Beas-Campo v. Case

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: June 22, 2023
• Docket: 4:23-cv-00199
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Melina Angelica Beas-Campo, No. CV-23-00199-TUC-JCH

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Hilary L Case, et al.,

13 Defendants. 14 15 Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint ("FAC"). Doc. 10. 16 Plaintiff was previously granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis and her Complaint was 17 screened and dismissed without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2). Doc. 8. With leave 18 of Court, Plaintiff filed her FAC on June 1, 2023. See Docs. 8, 10. The Court screens the 19 FAC under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss 20 the FAC and give Plaintiff one final opportunity to amend her complaint. 21 I. Background 22 The FAC names the following defendants: (1) Arizona Department of Child Safety 23 ("DCS"); (2) DCS employee Hilary L. Case; (3) DCS employee David Croxton; (4) Beth 24 Brungardt; and (5) Ombudsman. Doc 10 at 1. Although difficult to decipher, the FAC 25 alleges that employees from DCS used false allegations to justify the removal of Plaintiff's 26 five minor children. See FAC. Plaintiff seeks $15,600,000.00 in compensatory damages, 27 general damages, and costs. Id. at 6. She also seeks the return of her child A.C. who was 28 placed for adoption in February 2022. Id. 1 The FAC alleges the following: on or about January 10, 2019, DCS removed 2 Plaintiff's minor children—A.C., M.V., L.V., M.V., and G.V.1—from their respective 3 schools and childcare under a court authorized removal order. FAC at 2. The removal order 4 was issued based on allegations reported to DCS by A.C.'s teacher "Beth," who the Court 5 understands is Defendant Beth Brungardt, a special needs teacher at Keeling Elementary. 6 Id. at 3. 7 According to Plaintiff, A.C. is "disabled[,]" and suffers from behavioral issues and 8 "emotional delay[.]" FAC at 3. In 2015, DCS removed A.C. from Plaintiff's care citing 9 neglect. Id. at 4. After a contested "rule 59 hearing, [DCS] returned A.C. to Plaintiff's care 10 [on] August 27, 2018." Id. Plaintiff alleges that in the interim she was involved in a 11 dependency proceeding spanning years where DCS employees pushed for parental 12 severance and adoption over the state court's desire for family reunification. Id. Most 13 recently, Defendant David Croxton, a DCS Supervisor, and Defendant Hilary Case, a DCS 14 Case manager, were the DCS employees tasked with handling Plaintiff's case following 15 the 2019 removal. Id. at 2–3. It's unclear whether Defendants Croxton and Case were 16 involved in the dependency proceedings between 2015 and 2018. 17 At some unspecified time, Plaintiff alleges that A.C. was placed in Ms. Brungardt's 18 classroom, and that during this time Ms. Brungardt "[maintained] a very strong hatred 19 toward Plaintiff." On February 21, 2018, nearly a year before the removal, Ms. Brungardt 20 allegedly told A.C. "I think your mom should be in jail for how she treated you[.]" Id. This 21 statement upset A.C. and he allegedly attacked Ms. Brungardt, resulting in a report emailed 22 to all parties on the same date. Id. Plaintiff alleges Defendants Brungardt and Case "plotted" 23 to assert "false allegations" and "prevent [Plaintiff's] Dependency to close." Id. at 4. 24 On January 10, 2019, two weeks before a hearing date in Plaintiff's dependency 25 action, Defendant Brungardt reported Plaintiff to Defendant Case. Id. Defendant 26 Brungardt's allegations were related to Plaintiff's physical abuse, neglect, domestic 27 violence, and failure to protect A.C. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Case failed to notify

28 1 It appears Plaintiff has two children with the initials M.V., the younger being born in July 2018. FAC at 4. 1 the Court (which the Court understands as the juvenile court presiding over the 2 dependency) prior to the children's removal, obtained a removal order from Maricopa 3 County who allegedly did not have jurisdiction over Plaintiff, and "went out of her way to 4 make the removal possible." Id. Plaintiff further alleges that DCS's subsequent 5 investigations, following the children's removal, were flawed. Id. Specifically, DCS did 6 not record interviews with the children, failed to inspect Plaintiff's home, and did not 7 subject the children to any medical evaluation. FAC at 4. 8 According to Plaintiff, Defendant Case has a history of making false allegations 9 against her. For example, Defendant Case reported Plaintiff for methamphetamine use, an 10 allegation that was allegedly determined as unsubstantiated according to an email from 11 Defendant Croxton dated October 25, 2017. FAC at 5. In November 2018, Defendant Case 12 also reported that Plaintiff was in a romantic relationship with the children's father, 13 Gerardo. Id. Under the DCS case plan, Plaintiff and Gerardo were to "only engage 14 regarding the children." Id. This prompted a DCS investigation at Plaintiff's home where 15 Plaintiff alleges that DCS found no signs of the father living in the home. Id. 16 Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Croxton, was indifferent or nonresponsive to 17 her complaints related to Defendant Case. Defendant Croxton "failed Plaintiff by not taking 18 [Plaintiff's] e-mails, phone calls, meetings, mediations, in[-]person complaints [or] 19 grievances regarding [Defendant Case's] behavior towards Plaintiff seriously." FAC at 3. 