s Report and Recommendation (Doc. 18) is partially 14 adopted and partially modified, as set forth above. 15 2. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is granted to the extent 16 Petitioner requests a bond hearing at which the Government bears the burden 17 of proving by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner is a flight risk or 18 a danger to the community. 19 3. Respondents must provide Petitioner a new bond hearing within seven (7) 20 days of the date this Order is filed. The bond hearing shall comport with the 21 procedural requirements of Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2011). 22 There must be a contemporaneous record of the hearing, and the Government 23 bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner 24 is a flight risk or danger to the community. In the alternative, the 25 Government shall immediately release Petitioner under appropriate 26 conditions of release. 27 4. Respondents must provide a notice of compliance within two (2) days of 28 Petitioner’s bond hearing or release. 1 5. The Clerk of Court is directed to deny as moot any pending Motions (Docs. 2 11, 19, 22), enter judgment in favor of Petitioner, and close this case. 3 Dated this 12th day of June, 2026. 4

7 WNYC Honorable Rosthiary □□□□□□□ 8 United States District □□□□□ 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

-9-