Bd. of County Comm Rs v. Fourth Jud

Opinion

No. 82-285

I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F T H E S T A T E O F MONTANA

1983

THE BOARD O F COUNTY C O M M I S S I O N E R S O F R A V A L L I C O U N T Y , MONTANA,

Petitioner,

vs.

THE D I S T R I C T COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, e t al.,

Respondents.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING:

C o u n s e l of Record:

F o r P e t i t i o n e r :

R o b e r t Brown, County Attorney, Hamilton, Montana

For R e s p o n d e n t s :

John W . R o b i n s o n , Hamilton, Montana Koch, McKenna & Goheen, Hamilton, Montana

F i l e d :

r t tj 2 4 '983

Mr. Justice John Conway H a r r i s o n delivered t h e O p i n i o n of the Court.

T h i s a c t i o n i s b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t on a w r i t of r e v i e w by t h e Ravalli County commissioners. The commissioners were held in c o n t e m p t by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t o f the Fourth J u d i c i a l District

f o r v i o l a t i n g an o r d e r i s s u e d i n a c i v i l a c t i o n e n t i t l e d D e l b e r t

Carter, et al. v. A r t h u r J. Hoiland, et al., number DV-79-430,

f i l e d i n R a v a l l i County.

The s o u r c e o f t h e s e p r o c e e d i n g s is a d e d i c a t e d r o a d r i g h t - o f -

way i n M o u n t a i n V i e w O r c h a r d s d e s c r i b e d as a f i f t y - f o o t s t r i p of l a n d r u n n i n g e a s t and w e s t b e t w e e n B l o c k s 7 and 1 0 , M o u n t a i n V i e w Orchards, S e c t i o n 1 4 , Township 7 N o r t h , Range 20 West. On J u l y

30, 1979, fifteen landowners filed a petition to vacate the r i g h t - o f -way w i t h t h e R a v a l l i County c o m m i s s i o n e r s . The p e t i t i o n a s k e d t h a t t h e d e d i c a t e d , b u t n o t y e t opened r o a d , be a b a n d o n e d .

On A u g u s t 7, 1 9 7 9 , t h i r t e e n l a n d o w n e r s f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r removal of road obstructions. The petition asked the dedicated right-of-way be o p e n e d and t h a t a r o a d be c o n s t r u c t e d i n a c c o r -

dance with the o r i g i n a l p l a t .

On A u g u s t 9 , 1 9 7 9 , t h e m i n u t e s o f t h e c o m m i s s i o n e r s ' m e e t i n g reflect the two p e t i t i o n s were d i s c u s s e d and t h e commissioners

decided not t o t a k e a c t i o n on e i t h e r p e t i t i o n , concluding they

were i n d i r e c t c o n t r a s t w i t h e a c h o t h e r . On S e p t e m b e r 1 0 , 1 9 7 9 , t h e c o m m i s s i o n e r s i s s u e d a memorandum a g a i n s t a t i n g t h e y were n o t

g o i n g t o act on e i t h e r p e t i t i o n .

On November 7, 1979, the Carters filed a complaint in District C o u r t s e e k i n g t o e n j o i n a n y o b s t r u c t i o n of t h e u s e of the above-mentioned dedicated r i g h t - o f -way. Defendants in the a c t i o n a p p e a r t o be i n d i v i d u a l s who own l a n d n e a r o r a d j a c e n t to t h e right-of-way. A l l p a r t i e s moved f o r summary j u d g m e n t and o n June 12, 1981, the D i s t r i c t Court granted d e f e n d a n t s t motion f o r

summary judgment. Defendants then filed a motion in aid of judgment s e e k i n g c l a r i f i c a t i o n of t h e District C o u r t ' s o r d e r . On

August 13, 1981, the District Court issued a second order granting the commissioners authority to d o o n e o f two things: r e t a i n the s u b j e c t land i n t r u s t f o r the public, o r return the land to t h e g r a n t o r s . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t f u r t h e r o r d e r e d that

the commissioners did not have discretion to "do any other t h i n g s , i n c l u d i n g opening t h e land ."

