Bayersdorfer v. United States

7 Ct. Cust. 66, 1916 WL 21509, 1916 CCPA LEXIS 41
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedMay 1, 1916
DocketNo. 1669
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 7 Ct. Cust. 66 (Bayersdorfer v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bayersdorfer v. United States, 7 Ct. Cust. 66, 1916 WL 21509, 1916 CCPA LEXIS 41 (ccpa 1916).

Opinion

Barber, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The merchandise is natural flowers (immortelles) dried and dyed, and wreaths composed of the same having a straw frame. As to both it is conceded they are ornamental but not -artificial. Duty was assessed thereon at 60 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 347 of the tariff act of 1913 as ornamental flowers, and as wreaths wholly or in chief value thereof. This assessment was upheld by the Board of General Appraisers.

They were claimed by the importers to. be.dutiable under paragraph 210 as cut flowers, preserved or fresh, either directly or. by similitude, or as unenumerated articles under paragraph 385, but in this court the importers chiefly rely upon paragraph 210.

The real question is whether the term " artificial and ornamental * * * flowers ” in paragraph 347 requires flowers classifiable thereunder to be artificial and ornamental, the contention of the importers being that both characteristics are indispensable to such classification> while the Government insists that 'he word "and” is used in the sense of "or” and therefore that the possession of either of these characteristics is only requisite.

The relevant part of said paragraph 347 is as follows:

347. Feathers and downs, on the skin or otherwise, crude or not dressed, colored, or otherwise advanced or manufactured in any manner, not specially provided for in this section, 20 per centum ad valorem; when dressed, colored, or otherwise advanced or manufactured in any manner, and not suitable for use as millinery ornaments, including quilts of down, and manufactures of down, 40 per centum ad valorem j artificial or ornamental feathers suitable for use as millinery ornaments, artificial and ornamental fruits, grains, leaves, flowers, and stems or parts thereof, of whatever material composed, not specially provided for in this section, 60 per centum ad va-lorem; boas, boutonnieres, wreaths, and all articles not specially provided for in this section, composed wholly or in chief value of any of the feathers, flowers, leaves, or other material herein mentioned, 60 per centum ad valorem; * * *.

[68]*68It is at once obvious that unless the conjunctive "and” is read in the sense of the disjunctive “or” in the expression “artificial and ornamental fruits, * * * flowers,” etc., as the Government claims, the grammatical construction sustains the ■ importers’ position, because the rule is well settled that the lawmaker is presumed to know the meaning of words and the rules of grammar and that a statute will be read and understood accordingly, unless it is apparent that something different was intended. United States v. Goldenberg (168 U. S., 95); Lewis’s Sutherland Statutory Construction (sec. 408); United States v. Cohn (3 Ct. Cust. Appls., 273; T. D. 32571).

In determining whether something different was intended the context and purpose of the statute will be considered. If the result of a grammatical construction is repugnant to the manifest legislative purpose or produces absurd or unjust results, the strict grammatical sense may be modified, extended, or abridged as is found necessary to accomplish the clearly ascertainable legislative purpose. Lewis’s Sutherland Statutory Construction (secs. 408 and 489 and cases cited); Hensel v. United States (3 Ct. Cust. Appls., 117; T. D. 32366); United States v. Palm, Fechteler & Co. (4 Ct. Cust. Appls., 1; T. D. 33195).

It has been judicially stated that—

The popular use of “or” and “and ” is so loose and so frequently inaecuarate that it has infected statutory enactments. While they are not treated as interchangeable, and should be followed when their accurate reading does not render the sense dubious their strict meaning is more readily departed from than that of other words and one read in place of the other in deference to the meaning of the context.

See Lewis’s Sutherland Statutory Construction (sec. 397 and cases cited); Endlich on Interpretation of Statutes (sec. 303); Words and Phrases Judicially Defined (West'Publishing'Co.), under “and” and "or,” citations and discussion; Union Insurance Company v. United States (73 U. S., 759); Manson v. Dayton (153 Fed., 269).

When the meaning is plain, the courts can not look to the statutes which have been revised to see if Congress erred in that revision, but may do so when necessary to construe doubtful language used in expressing the meaning of Congress.

United States v. Bowen (100 U. S., 508, 513); Arthur v. Dodge (101 U. S., 34); Vietor v. Arthur (104 U. S., 498); Bate Refrigerating Co. v. Sulzberger (157 U. S., 1, 33).

If the expression “artificial and ornamental fruits, grains, leaves, flowers', and stems, or parts thereof” in paragraph 347 be considered as if it were an entirely new enactment with no previous legislative or judicial history, we think it could not be fairly argued that the meaning was doubtful or ambiguous. Artificial and ornamental flowers without doubt grammatically clearly means flowers that are both artificial and ornamental. We can therefore only justify a holding that “and” means “or” by finding that the congressional purpose is not accomplished unless so interpreted.

[69]*69• The initial evidence of the legislative purpose is the paragraph itself. It provides (a) for feathers and downs, crude, not dressed, colored, or advanced or manufactured, and not specially provided for; (5)'for the same if dressed, colored, or advanced or manufactured and not suitable for use as millinery ornaments; (c) for artificial or ornamental feathers suitable for use as millinery ornaments; (d) for artificial and ornamental fruits, grains, leaves, and flowers and stems or parts thereof, of whatever material composed; and (e) for boas, boutonnieres, wreaths, and all articles not specially provided for composed wholly or in chief value of any of the feathers, flowers, leaves, or other material mentioned in the paragraph.

It may be said that the paragraph seems to have been drafted with .precision and with due regard to, grammatical construction. The fact that the expression “artificial and ornamental” is immediately preceded by that of “artificial or ornamental” is indicative of this precision, as it was clearly thereby intended that either artificial ór ornamental feathers suitable for use as millinery ornaments were to be classified thereunder. The described fruits, flowers, etc., were .also to be there classified, whether or not suitable for use as such ornaments, and boas, boutonnieres, and wreaths made of either artificial or ornamental feathers or of the described fruits and flowers were to pay the same rate of duty as their component material. While this paragraph is often referred to as the millinery paragraph, it is evident upon careful examination that such ornaments are but a part', and perhaps a small part, of the merchandise covered thereby, for it is common knowledge that artificial and ornamental fruits, grains, leaves, flowers and stems, and articles made therefrom have other varied and large uses. So far as may be discovered from the paragraph itself, it is consistent with the legislative purpose therein expressed that “and” was designedly used in its grammatical sense.

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Bluebook (online)
7 Ct. Cust. 66, 1916 WL 21509, 1916 CCPA LEXIS 41, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bayersdorfer-v-united-states-ccpa-1916.