Bass v. Arizona Motor Vehicle Division

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedJanuary 29, 2025
Docket2:24-cv-02380
StatusUnknown

This text of Bass v. Arizona Motor Vehicle Division (Bass v. Arizona Motor Vehicle Division) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bass v. Arizona Motor Vehicle Division, (D. Ariz. 2025).

Opinion

1 MDR 2 WO 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Johann Alexander Bass, No. CV-24-02380-PHX-JAT (JFM) 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER 12 Arizona Motor Vehicle Division, et al., 13 Defendants.

15 Self-represented Plaintiff Johann Alexander Bass, who is confined in the Greene 16 Correctional Facility in Coxsackie, New York, filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 17 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1) and a Motion for Limited Discovery Order to Identify John Doe 18 Defendants. He subsequently filed an Application to Proceed In District Court Without 19 Prepaying Fees or Costs (Doc. 5) and an Amended Motion for Limited Discovery Order to 20 Identify John Doe Defendants (Doc. 7). The Court will grant the Application to Proceed, 21 dismiss the Complaint with leave to amend, and deny without prejudice the Amended 22 Motion. 23 I. Application to Proceed and Filing Fee 24 The Court will grant Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 25 Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). The Court 26 will assess an initial partial filing fee of $9.20. The remainder of the fee will be collected 27 monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month’s income credited to Plaintiff’s trust 28 account each time the amount in the account exceeds $10.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The 1 Court will enter a separate Order requiring the appropriate government agency to collect 2 and forward the fees according to the statutory formula. 3 II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 4 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 5 against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 6 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 7 has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which 8 relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 9 relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). 10 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 11 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does 12 not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the- 13 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 14 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 15 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 16 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 17 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 18 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content 19 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 20 misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 21 relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 22 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual 23 allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there 24 are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681. 25 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts 26 must “continue to construe [self-represented litigant’s] filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 27 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a self-represented prisoner] 28 1 ‘must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. 2 (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 3 If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other 4 facts, a self-represented litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before 5 dismissal of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en 6 banc). The Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to state a claim, with leave 7 to amend because it may possibly be amended to state a claim. 8 III. Complaint 9 In his Complaint,1 Plaintiff names as Defendants the Arizona Motor Vehicle 10 Division (AMVD) and four John Doe employees of the AMVD in their individual and 11 official capacities. Plaintiff makes the following allegations. 12 After being stopped by the South Dakota Department of Public Safety while driving 13 a semi-truck in May 2021, Plaintiff pleaded guilty to ingestion of a controlled substance 14 and was sentenced to probation. He was told the conviction would not affect his 15 Commercial Driver’s License (CDL), the state court “did not make any kind of order 16 affecting Plaintiff’s CDL,” and the conviction “does not constitute committing a felony in 17 a Commercial Motor Vehicle” under South Dakota law. However, Plaintiff subsequently 18 received a letter from the South Dakota Department of Public Safety stating that his CDL 19 “had been withdrawn for committing a felony in a commercial motor vehicle.” 20 Plaintiff attempted to get an administrative hearing in South Dakota, but he did not 21 receive one. He contacted Defendant AMVD and requested a hearing but was told that 22 “because the situation happened in South Dakota, [Defendant] AMVD could not help him.” 23 He claims Arizona law requires notice and an opportunity to be heard, but he “never 24 received any kind of notice” from Defendant AMVD and was not given a hearing, even 25 though he timely requested one.2

26 1 Plaintiff’s Complaint contains minor misspellings and misplaced or omitted 27 punctuation. The Court, when quoting the Complaint, has corrected these without specifically noting them. 28 2 Plaintiff claims he received a document from Defendant AMVD “with a caption 1 After filing a 2023 civil rights lawsuit in the United States District Court for the 2 Central District of South Dakota, Plaintiff wrote letters to Defendant AMVD “requesting 3 records pertaining to the disqualification/withdrawal of his CDL.” He never received the 4 documents because, according to Plaintiff, Defendant AMVD “has a policy of not 5 providing records to those in custody until they are within 90 days of their release.” A 6 judge in the Central District of South Dakota denied Plaintiff’s motion to subpoena those 7 records, but Plaintiff obtained, through family members, his “driver records” from 8 Defendant AMVD.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Rizzo v. Goode
423 U.S. 362 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Hebbe v. Pliler
627 F.3d 338 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Ivey v. Board of Regents of University of Alaska
673 F.2d 266 (Second Circuit, 1982)
Michael Henry Ferdik v. Joe Bonzelet, Sheriff
963 F.2d 1258 (Ninth Circuit, 1992)
Russell Marcilis, II v. Township of Redford
693 F.3d 589 (Sixth Circuit, 2012)
Lanman v. Hinson
529 F.3d 673 (Sixth Circuit, 2008)
Lopez v. Smith
203 F.3d 1122 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)
Ove v. Gwinn
264 F.3d 817 (Ninth Circuit, 2001)
Taylor v. List
880 F.2d 1040 (Ninth Circuit, 1989)
Gilbreath v. Cutter Biological, Inc.
931 F.2d 1320 (Ninth Circuit, 1991)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Bass v. Arizona Motor Vehicle Division, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bass-v-arizona-motor-vehicle-division-azd-2025.