Barret v. Wakefield Crossing, LLC

30 Mass. L. Rptr. 287
CourtMassachusetts Superior Court
DecidedOctober 12, 2012
DocketNo. MICV201102329D
StatusPublished

This text of 30 Mass. L. Rptr. 287 (Barret v. Wakefield Crossing, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Barret v. Wakefield Crossing, LLC, 30 Mass. L. Rptr. 287 (Mass. Ct. App. 2012).

Opinion

Kirpalam, Maynard M., J.

This action arises out of the development, renovation, and construction between 2004 and 2008 of the five building residential condominium project known as the Wakefield Crossing Condominium located in Wakefield, MA (the “Project”). Wakefield Crossing, LLC (“Wakefield Crossing”) was the declarant of the Project and Symes Associates (“Symes”) was the general contractor. VMY Vitols Architects, Inc. (“VMY Vitols”) provided professional architectural services on the Project and V. Victor Vitols (“Vitols”) (collectively, the “Vitols defendants”) was the principal of VMY Vitols at all relevant times during the Project. The plaintiffs, as Trustees of the Wakefield Crossing Condominium Trust (the “Trust”), filed claims for negligence against VMY Vitols and Vitols (Count IX), breach of contract based on a third-party beneficiary theory against VMY Vitols (Count X),3 and negligent misrepresentation against VMY Vitols and Vitols (Count XI). The matter is before the court on the Motion for Summary Judgment of Vitols and VMY Vitols. For the reasons stated below, the Motion for Summary Judgment is ALLOWED in part and DENIED in part.

BACKGROUND

VMY Vitols entered into two “Standard Form[s] of Agreement Between Owner and Architect for Housing Services,” one with Wakefield Crossing on August 4, 2004 and one with Symes on August 11, 2005 (the “Agreements”). Section 2.5.5 of both agreements provides that VMY Vitols shall

visit the site at intervals appropriate to the stage of construction (or as otherwise agreed by the Architect in writing) to become generally familiar with the progress and quality of the Work and to determine in general if the Work when completed will be in accordance with the Contract Documents. However, the Architect shall not be required to make exhaustive or continuous on-site inspections to check the quality or quantity of the Work. On the basis of on-site observations as an architect, the Architect shall keep the Owner informed of the progress and quality of the Work, and shall endeavor to guard the Owner against defects and deficiencies in the Work. (More extensive site representation maybe agreed to as an Additional Service, as described in Section 3.2).

Section 2.5.6 of both agreements states that

(t]he Architect shall not have control over, charge of, or responsibility for Construction means, methods, techniques, sequences or procedures ... since these are solely the Contractor’s responsibility under the Contract for Construction. The Architect shall not be responsible for the Contractor’s schedule or failure to carry out the Work in accordance with the Contract Documents. The Architect shall not have control over or charge of acts or omissions of the Contractor, Subcontractors, or their agents or employees, or any other persons performing any of the Work.

Throughout the course of the Project, the Vitols defendants sent “Construction Control Affidavits” and [288]*288“Final Construction Control Affidavits” to Symes who submitted them to the Town of Wakefield Building Inspector. In the “Construction Control Affidavits” Vitols certified that he

prepared or directly supervised the preparation of all design plans, computations and specifications concerning . . . Architectural ... for the above named project and that, to the best of my knowledge, such plans, computations and specifications meet the applicable provisions of the Massachusetts State Building Code, all acceptable engineering practices and applicable law and ordinances for the proposed use and occupancy.

Vitols further certified that he

shall perform the necessary professional services and be present on the construction site as required to determine that the work is proceeding in accordance with the documents approved for the Building Permit... I SHALL SUBMIT PERIODICALLY A PROGRESS REPORT TOGETHER WITH PERTINENT COMMENTS TO THE BUILDING INSPECTOR FOR WAKEFIELD, MA. UPON COMPLETION OF THE WORK, I SHALL SUBMIT A FINAL REPORTAS TO THE SATISFACTORY COMPLETION AND READINESS OF THE PROJECT FOR OCCUPANCY.

The “Final Construction Control Affidavits" contained identical language except for the following:

I [Vitols] further certify that I have performed the necessary professional services and be [sic] present on the construction site as required to determine that the work has proceeded in accordance with the documents approved for the Building Permit ... I HAVE SUBMITTED PERIODIC PROGRESS REPORTS TOGETHER WITH PERTINENT COMMENTS TO THE BUILDING INSPECTOR. THE BUILDING APPEARS COMPLETE AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONSTRUCTION DOCUMENTS.

The Trust filed this action seeking to recover damages related to “certain widespread deficiencies in the design and construction” of the Project.

DISCUSSION

Summary judgment shall be granted when all material facts have been established and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Miller v. Mooney, 431 Mass. 57, 60 (2000). The moving parly bears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating the absence of a triable issue. Pederson v. Time, Inc., 404 Mass. 14, 16-17 (1989). The moving party may satisfy this burden either by submitting affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the opposing parly’s case or by demonstrating that the opposing party has no reasonable expectation of proving an essential element of his case at trial. Flesner v. Technical Communications Corp., 410 Mass. 805, 809 (1991); Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 716 (1991). Once the moving party establishes the absence of a triable issue, the party opposing the motion must respond with evidence of specific facts establishing the existence of a genuine dispute. Pederson, 404 Mass. at 17. Summary judgment will be denied if there are genuine issues of material fact. Golub v. Milpo, Inc., 402 Mass. 397, 400 (1988).

I. Negligence

A. Economic Loss Doctrine

The Vitols defendants argue that the Trust’s negligence claim is barred by the economic loss doctrine. Pursuant to the economic loss doctrine, purely economic losses are unrecoverable in tort actions in the absence of personal injury or property damage. FMR Corp. v. Boston Edison Co., 415 Mass. 393, 395 (1993). See Garweth Corp. v. Boston Edison Co., 415 Mass. 303, 305 (1993) (“The traditional economic loss rule provides that, when a defendant interferes with a contract or economic opportunity due to negligence and causes no harm to either the person or property of the plaintiff, the plaintiff may not recover for purely economic losses”); cf. Commonwealth v. Johnson Insulation, 425 Mass. 650, 653 (1997) (instead, contractual remedies must be pursued). Economic loss includes “damages for inadequate value, costs of repair and replacement of the defective product, or consequent loss of profits without any claim of personal injury or damage to other property.” Berish v. Bornstein, 437 Mass. 252, 267 (2002). The economic loss doctrine applies to claims of negligent design and installation in newly constructed homes. See id. at 268.

The Trust has submitted the affidavit of Tim Little, P.E. (“Little”) in support of its opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment.

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Craig v. Everett M. Brooks Co.
222 N.E.2d 752 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1967)
Pederson v. Time, Inc.
532 N.E.2d 1211 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1989)
Garweth Corp. v. Boston Edison Co.
613 N.E.2d 92 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1993)
FMR Corp. v. Boston Edison Co.
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Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp.
575 N.E.2d 734 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1991)
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575 N.E.2d 1107 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1991)
Golub v. Milpo, Inc.
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Miller v. Mooney
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Berish v. Bornstein
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694 N.E.2d 401 (Massachusetts Appeals Court, 1998)
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Bluebook (online)
30 Mass. L. Rptr. 287, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/barret-v-wakefield-crossing-llc-masssuperct-2012.