Bartkowski Investment Group, Inc. v. Springfield Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd.

25 Pa. D. & C.5th 304
CourtPennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Delaware County
DecidedMarch 30, 2012
DocketNo. 11-3479
StatusPublished

This text of 25 Pa. D. & C.5th 304 (Bartkowski Investment Group, Inc. v. Springfield Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Delaware County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bartkowski Investment Group, Inc. v. Springfield Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 25 Pa. D. & C.5th 304 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012).

Opinion

KENNEY, J.,

This is an appeal from a decision of the Zoning Hearing Board of Springfield Township denying appellant, Bartkowski Investment Group, Inc.’s substantive challenge to Springfield Township’s Zoning Ordinance as it relates to the exclusion of billboards.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Bartkowski Investment Group, Inc. (hereinafter “BIG”), a corporation engaged in the development of outdoor advertisting, entered into lease agreements with the owners of six (6) properties in Springfield Township, intending to construct two-sided, 672 square foot billboards on the properties.1 On December 8, 2008, BIG filed an application with the Springfield Township Zoning Hearing Board (hereinafter “ZHB”) alleging that the Township’s Zoning Ordinance is invalid and [306]*306unconstitutional because it imposes a de jure total exclusion of billboards within the municipality. Specifically, BIG challenged the constitutionality of Section 143-101 (A)(5) of Springfield Township Zoning Ordinance which states, in relevant part:

§143-101, Restrictions and standards.

A. Prohibited signs. It is unlawful to erect or maintain the following signs:...

(5) Outdoor advertising billboards.
Springfield Township Zoning Ordinance, §143-101.

On March 26, 2009, the ZHB commenced hearings on BIG’s application. In support of its position at the hearings, the township offered the testimony of the following individuals: Jerry Wachtel, an expert in the area of traffic safety; Joseph Mastronardo, P.E., an expert in the area of civil engineering with an emphasis on municipal engineering; Thomas J. Comitta, an expert in the field of land planning; and Detective Daniel McNeely, an expert in the area of accident reconstruction. BIG also offered testimony to support its position at the hearings, namely that of: Thaddeus Bartkowski, who testified to his experience in the outdoor advertising industry; Michael W. Tañíala, P.E., an expert in the area of traffic safety; Joseph A. Platt, P.E., an expert who testified regarding the impact of the proposed billboards on traffic safety; and Larry Waetzman, an expert in the area of land planning.

On March 24,2011, after sixteen (16) days of hearings, the ZEOB issued a written decision denying BIG’s [307]*307challenge. On April 12, 2011, the ZHB issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law. On May 9, 2011, BIG instituted the present Land Use Appeal.

DISCUSSION

In Pennsylvania, where the trial court takes no additional evidence in an appeal from a decision of a zoning hearing board, the trial court’s review is limited to determining whether the ZHB abused its discretion or erred as a matter of law.2 See In re Petition of Dolington Land Group, 576 Pa. 519, 526, 839 A.2d 1021, 1026 (Pa. 2003). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the Board’s findings are not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Substantial evidence is that relevant evidence which a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support the conclusion reached.” Twp. of Exeter v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Exeter Twp., 599 Pa. 568, 578, 962 A.2d 653, 659 (2009). The ZHB “as fact finder is the sole judge of credibility with power to resolve conflicts in the testimony and to reject even uncontradicted testimony that it finds [308]*308to be lacking in credibility.” Id. The trial court is not to reweigh the evidence presented, but rather to examine the Board’s findings and determine whether there was substantial evidence to support them. See Montgomery Crossing Associates v. Twp. of Lower Gwynedd, 758 A.2d 285, 288 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000).

Zoning ordinances in this commonwealth are held to be presumptively constitutional and valid, and the party challenging a zoning ordinance bears a heavy burden of proving otherwise. See Macioce v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of the Borough of Baldwin, 850 A.2d 882, 887 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). In order to overcome this presumption of constitutionality, the challenger must demonstrate that the ordinance totally or effectively excludes an otherwise legitimate use. Id.; see also Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. Of Adjustment of West Whiteland Twp., 425 Pa. 43, 58, 228 A.2d 169, 178 (1967). To prove total or effective exclusion of a permitted use, a challenger can show that the ordinance is either de jure or de facto exclusionary. Twp. of Exeter, 962 A.2d at 659. A de jure exclusion exists where an ordinance, on its face, totally bans a legitimate use. Id. A de facto exclusion exists where an ordinance permits a use on its face, but when applied, acts to prohibit the use throughout the municipality. Id.

In deciding a substantive validity challenge to a zoning ordinance such as the one presented by this case, Pennsylvania courts are directed to follow a two-step analysis:

[W]e first consider whether the challenging party [309]*309has overcome the presumed constitutionality of an ordinance by showing it excludes billboards as a use. If we determine that the challenger has done so, we then consider whether the municipality has salvaged the ordinance by presenting evidence to show that the exclusionary regulation bears a substantial relationship to the public health, safety, morality or welfare.

Twp. of Exeter, 962 A.2d at 661.

I. SPRINGFIELD TOWNSHIP’S ZONING ORDINANCE ENTIRELY PROHIBITS THE CONSTRUCTION OF BILLBOARDS

In the present case, while Springfield Township’s Zoning Ordinance does not prohibit all outdoor, off-premises advertising, it does entirely exclude billboards as a use. Specifically, Section 143-101 of the Springfield Township Zoning Ordinance states, in relevant part:

§143-101, Restrictions and standards.
A. Prohibited signs, It is unlawful to erect or maintain the following signs:
(5) Outdoor advertising billboards.

Springfield Township Zoning Ordinance §143-101.

On appeal, the township argues that because the zoning ordinance merely prohibits one manifestation of outdoor advertising, namely the “massive scale erection of ‘billboards,’” the prohibition is not a de jure prohibition of billboards and, thus, is constitutional. In support of this proposition, the township sets forth numerous examples [310]*310of outdoor advertising that currently exist within the township, including:

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Related

Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego
453 U.S. 490 (Supreme Court, 1981)
In Re Petition of Dolington Land Group
839 A.2d 1021 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 2003)
Township of Exeter v. Zoning Hearing Board
962 A.2d 653 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 2009)
Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment
228 A.2d 169 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1967)
Montgomery Crossing Associates v. Township of Lower Gwynedd
758 A.2d 285 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 2000)
MacIoce v. Zoning Hearing Board
850 A.2d 882 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 2004)
Norate Corp. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment
207 A.2d 890 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1965)
Hammond v. Zoning Hearing Board
564 A.2d 1324 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 1989)

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Bluebook (online)
25 Pa. D. & C.5th 304, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bartkowski-investment-group-inc-v-springfield-twp-zoning-hearing-bd-pactcompldelawa-2012.