Bd. of Licensure in Med. v. Diering

• Court: Superior Court of Maine
• Decided: December 5, 2008
• Docket: KENap-08-23
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT KENNEBEC, ss. CIVIL ACTION Docket No. AP-08r23 ,V l' -', , (/ -­ I;) I 0 / IC) )

BOARD OF LICENSURE IN MEDICINE,

Petitioner v. DECISION AND ORDER

SCOTT 1. DIERING, M.D.,

Respondent

Pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80C, the petitioner seeks judicial review of the

respondent Maine Board of Licensure in Medicine (the Board)'s final agency action.

The Board found the petitioner committed several statutory violations, imposed

discipline upon the petitioner in the form of a reprimand, permitted petitioner's license

to lapse, and assessed petitioner costs of the hearing. (R. Tab 20 at 8-9.) For the

follOWing reasons, the decision of the Board is affirmed.

FACTS

The petitioner applied for licensure in Maine pursuant to an application dated

November 26, 2002, received by the Board on December 2, 2002. (State's Ex. 2 at PIO)

On the application, the petitioner answered "no" to question 6: "Have you EVER

suffered from any physical, psychiatric, or addictive disorder that would impair or

require limitations on your fun<:tioning as a physician, or that resulted in the inability to

practice medicine for more than 30 days?" (Id. at Pll.) On November 16, 2004, the

Board issued a medical license to the petitioner. (rd. at P9.) The petitioner practiced

medicine in Maine at the Aroostook Medical Center for a total of two shifts, on

December 10 and It 2004. (State's Ex. 27 at P117.) On his application for re-licensure, received by the Board on November 7, 2005,

the petitioner answered "yes" in response to question 15-5, which asked: "Since last

renewal, have you had any of the following occurrences: Suffered from any physicat

psychiatric, or addictive disorder that would impair or require limitations on your

functioning as a physician or resulted in an inability to engage in the practice of

medicine for more than 30 days?" (State's Ex. 3 at P77.)1 As mandated by the re-

licensure application/ petitioner attached a separate sheet of paper to his application

and explained his response:

In February, 2005 I was hospitalized for aspiration pneumonitis and Adult Respiratory Distress Syndrome (ARDS). This led to a prolonged hospital course, with ventilator support and exploratory laparotomies. I am currently scheduled for a ventral hernia repair on November 17, 2005, with Dr. Thomas Scalea at the University of Maryland. I expect to make a full recovery. With this exception, I suffer no significant long term sequelae.

I am under the care of Dr. Christopher Murphy for depression. I take Remeron and Lexapro for this condition.

These illnesses in no way impact or limit my ability to practice medicine.

(Id. at P80.)

Petitioner also answered "no" in response to question 15-6: "Since last renewal,

have you had any of the following occurrences: Been indicted, arrested or convicted of

any criminal offense (including motor vehicle offenses but not including minor traffic or

parking violations)?" (Id. at P77.) On December I, 2005, the Board renewed petitioner's

medical license. (Id. at P76.)

The Board received a copy of an order dated February 2, 2007 issued by the

Missouri State Board of Registration For the Healing Arts (Missouri Board) granting the

1 In the application and renewat the petitioner signed an affidavit and affirmed that his answers were true. (State's Ex. 2 at P10; State's Ex. 3 at P10.) 2The application provided that "[a]ny 'yes' response must be explained fully on a separate, attached 8 x 11 sheet of paper cross-referenced by question number." (State's Ex. 3 at P77.)

2 petitioner a temporary /limited license. 3 (State's Ex. 5.) According to that order, the

petitioner: (1) had "a past history of alcohol abuse which culminated with his

experimenting with cocaine in 2005"; (2) overdosed on cocaine on February 8, 2005; (3)

"enrolled in Crossroads Centers for chemical dependency treatment" in July 2005; and

(4) "entered into criminal probation for a period of eighteen (18) months for the criminal

charge of paraphernalia possession" on August 23,2005. 4 (State's Ex. 5 at P87-88.)

On March 9, 2007, the Board received a lette~ from petitioner, in which he stated:

I am also notifying you that my license in Missouri is in disciplinary status. As I have informed you in the past, I suffered complications of my chemical dependency in February, 2005 ... I have not committed any infractions of my arrangement with the Missouri licensing board, nor have I demonstrated any unprofessional, inappropriate nor addictive behaviors since I have been granted the license in Missouri, nor since my actions in February, 2005 ... I have notified all states in which I am licensed about my chemical dependency and my actions in 2005 ....