20 Defendant Croxton provided grievance forms for Ombudsman, an independent agency of 21 the Arizona Legislature that serves as an impartial dispute facilitator for complaints against 22 state agencies.2 Plaintiff alleges that "no action or remedy came forward" from 23 Ombudsman. Id. Plaintiff further alleges Defendant Croxton failed to investigate Plaintiff's 24 grievances including the false accusations made by Defendant Case, failed to investigate 25 the close relationship between Defendant Case and Defendant Brungardt, and failed to 26 remove Defendant Case as Plaintiff's case manager. Id. 27 It also appears that Plaintiff reported to DCS several events concerning A.C. that 28 2 See https://www.azoca.gov/about/ (last visited June 15, 2023). 1 went unaddressed by DCS employees, including: an incident in October 2018 where 2 Defendant Brungardt allegedly handcuffed A.C., a June 2019 incident where A.C. 3 allegedly exhibited signs of physical abuse while in foster care, and an April 2021 incident 4 where Defendant Brungardt reported that A.C. experienced abuse in his group home, 5 corroborating Plaintiff's earlier suspicions. 6 The juvenile court held a "Rule 59 hearing" on February 28, 2020. Id. at 5. It appears 7 the juvenile court ordered 9-month-old M.V. returned to Plaintiff. FAC at 5. Plaintiff 8 alleges that the four other children remained in DCS care for nearly two years. Id. On or 9 about December 20, 2022, A.C. was placed for adoption. FAC at 5. 10 II. Analysis 11 A. The FAC Fails to Comply with the Court's Instructions 12 In its screening order, the Court warned, "…if [Plaintiff] elects to file an amended 13 complaint that fails to comply with the Court's instructions explained in this order, the 14 action will be dismissed pursuant to section 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and/or Rule 41(b) of the 15 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." The Court also explained:

16 Furthermore, allegations must be set forth in numbered paragraphs. See 17 Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). Each claim must be stated in a separate count. See Bautista v. Los Angeles Cnty., 216 F.3d 837, 840–41 (9th Cir. 2000). 18 Separate counts are necessary to help the defendant to respond or to help the 19 court and the other parties to understand the claims. Id. at 840 (internal citations omitted). Courts require separate counts where multiple claims are 20 asserted or where separate statements will require a clear presentation. Id. at 21 840-41. 22 Doc. 8 at 5. 23 Here, the FAC does not set forth allegations in numbered paragraphs. See Doc. 10. 24 Moreover, the FAC makes a general reference to "§§ First Amendment; Fourth 25 Amendment; Fifth Amendment; Sixth Amendment; Seventh Amendment; Eight 26 Amendment; Ninth Amendment; Thirteenth Amendment; Fourteenth Amendment[]" 27 without any indication as to which facts correspond to the defendant or defendants' conduct 28 that harmed her and the specific legal right the plaintiff believes the defendant(s) violated. 1 It is also unclear which theory or theories Plaintiff is attempting to proceed under or 2 whether Plaintiff is asserting a single claim or multiple claims against any individual or 3 entity defendant. 4 B. The FAC Fails to Comply with Rule 8 5 Under Rule 8, a complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim 6 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Detailed factual 7 allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 8 supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation 9 omitted). Plaintiff must set forth "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim 10 to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 11 at 570, 127 S.Ct. at 1974). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions 12 are not. Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–557. The rules require that "[e]ach 13 allegation must be simple, concise, and direct." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). Without a clearer 14 explanation of the factual basis for her complaint, and more notice to defendant(s) of the 15 specific legal theories under which Plaintiff is asserting a cause of action, Plaintiff cannot 16 state a plausible claim for relief. 17 The Court finds the allegations in the FAC remain vague and conclusory and that it 18 is unable to determine whether the current action is frivolous or fails to state a claim for 19 relief. Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give 20 fair notice and state the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Community 21 Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir.1984). Plaintiff must allege, with at least some 22 degree of particularity, overt acts that defendants engaged in that support plaintiff's claim. 23 Id. As an example, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Case made false allegations in 2017 and 24 2018. It's unclear whether these allegations were presented to the juvenile court as 25 evidence, under a judicial deception theory, or whether these allegations were used as 26 justification for any particular action taken by DCS in the dependency proceeding. 