On O c t o b e r 3 0 , 1 9 8 1 , t h e c o m m i s s i o n e r s i s s u e d an o r d e r pur-

suant to the o r d e r of t h e District Court granting defendants'

motion for summary judgment entered June 12, 1981. The commissioners ' order stated : the dedicated roadway had been

inspected by Commissioners Frank Williams and County Surveyor

L a r r y H i g g i n b o t h a m and t h e r e p o r t o f t h e i n s p e c t i o n was f i l e d o n J u n e 29, 1 9 8 1 ; n o t i c e was g i v e n t o t h e a d j o i n i n g l a n d o w n e r s by

c e r t i f i e d mail and to t h e p u b l i c by p u b l i c a t i o n ; and, a public h e a r i n g on t h e p e t i t i o n s was h e l d o n A u g u s t 4 , 1981. The comm i s s i o n e r s e n t e r e d f i n d i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s o f l a w and ordered: t h e p e t i t i o n f o r v a c a t i o n of t h e roadway is d e n i e d ; a n y encroachments that i n t e r f e r e with the unencumbered use of the l a n d s b y t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c be removed; a n y u s e o f the premises

s h a l l be n o n e x l u s i v e and s h a l l n o t i n t e r f e r e w i t h t h e u s e by a n y o t h e r person; and t h e p r o p e r t y s h a l l be h e l d in t r u s t for the

p u b l i c by t h e Board o f County C o m m i s s i o n e r s f o r f u t u r e d e v e l o p - m e n t f o r t h e b e n e f i t of t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c .

On November 1 9 , 1 9 8 1 , d e f e n d a n t s moved t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r

a contempt o r d e r a g a i n s t t h e commissioners. On J u n e 2 5 , 1982, t h e District Court i s s u e d an o r d e r holding t h e commissioners i n

civil contempt for failure to abide by the District Court's o r d e r s o f J u n e 1 2 and A u g u s t 1 3 , 1 9 8 1 . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t f i n e d

t h e c o m m i s s i o n e r s $300 and o r d e r e d them t o p a y a t t o r n e y f e e s f o r t h e contempt proceeding. The o r d e r g a v e t h e c o m m i s s i o n e r s o p p o r - t u n i t y to p u r g e t h e m s e l v e s o f t h e c o n t e m p t c i t a t i o n by r e v o k i n g

t h e October 30, 1981, o r d e r w i t h i n t h i r t y days. On A u g u s t 3 ,

1982, t h e commissioners f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r w r i t of review i n t h i s Court.

The p e t i t i o n r a i s e s f i v e i s s u e s f o r r e v i e w :

1. Whether the District Court had jurisdiction over the petitioners;

2. W h e t h e r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t had j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e s u b -

ject matter of the p e t i t i o n e r s ' jurisdictional powers and title

t o t h e roadway;

3. W h e t h e r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t c a n l i m i t s t a t u t o r y powers o f e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s w i t h o u t g i v i n g t h e e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l s t h e opport u n i t y to a p p e a r and o f f e r t e s t i m o n y ;

4. W h e t h e r t h e p e t i t i o n e r s c a n be h e l d i n contempt without an evidentiary hearing;

5. W h e t h e r a t t o r n e y f e e s c a n be g r a n t e d i n a contempt pro-

c e e d i n g i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e p e n a l t y imposed.