(State's Ex. 6 at P94.)

On April 18, 2007, after review of the foregoing information, the Board voted to

initiate a complaint against the petitioner's medical license for fraud and deceit through

obtaining a license, engaging in habitual substance abuse, and disciplinary action by

another jurisdiction. (State's Ex. 7.) On May 11, 2007, the Board received petitioner's

response to the complaint. (State's Ex. 8.)

By letter dated July 12, 2007, the Board notified the petitioner that it had voted to

schedule the complaint for an adjudicatory hearing. (State's Ex. 10.) On September 5,

2007, the Board received a facsimile letter from petitioner, in which he acknowledged

3 The Missouri Board's decision to issue a probationary license was overturned on appeal by the Missouri Administrative Hearing Commission. (State's Ex. 29 at P273.) 4 The Board received further information regarding the petitioner's drug possession charge from the District Court of Maryland in July 2007. (See State's Ex. 16; R. Tab 20 at 4.) The Board also received a copy of the transcript of the petitioner's appeal of the Missouri Board's order in September 2007. (See State's Ex. 28.) 5 The Missouri order required the petitioner to notify, in writing, within fifteen days of the effective date of the order, the medical facilities where he practiced or had privileges of his disciplinary status in Missouri. (State's Ex. 5 at P92.)

3 his receipt of the Board's letter, and indicated that he did not intend to return to or

practice medicine in Maine, did not intend to appear at the hearing, and offered to

surrender his Maine license. 6 (State's Ex. 11.)

On November 30, 2007, the petitioner's Maine medical license expired. (Ir. at

96.) The petitioner did not apply to renew his Maine license. On December 11, 2007,

the Board sent the petitioner a "Notice of Adjudicatory Hearing." See 5 M.R.S. § 9052;

(R. Tab 3 at 2.) Following a hearing on January 8, 2008, the Board found the petitioner

committed the following violations: (1) engaging in the practice of fraud or deceit in

obtaining a license in violation of 32 M.R.S. § 3282-A(2)(A); (2) "engaging in habitual

substance abuse that has resulted or is foreseeably likely to result ... in performing

services in a manner that endangers the health or safety of patients" in violation of 32

M.R.S. § 3282-A(2)(B); (3) engaging in unprofessional conduct in violation of 32 M.R.S. §

3282-A(2)(F). (R. Tab 20 at 7, 8.)

DISCUSSION

On appeal, the petitioner asserts the following arguments: (1) the Board used an

incorrect standard of proof regarding the allegation that the petitioner obtained his

license by fraud or deceit; (2) the Board lacked authority to conduct a hearing regarding

the petitioner's lapsed license; (3) the record lacked substantial evidence to support the

Board's finding that the petitioner engaged in fraud or deceit regarding his 2002

application for licensure; (4) the petitioner's conduct outside Maine could not form the

basis for discipline in Maine; and (5) the Board erred by assessing the petitioner with

costs of the hearing. (Pet'r Br. at 5-7.) For the following reasons, the Board's decision is

affirmed.

6 The petitioner had previously offered to resign his license in Maine. (State's Ex. 8 at P97.)

4 I. Standard of Proof

The petitioner argues that the Board erred by applying a preponderance of the

evidence standard of proof to the claims that petitioner committed "the practice of

fraud or deceit" in obtaining his original license in 2002 and his renewal license in 2005.

See 32 M.R.S. § 3282-A(2)(A). The petitioner contends these allegations required proof

by clear and convincing evidence. (Pet'r Br. at 8.) The petitioner reasons that the

legislature's decision to make fraud and deceit in obtaining a license a ground for

discipline must be analyzed against the backdrop of common law, and Maine has a long

history of requiring that proof of fraud by clear and convincing evidence. (Pet'r Br. at

8); see, ~ Maine Eye Care Assocs. P.A. v. Gorman, 2006 ME 15,

711 (certain civil actions alleging fraud require proof by clear and convincing evidence).

First, the clear and convincing standard applied in the cases upon which the

petitioner relies is utilized in civil tort cases, not administrative proceedings. Although

the legislature may require a different standard to be used in the administration of a

specific statute, in most instances agency decisions, at least at the federal level, are

based on a preponderance of the evidence standard. See, ~ Steadman v. SEC, 450

U.s. 91, 100-01 (1981) (5 U.s.c. § 556(d) of the federal Administrative Procedure Act

applies the preponderance of the evidence standard in determining whether the

antifraud provisions of federal securities laws have been violated).

