Battle Foam v. Wade

District Court, D. New Hampshire·Decided June 29, 2010·No. 10-CV-116-SM·Published

Opinion

Battle Foam v. Wade 10-CV-116-SM 06/29/10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Battle Foam, LLC, Plaintiff

v. Civil No. lO-cv-116-SM Opinion No. 2 010 DNH 108 Bryan Wade, d/b/a Outrider Hobbies, Defendant

O R D E R

Plaintiff, Battle Foam, LLC, is an Arizona limited liability company that "specializes in laser cutting foam for carrying cases sold in the war gaming market under the mark, BATTLE FOAM, through [its] website www.battlefoam.com." Complaint (document no. 1) at 1. It brings this action against Bryan Wade, d/b/a Outrider Hobbies, seeking preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, as well as damages for alleged acts of trademark infringement, unfair competition, false designation of origin, trademark dilution, deceptive trade practices, injury to business reputation, and misappropriation of trade secrets. Wade is also a resident of Arizona.

While the complaint is replete with seeming hyperbole, including allegations of industrial espionage, unauthorized access to Battle Foam's manufacturing facility, and theft of trade secrets, it contains relatively few concrete factual

assertions. Nevertheless, it is clear that Battle Foam's claims rest, largely, on the following proposition:

Outrider Hobbies and Bryan Wade are trying to ride off of the good will of the BATTLE FOAM mark in adopting a similar military oriented FOAM CORPS mark, are passing their products off as Battle Foam products, and have taken other steps to improperly obtain trade secrets from Battle Foam's innovative foam laser cutting technology.

Plaintiff's opposition memorandum (document no. 6) at 1-2. To be sure. Battle Foam has submitted what it claims is evidence of consumer confusion between the parties' respective marks. But, as discussed below, that evidence is of questionable authenticity.

Wade, proceeding pro se, has filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue. In the alternative, he moves the court to transfer venue to the District of Arizona. Plaintiff objects and asserts that this court may properly exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Wade.

Standard of Review

When personal jurisdiction is contested, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the court has such jurisdiction. See Sawtelle v. Farrell, 70 F.3d 1381, 1387 (1st Cir. 1995); Kowalski v. Doherty, Wallace, Pillsburv & Murphy, 787 F.2d 7, 8

(1st Cir. 1986). Allegations of jurisdictional facts are construed in the plaintiff's favor, see Buckley v. Bourdon, 682 F. Supp. 95, 98 (D.N.H. 1988), and if, as here, the court proceeds based upon the written submissions of the parties without an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing that jurisdiction exists. See Kowalski, 787 F.2d at 8; Bolt v. Gar-Tec Products, Inc., 967 F.2d 671, 674-75 (1st Cir. 1992).

Nevertheless, the plaintiff's demonstration of personal jurisdiction must be based on specific facts set forth in the record in order to defeat a defendant's motion to dismiss. See TicketMaster-New York, Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 203 (1st Cir. 1994). See also Jet Wine & Spirits, Inc. v. Bacardi & Co., 298 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2002) ("Although the burden of proof is light, [plaintiff] may not rely on the mere allegations of its complaint, but must point to specific facts in the record that support those allegations.") . And, "in reviewing the record before it, a court 'may consider pleadings, affidavits, and other evidentiary materials without converting the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment.'" VDI Technologies v. Price, 781 F. Supp. 85, 87 (D.N.H. 1991) (quoting Lex Computer & Management Corp. v. Eslinqer & Pelton, B.C., 676 F. Supp. 399, 402 (D.N.H. 1987) ) .

Because at least some of Battle Foam's claims arise under federal law, the court's inquiry into whether it may exercise personal jurisdiction over Wade is necessarily distinct from the inquiry applicable in diversity cases. See generally United Elec. Workers v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d 1080 (1st Cir. 1992). In a federal question case, "the constitutional limits of the court's personal jurisdiction are fixed . . . not by the Fourteenth Amendment but by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment." .Id. at 1085. This distinction is significant "because under the Fifth Amendment, a plaintiff need only show that the defendant has adequate contacts with the United States as a whole, rather than with a particular state." United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 618 (1st Cir. 2001) . Importantly, however, "the plaintiff must still ground its service of process in a federal statute or civil rule." .Id. In other words. Battle Foam must demonstrate either: (1) that a federal statute invoked in its complaint authorizes nation-wide service of process; or (2) that it served Wade with a copy of its complaint in a way that comports with the requirements of Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Here, Battle Foam does not claim that any of the federal statutes under which it is proceeding authorizes national service of process. Consequently, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

provide that it must demonstrate that Wade was served in a manner consistent with New Hampshire's individual long-arm statute. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e). That long-arm statute, RSA 510:4, authorizes jurisdiction over foreign defendants to the full extent permitted by federal law. See Sawtelle, 70 F.3d at 1388. Stated another way. New Hampshire's long-arm statute is coextensive with the outer limits of due process protection under the United States Constitution. Accordingly, the court need only determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Wade would comport with federal constitutional guarantees.

Hence, our analysis comes full circle. When insufficient statutory authorization for extraterritorial service exists. Rule 4 (e) allows such service "only to the extent permitted by the law of the state in which the district court sits." It follows that, absent a federal statute permitting service of process on [defendant] . . . , our threshold inquiry must focus on [state] law concerning personal jurisdiction, notwithstanding that this is a federal question case. And, because state law is subject to Fourteenth Amendment limitations, the minimum contacts doctrine, while imposing no direct state-by-state constraint on a federal court in a federal question case, acts indirectly as a governing mechanism for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.

United Elec. Workers, 960 F.2d at 1086 (emphasis supplied) (citation omitted).

Ultimately, then, as in a diversity case. Battle Foam must still show that Wade has "certain minimum contacts with the forum

such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice," Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984) (citation and internal punctuation omitted), and that Wade's conduct bears such a "substantial connection with the forum State" that he "should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473- 75 (1985) (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)). The court of appeals for this circuit has summarized those jurisdictional requirements as follows:

To begin, the defendant must have purposeful "minimum contacts" with the state. Further, the exercise of jurisdiction must be "reasonable" under the circumstances. The third requirement . . . is that the plaintiff's claims be related to the defendant's contacts.

Cambridge Literary Props, v. W. Goebel Porzellanfabrik, 295 F.3d 59, 63 (1st Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). See also Sawtelle, 70 F.3d at 1389-95 (describing the three essential jurisdictional elements as "relatedness," "purposeful availment," and the so- called "Gestalt factors").

Background

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Related

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson
444 U.S. 286 (Supreme Court, 1980)
Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia, S. A. v. Hall
466 U.S. 408 (Supreme Court, 1984)
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz
471 U.S. 462 (Supreme Court, 1985)
United States v. Swiss American Bank, Ltd.
274 F.3d 610 (First Circuit, 2001)
Jet Wine & Spirits, Inc. v. Bacardi & Co.
298 F.3d 1 (First Circuit, 2002)
Robert S. Boit v. Gar-Tec Products, Inc.
967 F.2d 671 (First Circuit, 1992)
Ticketmaster-New York, Inc. v. Joseph M. Alioto
26 F.3d 201 (First Circuit, 1994)
Arthur F. Sawtelle, Etc. v. George E. Farrell
70 F.3d 1381 (First Circuit, 1995)
VDI TECHNOLOGIES v. Price
781 F. Supp. 85 (D. New Hampshire, 1991)
Buckley v. Bourdon
682 F. Supp. 95 (D. New Hampshire, 1988)
Lex Computer & Management Corp. v. Eslinger & Pelton, P.C.
676 F. Supp. 399 (D. New Hampshire, 1987)