¶1
Houghton, J.
— Department of Corrections (DOC) lieutenants appeal from a trial court summary judgment order dismissing their salary misclassification claims against DOC. The lieutenants argue that the trial court erred in ruling that they failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. Although the exhaustion doctrine does not apply here, we affirm the trial court because no cause of action exists for the lieutenants’ salary misclassification claims.
FACTS
¶2 Alleging salary misclassification under RCW 41-.06.150(14) (section (17) was renumbered as section (14) [741] in 2002), RCW 41.06.155, former RCW 41.06.500 (2002), and chapter 356-56 WAC,1 thirty-seven current and four [742] retired lieutenants sued DOC. The lieutenants asserted that in 1993, when the state changed its personnel system for supervisory corrections officers from Washington General Service to the Washington Management Service (WMS), the WMS incorrectly rated and placed them in a lower salary category called a band. 2 The lieutenants based their claims on state wage statutes, federal law, and the state constitution.
¶3 DOC moved for summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, that there was no cause of action supporting the improper band placement claim and that the lieutenants failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before bringing their lawsuit. In its oral ruling granting DOC’s summary judgment motion based only on the exhaustion argument, the court explained that “my decision ... is that the plaintiffs corrections officers did not exhaust their administrative remedies, and that must happen before this [743] court should wade into the public employee management thicket.” Report of Proceedings at 43.
¶4 The lieutenants appeal.
ANALYSIS
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
¶5 The lieutenants contend that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. They assert that they did not first have to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing their lawsuit. DOC counters that the trial court can be affirmed on the exhaustion doctrine and alternative grounds.
¶6 We review summary judgment from the same position as the trial court. Allstot v. Edwards, 116 Wn. App. 424, 430, 65 P.3d 696, review denied, 150 Wn.2d 1016 (2003). A court properly grants summary judgment in the absence of a genuine issue of material fact or when reasonable minds could not differ that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Allstot, 116 Wn. App. at 430.
¶7 Under the exhaustion doctrine, a plaintiff must seek administrative remedies when “(1) [the plaintiff’s] claim is cognizable in the first instance by an agency alone; (2) the agency has clearly established mechanisms for the resolution of complaints by aggrieved parties; and (3) the administrative remedies can provide the relief sought.” Milligan v. Thompson, 90 Wn. App. 586, 596, 953 P.2d 112 (1998). The doctrine allows an administrative body to exercise its expertise in areas that may be outside the courts’ experience. Milligan, 90 Wn. App. at 596-97.
¶8 DOC argued that WAC 356-56-610 gives the lieutenants an administrative remedy, which they did not exhaust. WAC 356-56-610(3) provides:
An agency shall conduct an informal review, at the employee’s request, for the following actions:
(a) Salary adjustment (or lack thereof) when the responsibilities of the permanent employee’s position have been changed.
[744] (b) Placement actions following reversion of a permanent employee.
(c) Decisions about if a position is included in the Washington management service.
(i) The final agency-internal review shall be conducted by the agency director or designee.
(ii) If the incumbent disagrees with the agency director/ designee’s decision, he/she may request a review by the director of the department of personnel, provided that such request is made within fifteen calendar days of notification of the decision. Such review will be limited to relevant documents and information and will be final.
WAC 356-56-610(6) adds: “The director of personnel retains the right to review any review decision rendered by agency heads or designees or any actions taken under the Washington management service.” And citing WAC 356-56--610(3) and (6), DOC further argued that the lieutenants could “seek internal agency review of the decision of the Position Evaluation Committee. If still unsatisfied, the employee may seek review by [Department of Personnel (DOP)].” Resp’t’s Br. at 22 (citations omitted).
¶9 The lieutenants disagree that the above remedies apply because WAC 356-56-610(3) “does not provide for mandatory review of the initial classification decisions or status . . . nor does it provide for superior court review.” Appellant’s Br. at 22. Although the lieutenants concede that WAC 356-56-610(6) provides review, they argue that this review is entirely discretionary with the director, not employees, and does not provide for review by superior courts.
