Beam v. State

400 S.E.2d 327, 260 Ga. 784

• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
• Decided: February 8, 1991
• Docket: S90A1645
• Status: Published

Opinions

Bell, Justice.

Steven L. Beam was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment for the malice murder of Oruada Okpani.¹ Beam appeals, contending, in part, that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to excuse for cause a prospective juror who was a full-time employee of the district attorney’s office. We agree with this contention, and, accordingly, we reverse.

1. There was evidence that the victim was a cab driver and appellant was a passenger in the victim’s cab. The two men argued, and appellant then killed the victim, shooting him eight times with two different guns. Considering the evidence most favorably to the state, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty of malice murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

2. In his first enumeration of error, appellant contends the trial court committed reversible error by denying his motion to excuse for cause a prospective juror who was a full-time employee of the district attorney’s office.² We agree.

“Jurors should be above suspicion.” [Cits.] It is inherent in the nature of [the duties of employees of district attorneys] and the closeness with which such [employees] are identified with criminal procedures that questions regarding possible bias, fairness, prejudice or impermissible influence upon jury deliberations inevitably arise. These questions cannot be erased by a mere subjective, albeit sincere, declaration by the officer that he or she can be fair and impartial as to a defendant. [Hutcheson v. State, 246 Ga. 13, 14 (1) (268 SE2d 643) (1980).]

See generally LaFave & Israel, Criminal Procedure, Vol. 2, § 21.3 (c) (West 1984 & 1990 pocket parts).

We hold that because the full-time employee of the district attorney’s office was not excused for cause, the judgment must be reversed.³ Even if the juror in this case was actually unbiased, her service as a juror while she was an employee of the same district attorney who prosecuted the appellant created a substantial appearance of impropriety. The trial court should have stricken the juror to preserve public respect for the integrity of the judicial process. Our reversal of the conviction is necessary to ensure that such public respect is not eroded in future cases.

3. Our holding in the previous division of this opinion moots appellant’s remaining enumeration of error.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur, except Hunt, J., who dissents.

1 The crime occurred on October 30, 1989. Beam was indicted on April 17, 1990. The verdict was returned on June 6,1990, and appellant was sentenced on June 8, 1990. On June 22, 1990, the court reporter certified the trial transcript. Beam moved for a new trial on July 8, 1990. On July 27, 1990, the trial court denied the motion. Beam filed his notice of appeal on August 24, 1990, and the clerk of the trial court certified the record on September 13, 1990. The record was filed in this Court on September 17, 1990. On November 2, 1990, the appeal was submitted for decision without oral argument.

2 The juror was a secretary in the appellate section of the district attorney’s office.

3 The State argues that because appellant did not exhaust his peremptory strikes, this Court should deem harmless the trial court’s erroneous refusal to strike for cause the employee of the district attorney. However, in Harris v. State, 255 Ga. 464 (2) (339 SE2d 712) (1986), we resolved this argument adversely to the State.