27 Because plaintiff has failed to comply with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 28 8(a)(2), the FAC must be dismissed. 1 C. The FAC Alleges Impermissible Child Custody Claims 2 The FAC requests, among other things, that this Court "[a]ssist Plaintiff in the return 3 of her child A.C." Doc. 10 at 6. Insofar as Plaintiff is attempting to raise claims regarding 4 child custody or errors made by the state court, the Court is without jurisdiction over such 5 claims because they are exclusively matters of state law. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 6 U.S. 689, 702–04 (1992) (holding that the domestic relations exception to federal subject 7 matter jurisdiction "divests the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony and child 8 custody decrees."); see also Peterson v. Babbitt, 708 F.2d 465, 466 (9th Cir.1983). Under 9 the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, "a federal district court does not have subject matter 10 jurisdiction to hear a direct appeal from the final judgment of a state court." Noel v. Hall, 11 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). Claims are barred under the doctrine "when the 12 federal plaintiff both asserts as her injury legal error or errors by the state court and seeks 13 as her remedy relief from the state court judgment." Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 14 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis in original). 15 Moreover, claims against social workers related to the removal of her child from her 16 custody, which seemingly arise from state court orders, would be barred by the Rooker- 17 Feldman doctrine. Johnson v. Child Protective Servs., No. 2:16-cv-763-GEB-EFB PS, 18 2017 WL 4387309, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2017) (finding that constitutional claims 19 relating to plaintiffs' children being removed from their custody and placed in foster care, 20 which were the subject of a state court action, barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine). To 21 the extent Plaintiff seeks relief from any state court judgment or order, such claims are 22 barred. 23 D. The FAC Does Not Allege Cognizable Family Association Claims 24 It appears that Plaintiff is attempting to allege a denial of familial association. 25 Parents have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the care and custody of their 26 children. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). A parent "may state a cause of 27 action under [Section] 1983 when she alleges that the state terminated her parent-child 28 relationship without due process of law." Smoot v. City of Placentia, 950 F. Supp. 282, 283 1 (C.D. Cal. 1997). The Ninth Circuit has generally characterized the right to familial 2 association as a liberty right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 685–86 (9th Cir. 2001); Wallis v. Spencer, 202 4 F.3d 1126, 1136 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Parents and children have a well-elaborated 5 constitutional right to live together without governmental interference .... That right is an 6 essential liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee that parents 7 and children will not be separated by the state without due process of law except in an 8 emergency."). See also Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1236 (9th Cir. 2018) (explaining 9 constitutional standards for evaluating claims based upon removal of children). 10 The right to familial association has both a substantive and a procedural component. 11 Keates, 883 F.3d at 1236. "While the right is a fundamental liberty interest, officials may 12 interfere with the right if they "provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures[.]" 13 Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Kirkpatrick v. Cnty. of Washoe, 843 F.3d 784, 789 14 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1136 (9th Cir. 1999)) (The 15 Fourteenth Amendment guarantees "that parents and children will not be separated by the 16 state without due process of law except in an emergency.") 17 To state a claim under the Due Process Clause, it is not enough to allege that a state 18 actor interfered with the familial relationship. Woodrum, 866 F.2d at 1125. "Officials may 19 not remove children from their parents without a court order unless they have 'information 20 at the time of the seizure that establishes reasonable cause to believe that the child is in 21 imminent danger of serious bodily injury.'" Keates, 883 F.3d at 1236 (quoting Rogers v. 22 County of San Joaquin, 487 F.3d 1288, 1294 (9th Cir. 2007)); see also Caldwell v. LeFaver, 23 928 F.2d 331, 333 (9th Cir. 1991) (a state agency may remove children from their parents' 24 custody in an emergency if the children are subject to immediate or apparent danger or 25 harm). 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 1. Defendant Case 2 a. Removal Claims 3 The FAC seems to involve two different types of conduct by Defendant Case— 4 conduct relating to the removal of the minor children from Plaintiff and conduct involving 5 post-removal dependency proceedings against Plaintiff. 