Although the Law Court has not explicitly recognized a default preponderance

of the evidence standard in Maine's Administrative Procedure Act, this standard is

common in professional disciplinary cases. For example, the Maine Board of Bar

Overseers employs the preponderance of the evidence standard in attorney discipline

cases, including those involving fraud or deceit. See Bd. of Overseers of the Bar v.

Lefebvre, 1998 ME 24,

5 discipline action the Board shall have the burden of proving by a preponderance of

evidence the charges specified in the information"); M. Bar. R. 3.2(f)(3) (attorney

misconduct includes "engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or

misrepresentation").

Second, the clear and convincing standard is not as uniform as the petitioner

suggests, and is not applicable to all civil tort cases involving fraud. See Petit v. Key

Bank of Maine, 688 A.2d 427, 431 (Me. 1996) (declining to apply the clear and

convincing evidence standard to the "fraud or intimidation" element of the tort of

wrongful interference with an advantageous economic relationship). Moreover, the

rationale for applying the clear and convincing standard of proof does not apply to

license disciplinary proceedings. The clear and convincing standard "was first applied

in equity to claims which experience had shown to be inherently subject to fabrication,

lapse of memory, or the flexibility of conscience." Id. ("fears that innovative plaintiffs

would fabricate equitable claims regarding documents to avoid restrictions at law were

the impetus for adoption of a higher proof requirement at equity in Maine") (citations

omitted). No such concern in the context of a license disciplinary proceeding exists to

justify a departure from the general rule that requires proof by a preponderance of the

evidence? See id. at 432-33.

II. Board's Iurisdiction

The petitioner argues that because the Board did not give the required notice of

an adjudicatory hearing mandated by 5 M.R.S. § 9052 until after the petitioner's medical

license expired, the Board lacked authority to conduct the hearing. (Pet'r Br. at 8-10.)

7 The rationale for applying the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof for punitive damages is similarly inapplicable. See Batchelder v. Realty Res. Hospitality, LLC 2007 ME 17, 'J[ 13, 914 A.2d 1116, 1121 (the purpose of the higher standard was to serve the goal of "avoiding an overbroad application of the doctrine of punitive damages," which could dull "the potentially keen edge of the doctrine as an effective deterrent of truly reprehensible conduct") (citations omitted).

6 On July 10, 2007, the Board voted to initiate a complaint against petitioner, and

informed petitioner of this decision by letter dated July 12, 2007. On May 11 and

September 5, 2007, the Board received letters from the petitioner, in which he

acknowledged the Board's actions. (See State's Exs. 8, 11.) The petitioner's license

expired on November 30, 2007. On December 11, 2007, the Board sent the petitioner a

"Notice of Hearing."

Essentially, the petitioner contends that neither the Board's vote to initiate the

complaint, nor the Board's letters sent to the petitioner regarding the Board's actions,

were sufficient to commence "disciplinary proceedings and sanctions" against the

petitioner. See 32 M.R.S. § 3282-A(1). Instead, the petitioner argues, disciplinary

proceedings commence only by giving the notice required by section 9052, which was

not given until after petitioner's license had expired. 5 M.R.S. § 9052; (Pet'r R. Br. at 6-7.)

Section 3282-A(l) titled "Disciplinary proceedings and sanctions," provides that,

"[t]he board shall investigate a complaint, on its own motion or upon receipt of a

written complaint filed with the board, regarding noncompliance with or violation of

this chapter or any rules adopted by the board." 32 M.R.S. § 3282-A(l). The Board

argues that "disciplinary proceedings" commence with the filing of a complaint.

(State's Br. at 15, n.l.) When reviewing an agency's interpretation of a statute that is

both administered by the agency and within the agency's expertise, the first inquiry is

whether the statute is ambiguous or unambiguous. Competitive Energy Servs., LLC v.

Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 2003 ME 12, <]I 15, 818 A.2d 1039, 1046. If the statute is

unambiguous, it is interpreted according to its plain language. Arsenault v. Sec'y of

State, 2006 ME 111,

given to the agency's interpretation if the interpretation is reasonable. Id. Resolving

any ambiguity in the statute in favor of the Board's reasonable interpretation, a

7 determination that "disciplinary proceedings" commence with the filing of a complaint

is supported by the language of the statute. See 32 M.R.S. § 3282-A(l). Petitioner has

provided no persuasive authority to the contrary. The petitioner was still licensed in

Maine when the Board initiated disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner.