110 We agree with the lieutenants that WAC 356-56--610(3) does not provide a mechanism for them to challenge their initial WMS classification. And because DOC did not change the lieutenants’ responsibilities, WAC 356-56--610(3)(a) does not apply. Similarly, the lieutenants do not dispute the decision to include them in WMS, as contemplated by WAC 356-56-610(3)(b) and (c) respectively. And WAC 356-56-610(6) offers the lieutenants no relief as it affords only the director, not an employee, the right to [745] review an agency decision. Accordingly, the lieutenants have no administrative remedy available to them here.
¶11 Where no clearly established mechanism for resolving a claim exists, the plaintiff is not required to exhaust administrative remedies. Allstot, 116 Wn. App. at 433. The trial court should not have dismissed the lieutenants’ claims for failure to exhaust their administrative remedies. We next turn to DOC’s other arguments in support of summary judgment of dismissal.3
Chapters 49.48 and 49.52 RCW Wage Claims
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¶1
Houghton, J.
— Department of Corrections (DOC) lieutenants appeal from a trial court summary judgment order dismissing their salary misclassification claims against DOC. The lieutenants argue that the trial court erred in ruling that they failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. Although the exhaustion doctrine does not apply here, we affirm the trial court because no cause of action exists for the lieutenants’ salary misclassification claims.
FACTS
¶2 Alleging salary misclassification under RCW 41-.06.150(14) (section (17) was renumbered as section (14) [741] in 2002), RCW 41.06.155, former RCW 41.06.500 (2002), and chapter 356-56 WAC,1 thirty-seven current and four [742] retired lieutenants sued DOC. The lieutenants asserted that in 1993, when the state changed its personnel system for supervisory corrections officers from Washington General Service to the Washington Management Service (WMS), the WMS incorrectly rated and placed them in a lower salary category called a band. 2 The lieutenants based their claims on state wage statutes, federal law, and the state constitution.
¶3 DOC moved for summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, that there was no cause of action supporting the improper band placement claim and that the lieutenants failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before bringing their lawsuit. In its oral ruling granting DOC’s summary judgment motion based only on the exhaustion argument, the court explained that “my decision ... is that the plaintiffs corrections officers did not exhaust their administrative remedies, and that must happen before this [743] court should wade into the public employee management thicket.” Report of Proceedings at 43.
¶4 The lieutenants appeal.
ANALYSIS
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
¶5 The lieutenants contend that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. They assert that they did not first have to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing their lawsuit. DOC counters that the trial court can be affirmed on the exhaustion doctrine and alternative grounds.
¶6 We review summary judgment from the same position as the trial court. Allstot v. Edwards, 116 Wn. App. 424, 430, 65 P.3d 696, review denied, 150 Wn.2d 1016 (2003). A court properly grants summary judgment in the absence of a genuine issue of material fact or when reasonable minds could not differ that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Allstot, 116 Wn. App. at 430.
¶7 Under the exhaustion doctrine, a plaintiff must seek administrative remedies when “(1) [the plaintiff’s] claim is cognizable in the first instance by an agency alone; (2) the agency has clearly established mechanisms for the resolution of complaints by aggrieved parties; and (3) the administrative remedies can provide the relief sought.” Milligan v. Thompson, 90 Wn. App. 586, 596, 953 P.2d 112 (1998). The doctrine allows an administrative body to exercise its expertise in areas that may be outside the courts’ experience. Milligan, 90 Wn. App. at 596-97.
¶8 DOC argued that WAC 356-56-610 gives the lieutenants an administrative remedy, which they did not exhaust. WAC 356-56-610(3) provides:
An agency shall conduct an informal review, at the employee’s request, for the following actions:
(a) Salary adjustment (or lack thereof) when the responsibilities of the permanent employee’s position have been changed.
[744] (b) Placement actions following reversion of a permanent employee.
(c) Decisions about if a position is included in the Washington management service.
(i) The final agency-internal review shall be conducted by the agency director or designee.
(ii) If the incumbent disagrees with the agency director/ designee’s decision, he/she may request a review by the director of the department of personnel, provided that such request is made within fifteen calendar days of notification of the decision. Such review will be limited to relevant documents and information and will be final.