We find issue number two to be dispositive. The comm i s s i o n e r s contend t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i d n o t have s u b j e c t matter

jurisdiction to enter an order which in effect abandoned the roadway. Here, t h e d e d i c a t e d roadway was i n c l u d e d i n t h e o r i g i -

n a l p l a t of Mountain V i e w Orchards f i l e d i n 1908. The r e l e v a n t

statute in effect at the t i m e of d e d i c a t i o n was s e c t i o n 1 3 3 7 , R e v i s e d C o d e s o f Montana 1 9 0 7 . The s e c t i o n s t a t e s i n p e r t i n e n t part:

" A l l highways, r o a d s , streets, a l l e y s , laid out ... by the public . . ., ...

or i f l a i d

o u t o r e r e c t e d b y o t h e r s , d e d i c a t e d o r abandoned to t h e p u b l i c , . . . are public highways. "

I n B a i l e y v . R a v a l l i County ( 1 9 8 2 ) f Mont . - , 6 5 3 P.2d 1 3 9 , 39 S t . R e p . 2010, t h i s Court h e l d a s i m i l a r d e d i c a t e d roadway c r e a t e d a p u b l i c r o a d w a y o r highway a t t h e t i m e of d e d i c a t i o n . S e c t i o n 7-14-2615 MCA, s t a t e s :

" ( 1 ) A l l county r o a d s once e s t a b l i s h e d must c o n t i n u e t o be c o u n t y r o a d s u n t i l abandoned or v a c a t e d by : "(a) o p e r a t i o n of l a w ; "(b) judgment of a court of competent j u r i s d i c t i o n ; or "(c) t h e o r d e r of t h e board.

" ( 2 ) No o r d e r t o a b a n d o n a n y c o u n t y r o a d s h a l l be v a l i d u n l e s s p r e c e d e d b y n o t i c e and public hearing. "

The D i s t r i c t C o u r t a r g u e s it had j u r i s d i c t i o n t o a b a n d o n t h e

r o a d v i a s e c t i o n 7 - 1 4 - 2 6 1 5 ( 1 ) ( b ) , MCA, b e c a u s e it is a c o u r t of

competent jurisdiction. However, section 7-14-2601, et seq., MCA, e s t a b l i s h e s t h e p r o c e d u r e t o abandon a r o a d . The s t a t u t o r y

procedure requires the f i l i n g of a p e t i t i o n by t e n freeholders with the Board of County Commissioners; investigation by the

B o a r d ; d e c i s i o n ; and n o t i c e t o t h e a d j o i n i n g l a n d o w n e r s .

Here , t h e r e were t w o p e t i t i o n s f i l e d . One to o p e n t h e r o a d

and one to abandon t h e road. At the commissioners I meeting t h e m i n u t e s r e f l e c t t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e c o m m i s s i o n e r s was to n o t a c t

on e i t h e r p e t i t i o n . At t h i s point the Carters filed a civil

action i n District Court seeking t o e n j o i n o b s t r u c t i o n of the road. However, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t g r a n t e d d e f e n d a n t s 1 m o t i o n f o r summary j u d g m e n t and o r d e r e d t h e c o m m i s s i o n e r s to d o o n e of two things: "1. Retain the subject land i n t r u s t f o r the public; 2. Return the land to t h e g r a n t o r s . The C o m m i s s i o n e r s d o n o t

have discretion to do any o t h e r t h i n g s , including opening the

land. "

The e f f e c t o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s o r d e r was t o a b a n d o n t h e road whereas the initial cause of a c t i o n was injunction. As

e x p l a i n e d a b o v e , t h e p r o c e d u r e f o r abandoning a road is t o p e t i - tion the Board o f Commissioners. The D i s t r i c t Court does not

have o r i g i n a l jurisdiction to entertain the petition. Should

petitioners o r r e s p o n d e n t s be unsatisfied w i t h t h e d e c i s i o n of the commissioners , they could then p e t i t ion the District Court

f o r a w r i t o f r e v i e w p u r s u a n t to s e c t i o n 27-25-102, MCA:

"A w r i t o f r e v i e w may be g r a n t e d b y : (2) the s u p r e m e c o u r t or t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t o r a n y j u d g e t h e r e o f , when a n ... board e x c e e d e d t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of s u c h . .. . .

has . board

. . . and t h e r e i s no a p p e a l o r , i n t h e j u d g m e n t o f t h e c o u r t , a n y p l a i n s p e e d y , and a d e q u a t e remedy. "

Upon a w r i t o f r e v i e w t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t would become a c o u r t of

competent j u r i s d i c t i o n .

