Barrier v. Shalala, Sec

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
DecidedJanuary 27, 1998
Docket96-2748
StatusUnpublished

This text of Barrier v. Shalala, Sec (Barrier v. Shalala, Sec) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Barrier v. Shalala, Sec, (4th Cir. 1998).

Opinion

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

ANITA BARRIER, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. No. 96-2748 DONNA E. SHALALA, SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L. Voorhees, Chief District Judge. (CA-94-53-5-V)

Submitted: January 13, 1998

Decided: January 27, 1998

Before HAMILTON, WILLIAMS, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

M. Alan LeCroy, DANIEL & LECROY, P.A., Morganton, North Carolina, for Appellant. Mark T. Calloway, United States Attorney, James M. Sullivan, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________ Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Anita Barrier appeals from the district court order granting the Sec- retary's motion for summary judgment and dismissing her action, and affirming the Secretary's decision denying social security benefits. On appeal, Barrier alleges that the district court failed to give proper weight to her treating physicians' opinions and that her asthma attacks equaled the severity contemplated in the medical listing. Finding no error, we affirm.

Barrier is a forty-five year old woman with a two-year associate degree in early childhood education. At the time of the alleged dis- ability, she was employed as a weaver with Rospatch Labels. She filed an application for disability insurance benefits on January 17, 1992, alleging that she became disabled on July 18, 1991. The alleged cause of her disability is a severe asthmatic condition. The adminis- trative law judge (ALJ) found that Barrier suffered from severe asthma, but that her impairment did not meet or equal the listing level for presumptive disability; that she was capable of performing light work with the restriction that she not be exposed to irritants which could exacerbate her asthma; that she was capable of returning to her previous occupation as a teacher's aide, and therefore was not dis- abled within the meaning of the law to receive disability benefits. Barrier requested review of the ALJ's decision by the Appeals Coun- cil. The Appeals Council denied Barrier's request for review. The ALJ's decision then became the Secretary's final decision.

Barrier filed a complaint in the district court challenging the final decision of the Secretary. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The district court granted the Secretary's motion and affirmed the decision of the Secretary. This appeal followed.

We review the Secretary's final decision to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct law was

2 applied. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g) (West Supp. 1997); Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). Substantial evidence is "`such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as ade- quate to support a conclusion.'" Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). We do not re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibil- ity determinations, or substitute our judgment for that of the Secre- tary. See Hays, 907 F.2d at 1456.

Barrier first argues that her asthmatic condition meets the listing for asthma in the Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 3.03B (1993). Thus, Barrier contends that she should have been found disabled at step three of the sequential analysis. The evidence is to the contrary. To meet the requisite level of severity under § 3.03B, the claimant must experience:"[e]pisodes of severe attacks (See 3.00C), in spite of prescribed treatment, occurring at least once every 2 months or on an average of at least six times a year, and prolonged expiration with wheezing or rhonchi on physical examina- tion between attacks."

Under § 3.00C, when a respiratory impairment is episodic in nature, as may occur in complications of asthma, the frequency and intensity of severe episodes, despite prescribed treatment, are impor- tant criteria for determining the level of impairment. Documentation for episodic asthma should include the hospital or emergency room records indicating the dates of treatment, clinical findings on presen- tation, what treatment was given and for what period of time, results of spirometry and arterial blood gas studies (ABGS), and clinical results. Severe attacks of episodic asthma, as those listed in section 3.03B, are defined as prolonged episodes lasting at least several hours, and requiring intensive treatment such as intravenous drug administration or prolonged inhalation therapy in a hospital or emer- gency room. See 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 3.00C (1993).

Barrier argues that the district court failed to give proper weight to the opinions of her treating physicians and that the record did not con- tain persuasive contradictory evidence to discount the treating physi- cians' opinions. The ALJ properly accorded great weight to Barrier's treating physicians, Drs. Schneider and Inglefield, regarding their

3 assessment of Barrier's physical limitations. See Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987). Although Drs. Schneider and Inglefield treated Barrier, the ALJ was entitled to disregard their opin- ions in the face of persuasive contradictory evidence. See Smith v. Schweiker, 795 F.2d 343, 345-46 (4th Cir. 1986).

Dr. Schneider had the most extensive role in Barrier's treatment. The medical records generally showed that Barrier experienced recur- rent episodes of asthmatic bronchitis which was occasionally exacer- bated by immunotherapy. Barrier showed general improvement and responded well to medications. Dr. Schneider noted an onset date of July 18, 1991. Several doctors examined Barrier in the next few years and the record reflects that the asthmatic episodes were related to environmental factors and were reversible. The doctors noted that Barrier responded well to medications and that she could withdraw from using them.

In November 1991, Dr. Schneider referred Barrier to Dr. Inglefield for allergy injections. Dr. Schneider continued to follow Barrier and noted that her lungs were fairly clear. Also during that time Dr. Har- ris, a pulmonary specialist, examined Barrier at the request of Barri- er's employer. Dr. Harris found that Barrier's total lung capacity was normal, and after bronchodilator therapy, there was only mild abnor- mality. Dr. Harris concluded that there was no permanent impairment. In March 1992, Dr. Schneider noted that Barrier was doing "fairly well" and that her lungs were "fairly clear," although Barrier suffered from a sinus infection.

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