The petitioner relies upon State v. Dhuy and argues that the "rule is that

expiration of a license moots any pending disciplinary hearing, absent specific statutory

authorization to the contrary." (Pet'r Br. at 9.); State v. Dhuy, 2003 ME 75, 825 A.2d 336.

In Dhuy, the Dental Board requested that the Attorney General file a complaint against

a licensee for the licensee's continuing statutory violations and failure to satisfy the

Board's prior order. 8 2003 ME 75,

District Court entered a judgment against the licensee, enjoined him from practicing

until properly licensed, and imposed several conditions on any future license granted

by the Board. Id.

Court's judgment was pending before the Law Court, the Board granted a license to the

licensee, subject to several license conditions. Id.

concluded that the Board's grant of a license to the licensee during the appeal rendered

moot certain provisions of the District Court's judgment. Because both the Board and

the licensee would no longer be bound by the conditions imposed by the District Court

on any future license if the licensee prevailed, however, the appeal was not entirely

moot. Id. at

After dispensing with the mootness issue, the licensee in Dhuy argued that the

District Court had lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the action because at

8The complaint was filed pursuant to 4 M.R.S. § 152(9), which provides that "The District Court has original concurrent jurisdiction to grant equitable relief in proceedings initiated by an agency or Department of the Attorney General alleging any violation of a license or licensing laws or rules." Dhuy, 2003 ME 75, 19,825 A,2d at 341.

8 the time the Board initiated the action the licensee's temporary permit had expired and

the Board lacked authority to bring an action against him. Id.

court rejected the licensee's argument, finding that "[a]t the time of his alleged

violations, Dhuy was a licensee because he held a temporary denturist permit and thus

was subject to the Board's authority." Id.

the Board had authority to bring the action, and the District Court had jurisdiction to

consider it. Id.

Contrary to the petitioner's argument, Dhuy does not render "moot" any

pending disciplinary hearing upon the expiration of a license. Instead, the Law Court

in Dhuy concluded that the Board had authority to bring an action because the licensee

held a license "at the time of his alleged violations." Id. In this case, at the time of

petitioner's alleged violations and the Board's initiation of the complaint, the petitioner

held an active Maine medical license. Because the Board had authority when it initiated

the disciplinary proceedings, the Board did not lose authority because the petitioner's

license expired. See also Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 498 U.s. 426, 428

(1991) (if jurisdiction exists at the time an action is commenced, jurisdiction is not

divested by subsequent events). Moreover, the Law Court has indicated that the Board

is not necessarily divested of jurisdiction when a license is surrendered or expires. See,

g,g", Golz v. Maine Real Estate Comm'n, 634 A.2d 1288, 1289 (Me. 1993) ("Generally

speaking, the disciplinary authority of occupational and professional licensing boards is

limited to enforcement against licensees or former licensees."); Wood v. Superintendent

of Ins., 638 A.2d 67, 70 (Me. 1994) (citing supporting case law from other jurisdictions

but determining it unnecessary to decide the issue).

9 III. Substantial Evidence

The petitioner argues that the record lacks substantial evidence to support the

Board's finding that the petitioner committed fraud or deceit in obtaining his initial

medical license in 2004. 9 (Pet'r Br. at 10.) The petitioner asserts that it was clear error

for the Board to conclude that petitioner's answer to question 6 in the 2002 application

involved fraud or deceit. (Pet'r Br. at 12.)

When the decision of an administrative agency is appealed pursuant to M.R. Civ.

P. 80C, this court reviews the agency's decision directly for abuse of discretion, errors of

law, or findings not supported by the evidence. Centamore v. Dep't of Human Servs.,

664 A.2d 369, 370 (Me. 1995). "An administrative decision will be sustained if, on the

basis of the entire record before it, the agency could have fairly and reasonably found

the facts as it did." Seider v. Bd. of Exam'rs of Psychologists, 2000 ME 206, «J[ 9, 762 A.2d

551, 555 (citing CWCO, Inc. v. Superintendent of Ins., 1997 ME 226, «J[ 6, 703 A.2d 1258,

1261). The court will "not attempt to second-guess the agency on matters falling within

its realm of expertise" and judicial review is limited to "determining whether the

agency's conclusions are unreasonable, unjust or unlawful in light of the record."

Imagineering, Inc. v. Superintendent of Ins., 593 A.2d 1050, 1053 (Me. 1991).