W e f i n d t h i s t o be t h e o n l y method f o r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t to

o b t a i n j u r i s d i c t i o n to abandon a r o a d . Here, t h i s p r o c e d u r e was not followed. As the proper procedure was not followed, the D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i d n o t h a v e j u r i s d i c t i o n t o o r d e r a b a n d o n m e n t of

t h e road. The c o m m i s s i o n e r s c l a i m t h e y c a n n o t be h e l d i n cont e m p t f o r v i o l a t i n g a n o r d e r which e x c e e d e d t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s

jurisdiction. W e agree. A p a r t y c a n n o t be h e l d i n contempt f o r d i s o b e y i n g an o r d e r which the c o u r t had n o a u t h o r i t y to make. P h i l l i p s v. Loberg ( 1 9 8 0 ) , -- - Mont . - r 6 0 7 P.2d 561, 564, 37

Because the ~ i s t r i c tCourt exceeded its jurisdiction by o r d e r i n g t h e r o a d a b a n d o n e d , i t had no a u t h o r i t y to h o l d t h e com-

missioners i n contempt f o r v i o l a t i n g t h e o r d e r . Therefore, the

o r d e r h o l d i n g t h e c o m m i s s i o n e r s i n c o n t e m p t is v a c a t e d .

Justices

M r . J u s t i c e J o h n C . S h e e h y d i s s e n t s and w i l l f i l e a written dissent later.

Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy, dissenting:

I dissent. The Board of County Commissioners of Ravalli County are in contempt of the presiding judge and of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Montana for the County of Ravalli, and this Court should uphold the right of that District Court to protect its process and proceedings from obstruction and disruption by the contemnors.

In the underlying suit to determine whether a roadway existed, the District Court had concluded that a roadway had indeed been dedicated to the public use; that since the time of its dedication, no use as a roadway had occurred; that by its lack of use for more than 70 years, the public had abandoned any right to have the dedicated stip used as a roadway; and because of the absolute waiver that had so occurred the county commissioners could either (1) continue to hold the land in public trust, or (2) vacate the roadway.

The board of county commissioners violated, obstructed and disrupted the proceedings and decision of the District Court in the underlying cause by adopting a resolution contra to the order of the court, and in effect countermanding the decree of the court that the landowners had no right to a roadway.

It is true that the Board of County Commissioners were not parties to the action in which the court made its decision. What the majority forgets, however, is that an action for contempt is a separate cause of action. Contempt proceedings are entirely independent of the civil action for which they arise. McPartlin v. Fransen (1978), 178 Mont. 178, 582 P.2d 1255. The power of the District Court reaches to any person or officer who is in contempt of the authority of the court by misbehavior in office or by any other unla.wfu1 interference with the process or proceedings of a court. Section 3-1-501, MCA.

Here the District Court, after hearing, determined that the commissioners were in fact in contempt of the court's authority and levied a punishment of $300 on each and attorney's fees, which punishment they could purge by vacating the contemptuous order which they had made. The majority fails to note in is statement of facts that one of the commissioners who signed the contemptuous order was Hugh G. Cumming, a nearby landowner who would benefit from the County Commissioners' order that the roadway be maintained. I can think of no more contemptuous situation than to have a. public officer for his personal benefit use the power of his office to flaunt a lawful decision of the District Court.

This Court's decision leaves the respondents in a legal no-man's land. They have a judgment from the Fourth Judicial District Court that there has been a waiver by the public of any right to use the strip of land as a roadway. They have a Board of County Commissioners' subsequent order which has the effect of establishing the roadway. It is small wonder tha.t taxpayers and litigants are perplexed by decisions of the courts that in the guise of reasoned approaches can sanctify two exactly divergent results.

\ Justice