6 A lawful removal order would likely prevent Plaintiff from stating a cognizable 7 claim for denial of familial association in violation of Due Process. Under Arizona law, a 8 superior court may allow DCS "to take temporary custody of a child on finding that 9 probable cause exists to believe that temporary custody is clearly necessary to protect the 10 child from suffering abuse or neglect and it is contrary to the child's welfare to remain in 11 the home." Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-821(B). Likewise, to continue temporary custody, 12 DCS "has the burden of presenting evidence as to whether there is probable cause to believe 13 that continued temporary custody is clearly necessary to prevent abuse or neglect pending 14 the hearing on the dependency petition." Id. § 8-824(F). The test for probable cause asks 15 whether, under the circumstances, a reasonably prudent person would have believed the 16 presented allegations. Gonzales v. City of Phx., 52 P.3d 184, 187 (Ariz. 2002). Abuse 17 means "the infliction or allowing of physical injury." Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-201(2). 18 Physical injury may include "any skin bruising." See Louis C. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 353 19 P.3d 364, 368 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015); see also Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13–3623(F)(4). In 20 these proceedings, the superior court applies the preponderance of the evidence standard. 21 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-844(C); In re Cochise Cnty. Juv. Action No. 5666–J, 650 P.2d 22 459, 460–61 (Ariz. 1982); Louis C., 353 P.3d at 370. 23 Plaintiff appears to challenge, in conclusory terms, the premise justifying the 2019 24 removal and suggests that the underlying allegations were fabricated or that the legal 25 process was somehow deficient. The FAC, however, lacks sufficient facts alleging 26 "reckless, intentional and deliberate acts and omissions of defendants" constituting an 27 "unwarranted interference" with the right of familial association. Cf. Lee, 250 F.3d at 685– 28 86. As such, the Court will also dismiss the due process claim for failure state a claim upon 1 which relief may be granted. This claim is dismissed with leave to amend. 2 b. Post-Removal Claims 3 Plaintiff's post-removal dependency proceeding claims are similarly vague. It is 4 unclear what theory or theories Plaintiff is attempting to allege, or what specific actions 5 any individual Defendant took. It appears that Plaintiff may be attempting to assert a 6 judicial deception claim. To succeed on a judicial deception claim, a plaintiff must prove: 7 "(1) the defendant official deliberately fabricated evidence and (2) the deliberate 8 fabrication caused the plaintiff's deprivation of liberty." Spencer v. Peters, 857 F.3d 789, 9 798 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal citation omitted). The due process clause of the Fourteenth 10 Amendment prohibits the deliberate fabrication of evidence by a state official. Id. at 793. 11 Deliberately falsifying evidence in a child abuse investigation or including false 12 evidentiary statements in a supporting declaration violates this constitutional right. 13 Constanich v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 627 F.3d 1101, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010). The 14 second prong is a question of materiality, requiring the plaintiff to show "the juvenile court 15 would have declined to issue the order had [the defendant] been truthful." Greene v. 16 Camreta, 588 F.3d at 1011, 1035 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated in part on other grounds, 563 17 U.S. 692 (2011). "[O]fficial conduct that 'shocks the conscience' in depriving parents of [a 18 relationship with their children] is cognizable as a violation of due process," Wilkinson v. 19 Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 554 (9th Cir. 2010). Here, the FAC lacks specificity regarding any 20 fabricated or omitted evidence submitted during the dependency proceedings and there are 21 insufficient facts to infer that Defendant Case deceived the juvenile court. To the extent 22 Plaintiff attempts to assert a judicial deception claim, this claim is dismissed with leave to 23 amend. 24 2. Defendant Croxton 25 A supervisor may be held individually liable under Section 1983 for (1) his own 26 culpable action or inaction in the training, (2) supervision, or control of his subordinates; 27 for his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation; or (3) for conduct that showed a 28 reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others. Keates, 883 F.3d at 1243. A 1 supervisor cannot be held liable on a theory of vicarious liability. See Starr v. Baca, 652 2 F.3d 1202, 1206–07 (9th Cir. 2011). Deliberate indifference is an objective standard, and 3 it is satisfied only when a Section 1983 "plaintiff can establish that the facts available to ... 4 policymakers put them on actual or constructive notice that the particular omission [or act] 5 is substantially certain to result in the violation of the constitutional rights of their citizens." 6 Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 797 F.3d 654, 676 (9th Cir. 2015). 