"Inconsistent evidence will not render an agency decision unsupported." Seider, 2000

ME 206, «J[ 9, 762 A.2d at 555. The burden of proof rests with the party seeking to

overturn the agency's decision, and that party must prove that no competent evidence

supports the Board's decision. See Bischoff v. Bd. of Trs., 661 A.2d 167, 170 (Me. 1995).

On his application, petitioner responded "no" to question 6: "Have you EVER

suffered from any physical, psychiatric, or addictive disorder that would impair or

9Petitioner does not appear to challenge the Board's finding that he committed fraud or deceit on his 2005 renewal application. That finding is supported by evidence in the record.

10 require limitations on your functioning as a physician, or that resulted in the inability to

practice medicine for more than 30 days?" (State's Ex. 2 at Pll.) The petitioner argues

that the question is ambiguous and poorly worded. (Pet'r Br. at 11, 12; Pet'r R. Br. at 3­

5.) The petitioner also argues that part of the question "is more in the nature of an

opinion," and, because fraud or deceit involves a misrepresentation of fact rather than

opinion, the petitioner's answer does not constitute fraud or deceit. (Pet'r Br. at 12); see

Coffin v. Dodge, 146 Me. 3, 6, 76 A.2d 541, 543 (1950) ("fraud must be a

misrepresentation of a past or present fact and not ... an expression of opinion"). The

petitioner argues that because of the ambiguities in the question, the petitioner

reasonably believed he was answering the question correctly. (Pet'r R. Br. at 5.)

The Board's finding that petitioner violated section 3282-A(2)(A) is supported by

the record. 32 M.R.S. § 3282-A(2)(A). Evidence was presented that petitioner became

addicted to alcohol and prescription drugs and, in 2001, admitted himself to Harmony

House, a 28-day in-patient treatment program in Colorado. (Tr. at 34-36; State's Ex. 28.)

The petitioner thereafter attended AA meetings and a program to support recovering

addicts. (Tr. at 38-39.) The Board was concerned that the petitioner was less than

forthcoming in his 2002 application and described several of his answers as "the truth,

but not the whole truth." (R. Tab 20 at 6.)

In explaining his reason for failing to disclose his addiction and hospitalization

on his 2002 application, the petitioner explained that his treatment at Harmony was 28

days, rather than 30. (Tr. at 43-44.) Although the petitioner testified that he believed he

"didn't violate the literal letter of the law," he admitted he "violate[d] the spirit of the

application" and should have been "more forthcoming." (Id. at 44.) The petitioner's

acknowledgement that he "really d[id]'nt have a good answer" as to why he failed to

include certain details in answering the license application questions, and the

11 petitioner's acknowledgement that he was answering questions in the narrowest terms

support the Board's finding that petitioner engaged in fraud or deceit regarding his

2002 application. (Tr. at 64, 66, 115.)

In light of the petitioner's history of substance abuse and his lack of candor, the

Board's inference that petitioner had a substance abuse addiction before his 28-day

hospitalization is reasonable. (Tab 20 at 7.) The Board's decision cannot be said to be

"unreasonable, unjust or unlawful in light of the record." Imagineering, Inc., 593 A.2d at

1053.

IV. Board's authority to impose discipline for conduct occurring outside of Maine

The petitioner argues that the Board applied Maine law extraterritorially by

finding the petitioner's theft of cocaine from the emergency room at Washington

County Hospital in Maryland constituted "unprofessional conduct". (Pet'r. Br. at 13.);

32 M.R.S. § 3282-A(2)(F); (R. Tab 20 at 8.). The Board did not attempt to exercise

authority over the petitioner's Maryland or Missouri licenses. The Board acted upon

the petitioner's Maine medical license based upon the petitioner's conduct some of

which occurred outside of Maine.

The Board may consider such extraterritorial conduct in carrying out its purpose

to "protect the public health and welfare" of Maine. 10 M.R.S. § 8008. The statute

expressly includes· acts occurring outside this state within its definition of

unprofessional conduct. See, ~ 32 M.R.S. 3282-A(l) ("The Board may deny a license

or authorize a restricted license based on the record of the applicant in other states."); 5

M.R.S. § 5301(1) (authorizing the Board to "take into consideration criminal history

record information from Maine or elsewhere"). The Board's decision restricts only the

petitioner's Maine medical license, which is regulated pursuant to statute, by the Board.