WAC 356-56-610(6) adds: “The director of personnel retains the right to review any review decision rendered by agency heads or designees or any actions taken under the Washington management service.” And citing WAC 356-56--610(3) and (6), DOC further argued that the lieutenants could “seek internal agency review of the decision of the Position Evaluation Committee. If still unsatisfied, the employee may seek review by [Department of Personnel (DOP)].” Resp’t’s Br. at 22 (citations omitted).
¶9 The lieutenants disagree that the above remedies apply because WAC 356-56-610(3) “does not provide for mandatory review of the initial classification decisions or status . . . nor does it provide for superior court review.” Appellant’s Br. at 22. Although the lieutenants concede that WAC 356-56-610(6) provides review, they argue that this review is entirely discretionary with the director, not employees, and does not provide for review by superior courts.
110 We agree with the lieutenants that WAC 356-56--610(3) does not provide a mechanism for them to challenge their initial WMS classification. And because DOC did not change the lieutenants’ responsibilities, WAC 356-56--610(3)(a) does not apply. Similarly, the lieutenants do not dispute the decision to include them in WMS, as contemplated by WAC 356-56-610(3)(b) and (c) respectively. And WAC 356-56-610(6) offers the lieutenants no relief as it affords only the director, not an employee, the right to [745] review an agency decision. Accordingly, the lieutenants have no administrative remedy available to them here.
¶11 Where no clearly established mechanism for resolving a claim exists, the plaintiff is not required to exhaust administrative remedies. Allstot, 116 Wn. App. at 433. The trial court should not have dismissed the lieutenants’ claims for failure to exhaust their administrative remedies. We next turn to DOC’s other arguments in support of summary judgment of dismissal.3
Chapters 49.48 and 49.52 RCW Wage Claims
¶12 In their lawsuit, the lieutenants based their claims on Washington’s wage statutes, chapters 49.48 and 49.52 RCW.4 The lieutenants argue that by placing them in the wrong band, DOC unlawfully withheld their wages under RCW 49.48.010 and RCW 49.52.050.5
¶13 RCW 49.48.010 states, in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any employer to withhold or divert any portion of an employee’s wages unless the deduction is:
(1) Required by state or federal law; or
(2) Specifically agreed upon orally or in writing by the employee and employer; or
[746] (3) For medical, surgical or hospital care of service, pursuant to any rule or regulation.
This statute clearly applies to a claim for wrongful withholding of salary earned, not to a claim of salary mis-classification. As the lieutenants claim the latter and not the former, their argument fails.
¶14 The lieutenants raised other arguments. These claims lack merit.
¶15 First, the lieutenants assert a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, but they concede that DOC, a state entity, is immune from a § 1983 action. Wash. State Republican Party v. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n, 141 Wn.2d 245, 285-86, 4 P.3d 808 (2000). And actions taken by individuals in their official capacity as state officers of the state are also immune from liability unless acting under color of law but in violation of clearly established state law. Wash. State Republican Party, 141 Wn.2d at 285-86. Under these facts, the lieutenants’ § 1983 argument fails.
¶16 The lieutenants further assert state constitutional due process and privileges and immunities claims. Wash. Const, art. I, §§ 3, 12. These claims fail because an individual has no constitutional property interest in public employment and the lieutenants set forth no basis on which they have a constitutional property interest in a particular salary band of public employment. State ex rel. Swartout v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 25 Wn. App. 174, 182, 605 P.2d 796, review denied, 93 Wn.2d 1021, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 992 (1980).
¶17 The lieutenants also devote a short section of their brief asserting a right to a writ of mandamus should they demonstrate a salary misclassification, but they fail to adequately argue this issue and we decline to address it. See State v. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821, 868-69, 83 P.3d 970 (2004); RAP 2.5.
[747] Attorney Fees
¶18 The lieutenants request attorney fees under RAP 18.1 and RCW 49.52.070. Because we affirm, we decline to award attorney fees.
¶19 Affirmed.
Morgan, A.C.J ., and Hunt , J ., concur .
Review denied at 154 Wn.2d 1025 (2005).