Bartell v. Del Cook Lumber Co.

133 S.E.2d 903, 108 Ga. App. 592, 1963 Ga. App. LEXIS 716
CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia
DecidedNovember 1, 1963
Docket40204, 40205
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 133 S.E.2d 903 (Bartell v. Del Cook Lumber Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bartell v. Del Cook Lumber Co., 133 S.E.2d 903, 108 Ga. App. 592, 1963 Ga. App. LEXIS 716 (Ga. Ct. App. 1963).

Opinion

Felton, Chief Judge.

The general grounds of both motions were expressly abandoned. Special ground 1 (of both motions) excepts to the trial judge’s refusal to permit the plaintiffs to cross examine in rebuttal the truck driver, Samuel Odom, as agent of the defendant corporation, after both sides had rested, and his ruling that he might be called only as a witness for the plaintiffs.

“In order to expedite the trial of cases, it is a rule of practice that the plaintiff shall in the opening present all of his evidence which goes to establish his case; the defendant shall then introduce his evidence in support of his defense; and then the plaintiff may offer any proof that rebuts that of the defendant; but if either side should omit to tender in its proper order evidence that is relevant and material, it is a matter in the sound discretion of the trial judge, and his discretion should not be controlled except in a case so gross and palpable as not to admit *595 of hesitation or doubt.” Woodward v. State, 197 Ga. 60, 69 (28 SE2d 480), and cases cited. Where the evidence introduced by the plaintiff is insufficient to support the essential allegations in the petition and make out a prima facie case, a motion for a nonsuit can be properly granted, Code § 110-310, and after all the evidence has been presented by both sides, if there is no conflict therein, and that introduced, with all reasonable deductions or inferences therefrom, shall demand a verdict for the defendant, the court may direct a verdict for the defendant. Code Ann. § 110-104. From the above it follows that plaintiff here had to make out a prima fade case against the defendant before the burden of going forward with the evidence shifted, and under the facts here he copld not call the defendant’s agent for the purpose of cross examination under the provisions of Code Ann. § 38-1801 except for rebutting defendant’s proof.

The plaintiff’s contention as to how the collision occurred is as follows: That the automobile, going in a southerly direction at a speed of approximately 50 m.p.h., rounded a curve and topped a slight hill, being driven in the center of the highway with its bright lights on; that as it came over the hill, the driver encountered the undimmed lights of the truck, which was approaching towards him at a speed of 60 m.p.h. down the center of the highway; that the decedent driver thereupon lowered his own lights and moved over into his own right-hand lane, but the truck did not dim his lights nor move over into his own lane until the vehicles were less than 500 feet apart; that, -his vision blinded by the truck’s lights, the decedent did what seemed best under the circumstances, i.e., he held the steering wheel steady and applied his brakes, causing the vehicle to go into a straight skid down its own lane; that the automobile’s single skid mark was laid down by its left-hand wheel, the brakes on which held better than those on the right, which fact finally caused the automobile to veer to the left for the last ten feet and to cross the center line and into the truck’s lane, wherein the point of impact was located; that the last 10 feet of the mark, which was smudged in appearance, was caused by a wheel slipping sideways before the collision; that the truck, at the time of the collision, was *596 situated diagonally across the highway in a northeasterly direction because of its driver’s belated attempt to get back into his own lane; that the collision was caused by the defendant’s driver creating an emergency situation by failing to dim his lights, reduce his speed and move over on his own side of the highway.

The defendant’s version of the collision was as follows: That the decedent automobile driver had been traveling at the rate of 75 m.p.h., straddling the center line of the highway, and under the influence of alcohol, in an automobile with defective brakes; that the automobile topped the hill at this speed and straddling the center line and, upon seeing the truck approaching, the decedent driver applied his brakes; that the right rear automobile wheel brake held better, causing the single skid mark on the automobile’s side, which would have placed the automobile’s left side 3y2 feet over in the truck’s lane; that the 10 foot smudged mark was laid down after the impact, rather than before it as contended by the plaintiffs; that the point of impact was located on the truck’s side at a point even with the place at which the automobile’s even skid mark ended.

Since a picture is worth a thousand words, perhaps the diagram, on the opposite page, of the highway at the vicinity of the collision will be helpful in visualizing the situation.

The following evidence was adduced by the plaintiffs in the trial of the case: The decedent driver had one daytime job, one nighttime job and another one on the weekend. The collision took place at 3 a.m., after he had gotten off from having worked on both the day and night jobs. The decedent stopped to get a fifth of whiskey, purportedly for his father, before leaving Atlanta.. The report of the investigating patrolman said “obviously drunk” and “ability impaired.”. The plaintiff guest passenger, the only witness present at the scene of the collision to testify, had had a beer before leaving on the trip and for some minutes before the collision he had been looking out the side window. He testified that the driver usually drove around 50 m.p.h. and that the old car wouldn’t go 65 m.p.h., but that since he hadn’t looked at the speedometer he couldn’t say how fast they were going at that time; that in about 2% hours of driving time they had gone about 165 miles; that the automobile was on the right side several *597 minutes prior to the collision, but that since he was not looking forward at the time he didn’t know which side either vehicle was on and when he looked up when the brakes were applied all he could see was “the bright light” in front of him, then the car started spinning and he didn’t have time to “visualize” anything; that the decedent driver had “nothing on his breath” (the witness, it will be remembered, having had a beer himself) and had nothing to drink while he was with him; that he had been told that there were beer cans in the automobile, although he hadn’t seen them; that the automobile had just rounded a curve and topped a hill before the collision; that he didn’t know what happened to the decedent’s fifth after the wreck; that the seals on the two whiskey bottles were not broken prior to the wreck. Sam Ball, a land surveyor, testified that all of the truck’s two skid marks were on its own side, no closer than 2 feet to the center line; that although he could “imagine” a line from the *598 truck’s skid marks projected back to the center line, he could not actually see one; that if the collision occurred at the southern end of the truck’s skid marks the automobile’s skid mark would have had to be caused by its right-hand wheel, since the marks were too far apart for a collision to have occurred there if it were the left-hand wheel. Sheriff Alex Storey testified that in his opinion the point of impact was at the center line, at the extreme end of the automobile’s smudged tire marks.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
133 S.E.2d 903, 108 Ga. App. 592, 1963 Ga. App. LEXIS 716, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bartell-v-del-cook-lumber-co-gactapp-1963.