7 When supervisors are not directly involved in the allegedly unconstitutional 8 conduct, e.g., the child's removal, a Plaintiff can still plead a claim by showing that the 9 supervisors "knew of unconstitutional conditions and culpable actions of [their] 10 subordinates but failed to act." Keates, 883 F.3d at 1243 (internal citations and quotations 11 omitted). The FAC fails on this front as well. Lacking are allegations to establish Defendant 12 Croxton's knowledge of the alleged constitutional violations, or his inaction, such that a 13 deliberate indifference inference can be made. In sum, the FAC lacks details related to 14 when Plaintiff made her grievances, the substance of those grievances, the substance of 15 Defendant Croxton's response, and the implicated constitutional violation. This claim is 16 dismissed with leave to amend. 17 3. Defendant Brungardt 18 The FAC seems to allege that Defendant Brungardy made a false report to DCS with 19 the intent to harm Plaintiff. The allegations are conclusory and do not indicate that 20 Defendant Brungardy knew or reasonably should have known that she reported false 21 information or that her submission caused a constitutional injury. For this reason, the claim 22 is deficient. Defendant Brungardy is dismissed without prejudice. 23 E. The FAC Names Improper Entity Defendants 24 Under Monell, a municipality can be sued as a "person" under section 1983 for 25 "constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental custom." Monell v. 26 Department of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 698 (1978). To establish Monell 27 liability, a Plaintiff must show that (1) they were deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the 28 municipality had a policy; (3) the policy amounted to a deliberate indifference to their 1 constitutional right; and (4) the policy was the "moving force behind the constitutional 2 violation." See Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 835 (9th Cir.1996). 3 1. DCS 4 Arizona law applies in determining whether DCS has the capacity to be sued. See 5 Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b); Machowicz v. Maricopa County, No. CV-21-00316-PHX-JJT, 2021 6 WL 4319206, at *2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 23, 2021). In Arizona, "a governmental entity may be 7 sued only if the legislature has so provided." Braillard v. Maricopa County, 224 Ariz. 481 8 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010). "The statutory provisions by which the legislature created DCS do 9 not so provide." East v. Arizona, No. CV-17-01685-PHX-GMS, 2017 WL 6820141, at *2 10 (D. Ariz. Aug. 23, 2017) (citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 8-451 to -892); see also Neeley v. 11 Arizona, No. CV-19-05899-PHX-SPL, 2022 WL 44676, at *7 (D. Ariz. Jan. 5, 2022). As 12 such, DCS lacks the capacity to be sued. 13 Even if DCS could be sued, courts have repeatedly rejected the argument that DCS 14 is subject to Section 1983 liability under Monell, because DCS is plainly a state entity 15 rather than a municipal entity. See, e.g., Neeley, 2022 WL 44676, at *7–8; Stanberry- 16 Sproles v. Ariz. Dep't of Child Safety, No. CV-22-00364-PHX-DWL, 2022 WL 1061913, 17 at *2 (D. Ariz. Apr. 8, 2022). Plaintiff's claims against DCS will be dismissed with 18 prejudice. 19 2. Ombudsman 20 Plaintiff does not allege that an Ombudsman staff participated in or directed any 21 constitutional violation against her. Moreover, the Court has found no authority, and 22 Plaintiff has referenced none, to show Ombudsman is a municipal entity for purposes of 23 Section 1983 liability under Monell. Lastly, it appears Ombudsman is an arm of the State 24 that is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See generally, Chagolla v. Vullo, 834 25 F. App'x 350, 352 (9th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff's claims against Ombudsman will be dismissed 26 with prejudice. 27 III. Leave to Amend 28 "[A] district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the 1 || pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts." Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (cleaned || up). Plaintiff's second amended complaint must address the deficiencies identified above and should follow the form detailed in Rule 7.1 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. || Within thirty (30) days from the date of entry of this Order, Plaintiff may submit an || amended complaint. Plaintiff must clearly designate on the face of the document that it is || the "Second Amended Complaint." The amended complaint must be retyped or rewritten 8 || in its entirety and may not incorporate any part of the original Complaint by reference. 9|| IV. Order 10 IT IS ORDERED DISMISSING WITH PREJUDICE Defendants: 11 || (1) Department of Child Safety; and (2) Ombudsman. 12 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DISMISSING WITHOUT PREJUDICE the 13 || remaining claims in Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint (Doc. 10). 14 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED GRANTING Plaintiff leave to file a Second 15 || Amended Complaint within thirty (30) days from the date of entry of this Order. If Plaintiff || does not file a Second Amended Complaint within thirty (30) days from the date of entry of this Order, the Clerk of the Court shall dismiss this action without further order of this 18 |} Court. 19 Dated this 21st day of June, 2023. 20 21

22 WS herb onorable John C. Hinderaker 23 United States District Judge 24 25 26 27 28

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