Batchelor v. Brereton

Supreme Court

Batchelor v. Brereton

112 U.S. 396, 5 S. Ct. 180, 28 L. Ed. 748, 1884 U.S. LEXIS 1892

CourtSupreme Court of the United States

DecidedDecember 1, 1884

StatusPublished

Cited by7 cases

This text of 112 U.S. 396 (Batchelor v. Brereton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Batchelor v. Brereton, 112 U.S. 396, 5 S. Ct. 180, 28 L. Ed. 748, 1884 U.S. LEXIS 1892 (1884).

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Opinion

Mr. Justice Blatchford

delivered the opinion of the court. He stated the facts in the foregoing language, and continued:

The only question involved is that stated by the auditor in his report, and it is easy of solution. Mrs. Brereton was not named in the deed of June 1, 1874. She was not a party to it. She granted nothing by it. Although she signed it, and although the magistrate certified that she was- a party to it, and that she acknowledged it tó be her act and deed, after haying had it fully explained to her, and declared that she had’ willingly signed, sealed and delivered it, and that she wished not to retract it, it is apparent that she was regarded by the parties to it and the magistrate as having executed it only in respect of a dower interest of hers, as the wife of Samuel Brereton- — a supposed interest, perhaps, as regarded lot 9, and an actual interest as regarded lot 8. In view of the deed of February 2, 1854, to William H. Brereton and Samuel Brereton, conveying the land in lots 8 and 9 to them in fee, as tenants in *403 common, and of the reference in the deed of June 1,1874, to the deed of February 2, 1854, as the basis of the title which the grantors were conveying, it may have been supposed that there was sufficient scope for the signature and acknowledgment by Mrs. Brereton, as regarded lot 9, in the fact that, if her husband had an interest under that deed, in respect to lot 9, which was capable of conveyance, she, as his wife, had an inchoate right.of dower in regard to it, which she had not conveyed by the deed of September 29, 1859, and which the parties to the deed of June 1, 1874, and the magistrate had. a right to regard as the subject-matter to be affected by her signature and acknowledgment, although the deed of May 1,1851, had, by the death of Mary Ann Brereton, become operative to vest in William H. and Samuel, Jr., a title in fee to the land in lot 9, prior to the execution of the deeds of February 1, 1854, and September 29, 1859. This may have been thought a sufficient reason for signing the deed, so far as the land in question, which is wholly in lot 9, is concerned, the deed of September 29,1859, covering land wholly in lot 9. Then, again, the deeds of May 1, 1851, February 2, 1854, and June 1,1874, cover land in lot 8, as well as land in lot 9; and, as to the land in lot 8, there was clearly a dower interest to be covered by the execution, by Mrs. Brereton, of the last named deed.

But, however all this may be (and it is referred to only as furnishing an explanation of her signature), her interest in the undivided half of the land in lot 9, for her life, free from the ownership of her husband, with the power to direct the conveyance of it by Hannay, was a distinct interest, the legal title to which was in Hannay, in trust, and could not be-conveyed, except by Hannay, on her request or direction in writing, with, the written consent of her husband. Under the deed of September 29, 1859, no interest in the undivided half of the land in lot 9 could revert to her husband prior to her death. Therefore, it was not any interest of his under that deed which her husband was conveying by the deed of June 1, 1874.

Nor was it her power of appointment created by the deed of September 29,1859, which she was exercising by the deed of June 1,1874, because that was to be made effective by a con *404 veyance by Hannay, and there was no request or direction by her to Hannay to convey, and he never did convey. The debt of $3,500 to Batchelor, named in the latter deed, is described therein as a debt by William H. Brereton and Samuel Brereton to Batchelor, and Mrs. Brereton is not named as debtor. Therefore, all property which they were conveying by that deed, to secure that debt, was presumably their own property, and- any interest of Mrs. Brereton in it. sufficient to call for her signature to that deed, was presumably an interest created by her being the wife of Samuel, and which was supposed to grow out of: his title and her marital relation, and not to have been before conveyed, irrespective of any other interest which she had in .the land, or any power of appointment in respect of it.

It needs not much argument or authority to support the conclusion at which we have arrived. In Agricultural Bank v. Rice, 4 How. 225, 241, it was held that, in order to convey by grant, the party possessing the right must be the grantop, and use apt and proper words to convey to the grantee, and that merely, signing, sealing and acknowledging an instrument, in which another person is grantor, is not sufficient. In the present case, if Mrs. Brereton possessed the right, she was not the grantor, and used no words to convey her right. No intention on her part to execute the power she possessed appears in the deed. Warner v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 109 U. S. 357, and cases there cited; Story’s Eq. Juris. § 1062 a.

