Bd. of Cty. Com'rs of Metro. Dade Cty. v. Lowas

348 So. 2d 13
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedJune 14, 1977
Docket76-1739
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 348 So. 2d 13 (Bd. of Cty. Com'rs of Metro. Dade Cty. v. Lowas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bd. of Cty. Com'rs of Metro. Dade Cty. v. Lowas, 348 So. 2d 13 (Fla. Ct. App. 1977).

Opinion

348 So.2d 13 (1977)

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY and Dade County, a Political Subdivision of the State of Florida, and Frank C. Gardner, Appellants,
v.
Joseph V. Bia LOWAS et al., Appellees.

No. 76-1739.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

June 14, 1977.
Rehearing Denied August 3, 1977.

Horton, Perse & Ginsberg and Mallory H. Horton, Miami, Stuart L. Simon, County Atty., and Stanley B. Price, Asst. County Atty., for appellants.

Prunty, Ross, DeLoach & Olsen, John W. Prunty, William Bruce Israel and Ray M. Watson, Miami, for appellees.

Before PEARSON, BARKDULL and HAVERFIELD, JJ.

BARKDULL, Judge.

Some time prior to July 20, 1973, the appellant, Frank Gardner, and others determined to form a private corporation for the purpose of promoting a commercial tennis *14 club facility. In furtherance of this venture, they caused Sunset Tennis Club, Inc., to be incorporated in July of 1973. They set about to find a suitable site for the club and, after examining some twenty parcels, Frank Gardner purchased approximately four acres of property upon which a residence was constructed. This was in the unincorporated area of Dade County in a EU-1 zoning classification, which provides for single family residences; minimum one acre. This zoning classification is one of the highest residential type zoning classifications under the Dade County Code and has been on the subject property and its surrounding area in excess of twenty-five years. The area in question is a fully developed exclusive one-acre residential area for approximately one mile surrounding the property.

The property was acquired by Gardner on March 13, 1974, and an application for a change in zoning from EU-1 Estate to BU-2 Business (including liquor), together with a request for unusual use special exceptions and numerous variances, was filed and was set for public hearing on June 25, 1974. This proposed tennis club was to be built in accordance with plans submitted to the Zoning Department, dated January 25, 1974. Apparently, upon this application being considered, it was met with substantial opposition from the surrounding neighbors and the application was withdrawn. It was thereafter modified and resubmitted in July 1975, and sought a change from EU-1 Estate zoning for an unusual use to permit a tennis court and variance relative to certain setbacks and fence height requirements. The Planning Department recommended approval with conditions, based on a resubmission of plans submitted dated June 30, 1975. The Zoning Director of Dade County recommended that the application should be denied with prejudice in its entirety.[1] The matter occurred before the Zoning Appeals Board (hereafter referred to as ZAB) on February 2, 1976. The ZAB found that the request for unusual use would not be compatible with the area and, on said date, denied the request for the unusual use and variance.[2] [It is noted here that the variance would only have been applicable in the event of the granting of the unusual use, and no further reference will be made to the variance.]

Thereafter, Gardner pursued an appeal from the decision of the ZAB to the Board of County Commissioners. In seeking a *15 repeal of the entire decision of the ZAB, the application for appeal reads in part as follows:

* * * * * *
"Application, or part of Application Appealed (Explain):
"Entire Appealable Application
"appeals the decision of the Dade County Zoning Appeals Board with reference to the above subject matter, and in accordance with the provisions contained in Chapter 33 of the Code of Metropolitan Dade County, Florida, hereby makes application to the Board of County Commissioners for review of said decision. The grounds and reasons supporting the reversal of the ruling of the Zoning Appeals Board are as follows:
"(State in brief and concise language)
"In support of this appeal, the Applicant would state:
"The testimony and exhibits presented before the Zoning Appeals Board concerning the above revealed that the facility planned by the Applicant would meet all of the criteria as stated in Section 33-311 of the Metropolitan Code of Dade County. In addition, the Applicant has shown that his request would have no adverse effect on the present or future development of the immediate neighborhood and that said request is compatible with same.
"Wherefore, the Applicant asks that the County Commission reverse the ruling made by the Zoning Appeals Board and grant the Applicant's request." [emphasis added]
* * * * * *

By this application and its very wording, Gardner sought review of the decision of the ZAB and sought a reversal, because the testimony and exhibits before the ZAB demonstrated that his application for unusual use permit met all the criteria of Section 33-311 of the Code of Metropolitan Dade County, and that the request would have no adverse effect on the present or future development of the immediate neighborhood.[3]

In due course, the petition for appeal came on for consideration before the Board of County Commissioners. At that time, the Board of County Commissioners undertook a de novo hearing, without any review of the evidence or exhibits introduced before the ZAB. At this hearing, the applicant produced argument by an attorney; unsworn testimony by himself, an architect, an engineer, and property owners not directly in the area to be affected by the planned facility urging its approval. The vast majority of the people living within 500 feet of the property involved either testified or were shown by exhibits to oppose the application; they were also not sworn and were represented by counsel. There was no attempt by the Board of County Commissioners to review the decision of the ZAB, as requested by the petition of appeal filed by Gardner. There was no attempt by Gardner forces to show why the decision of the ZAB was not supported by substantial competent evidence; there was no attempt to show that the evidence produced before the ZAB met the requirements of Section 33-311(d) of the Code of Metropolitan Dade County to justify an unusual use. At the conclusion of the public hearing, the Board of County Commissioners adopted a resolution overruling the decision of the ZAB and granted the request, subject to certain conditions.

The appellees, as aggrieved property owners, pursued a petition for writ of certiorari to the circuit court.[4] During the pendency of this proceeding, the property owner [Gardner] was permitted to intervene in this proceeding. The circuit court, *16 after reviewing the evidence and exhibits tendered at the hearing before the Board of County Commissioners and following review of the briefs and argument of counsel, entered an order in effect quashing the resolution reversing the decision of the ZAB and granting the unusual use.[5] Thereafter, the Board of County Commissioners and Dade County filed a notice of appeal, which was joined in by Gardner. Upon the appeal, the County and Gardner urge that the circuit court erred in its order granting the writ of certiorari in accepting any of the grounds urged by the petitioners. Following the matter being briefed, it was set for oral argument.

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Bluebook (online)
348 So. 2d 13, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bd-of-cty-comrs-of-metro-dade-cty-v-lowas-fladistctapp-1977.