See, ~ 32 M.R.S. §§ 3263-89. Because the Board has statutory authority to discipline

12 physicians licensed to practice medicine in Maine for acts that occur elsewhere, the

Board did not exceed its authority in disciplining the petitioner.

Principles of comity, as argued by the petitioner, do not change this conclusion.

The petitioner argues that the Board should have respected the decisions of Maryland,

which took no action, and Missouri, which did not require probation. The principles of

comity do not require the Board to recognize the decisions of the Maryland and

Missouri boards. 10 See Society of Lloyd's v. Baker, 673 A.2d 1336, 1338 (Me. 1996) (citing

Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3rd Cir. 1971))

("Although more than mere courtesy and accommodation, comity does not achieve the

force of imperative or obligation.").

V. Costs

Finally, the petitioner argues that the Board abused its discretion by ordering

petitioner to pay costs of the hearing because: (1) the Board punished the petitioner for

exercising his right to hearing; and (2) the Board's decision was "more favorable" than a

pre-hearing consent decree offered. (Pet'r Br. at 17.) Upon finding a violation, the

Board is authorized to "assess the licensed person or entity for all or part of the actual

expenses incurred by the board . . . for investigations and enforcement duties

performed." 10 M.R.S. § 8003-D. The Board is required "to exercise its discretion

reasonably in imposing costs." See Zegel v. Bd. of Soc. Worker Licensure, 2004 ME 31, ~

19, 843 A.2d 18, 23 (finding Board exceeded its discretion by imposing additional costs

without addressing licensee's capacity to pay). The Board did consider petitioner's

ability to pay costs and did not impose a fine. (See Tr. at 156, 171-72.) Moreover, the

petitioner's argument that the Board punished the petitioner for rejecting a pre-hearing

10 It is unclear whether the Missouri and Maryland boards' decisions addressed the same issues that formed the bases for the Board's finding that petitioner violated Maine statutory provisions.

13 consent decree offered to him and exercising his right to a hearing is not supported by

the record or case law. See ZegeL at <[ 23, 843 A.2d at 24 ("We also reject Zegel's

argument that the proposed consent agreement provides the parameters, or even a

context for determining sanctions after the hearing.").

The entry is

The Decision of the Maine Board of Licensure in Medicine is AFFIRMED.

Date: December 5, 2008 ancy Mills Justice, Superior

14 F Date Filed --.,}3+/~2~51--1Ov-8G---- Kennebec Docket No. _~Al..[P:--:-=<.Ou..8=L2....;3L- _ County 80C Action _

SCOTT L. DIERING, MC Ys. MAINE BOARD OF LICENSURE ·fN MEDICINE PI ai nti ff' s Attorney Defendant's Attorney

Charles Gilbert, III, Esq. Dennis Smith, AAG PO Box 2339 6 State House Station Bangor, Maine 04402-2339 Augusta, ME 04333-0006

Date of Entry 3/25/08 . Rule 80C complaint and summary sheet filed. s/ Gilbert, Esq.

3/31/08 Appearance and Statement of Position Pursuant to 5 MRSA §11005, filed 3/28/08. s/Smith, Esq.

4/17/08 Certification Of Administrative Record, Agency Record, filed 4/16/08. (Record in vault)

Notice and Briefing Schedule mailed to attorneys of record. 6/6/08 Petitioner's Rule SOC Brief on Appeal, filed. s/Gilbert, Esq. (filed 5/27/08)

6/23/08 Brief of Respondent, filed. s/Smith, AAG

7/1/08 PIt's consent motion to enlarge time which to file reply brief filed by Atty Gilbert.

7/15/08 ORDER, Mills, J. (7/14/08) The time in which Petitioner may file his reply brief is enlarged to 7/21/08. Copy to attorneys of record.

7/25/08 Petitioner's Motion To File Late Brief, filed 7/24/08. s/Gilbert, Esq.

7/25/08 Petitioner's Rule 80C Reply Brief, filed 7/24/08. s/Gilbert, Esq.

7/30/08 ORDER, Mills, J. (7/28/08) On Petitioner's motion and for cause shown, without objection, Petitioner is allowed to file his Reply Brief late. Copy mailed to attorneys of record.

9/3/08 Plaintiff's Request For Oral Argument, filed 8/28/08. s/Gilbert, Esq.

12/5/08 DECISION AND ORDER, Mills, J. The Decision of the Maine Board of Licensure in Medicine is AFFIRMED. Copy to attorneys of record. Copy to Garbrecht Law Library, Deborah Firestone, Goss Data Service.