Moreover, Hannay possessed the right, and was not the grantor, and was not requested or directed by Mrs. Brereton to convey. 2 Perry on Trusts, § 778.

The decree -of the court in general term is Affirmed,

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Mr. Justice Blatchford

delivered the opinion of the court. He stated the facts in the foregoing language, and continued:

The only question involved is that stated by the auditor in his report, and it is easy of solution. Mrs. Brereton was not named in the deed of June 1, 1874. She was not a party to it. She granted nothing by it. Although she signed it, and although the magistrate certified that she was- a party to it, and that she acknowledged it tó be her act and deed, after haying had it fully explained to her, and declared that she had’ willingly signed, sealed and delivered it, and that she wished not to retract it, it is apparent that she was regarded by the parties to it and the magistrate as having executed it only in respect of a dower interest of hers, as the wife of Samuel Brereton- — a supposed interest, perhaps, as regarded lot 9, and an actual interest as regarded lot 8. In view of the deed of February 2, 1854, to William H. Brereton and Samuel Brereton, conveying the land in lots 8 and 9 to them in fee, as tenants in *403 common, and of the reference in the deed of June 1,1874, to the deed of February 2, 1854, as the basis of the title which the grantors were conveying, it may have been supposed that there was sufficient scope for the signature and acknowledgment by Mrs. Brereton, as regarded lot 9, in the fact that, if her husband had an interest under that deed, in respect to lot 9, which was capable of conveyance, she, as his wife, had an inchoate right.of dower in regard to it, which she had not conveyed by the deed of September 29, 1859, and which the parties to the deed of June 1, 1874, and the magistrate had. a right to regard as the subject-matter to be affected by her signature and acknowledgment, although the deed of May 1,1851, had, by the death of Mary Ann Brereton, become operative to vest in William H. and Samuel, Jr., a title in fee to the land in lot 9, prior to the execution of the deeds of February 1, 1854, and September 29, 1859. This may have been thought a sufficient reason for signing the deed, so far as the land in question, which is wholly in lot 9, is concerned, the deed of September 29,1859, covering land wholly in lot 9. Then, again, the deeds of May 1, 1851, February 2, 1854, and June 1,1874, cover land in lot 8, as well as land in lot 9; and, as to the land in lot 8, there was clearly a dower interest to be covered by the execution, by Mrs. Brereton, of the last named deed.

But, however all this may be (and it is referred to only as furnishing an explanation of her signature), her interest in the undivided half of the land in lot 9, for her life, free from the ownership of her husband, with the power to direct the conveyance of it by Hannay, was a distinct interest, the legal title to which was in Hannay, in trust, and could not be-conveyed, except by Hannay, on her request or direction in writing, with, the written consent of her husband. Under the deed of September 29, 1859, no interest in the undivided half of the land in lot 9 could revert to her husband prior to her death. Therefore, it was not any interest of his under that deed which her husband was conveying by the deed of June 1, 1874.

Nor was it her power of appointment created by the deed of September 29,1859, which she was exercising by the deed of June 1,1874, because that was to be made effective by a con *404 veyance by Hannay, and there was no request or direction by her to Hannay to convey, and he never did convey. The debt of $3,500 to Batchelor, named in the latter deed, is described therein as a debt by William H. Brereton and Samuel Brereton to Batchelor, and Mrs. Brereton is not named as debtor. Therefore, all property which they were conveying by that deed, to secure that debt, was presumably their own property, and- any interest of Mrs. Brereton in it. sufficient to call for her signature to that deed, was presumably an interest created by her being the wife of Samuel, and which was supposed to grow out of: his title and her marital relation, and not to have been before conveyed, irrespective of any other interest which she had in .the land, or any power of appointment in respect of it.

It needs not much argument or authority to support the conclusion at which we have arrived. In Agricultural Bank v. Rice, 4 How. 225, 241, it was held that, in order to convey by grant, the party possessing the right must be the grantop, and use apt and proper words to convey to the grantee, and that merely, signing, sealing and acknowledging an instrument, in which another person is grantor, is not sufficient. In the present case, if Mrs. Brereton possessed the right, she was not the grantor, and used no words to convey her right. No intention on her part to execute the power she possessed appears in the deed. Warner v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 109 U. S. 357, and cases there cited; Story’s Eq. Juris. § 1062 a.

Moreover, Hannay possessed the right, and was not the grantor, and was not requested or directed by Mrs. Brereton to convey. 2 Perry on Trusts, § 778.

The decree -of the court in general term is Affirmed,

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112 U.S. 396, 5 S. Ct. 180, 28 L. Ed. 748, 1884 U.S. LEXIS 1892, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/batchelor-v-brereton-scotus-1884.

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