Barral v. Garrett

District Court, D. Nevada·Decided October 16, 2023·No. 3:23-cv-00438·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 5 * * * 6 DUSTIN JAMES BARRAL, Case No. 3:23-cv-00438-MMD-CLB 7 Petitioner, DISMISSAL ORDER 8 v. 9 TIM GARRETT, et al., 10 Respondents. 11 12 Petitioner Dustin James Barral filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 13 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 1-1 (“Petition”).) This Court conducted an initial review of the 14 Petition and ordered Barral to show cause why it should not be dismissed as untimely. 15 (ECF No 5.) Barral timely responded. (ECF No. 6.) The Court now dismisses the Petition. 16 I. BACKGROUND1 17 Barral challenges a conviction and sentence imposed by the Eighth Judicial District 18 Court for Clark County. State of Nevada v. Dustin Barral, C-10-269095-1. On September 19 29, 2017, the state court entered a judgment of conviction, pursuant to an Alford plea, 20 convicting Barral of attempted sexual assault with a minor under the age of 14 and child 21 abuse, neglect, or endangerment. Barral was sentenced to 10 to 26 years in prison. Barral 22 appealed, and the Nevada Court of Appeals affirmed on September 26, 2018, in case 23 number 74288-COA. Remittitur issued on October 22, 2018. 24 On November 9, 2020, Barral moved to correct his sentence. On December 18, 25

1Judicial notice is taken of the docket records of the Eighth Judicial District Court 26 and Nevada appellate courts, which are accessible at www.clarkcountycourts.us/portal 27 and http://caseinfo.nvsupremecourt.us/public/caseSearch.do. 1 1 2020, the state court denied the motion. Barral appealed, and on May 8, 2023, the Nevada 2 Court of Appeals affirmed. Remittitur issued on July 24, 2023. 3 II. LEGAL STANDARD 4 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) establishes a one- 5 year period of limitations for state prisoners to file a federal habeas petition pursuant to 6 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The one-year limitation period begins to run from the latest of four 7 possible triggering dates, with the most common being the date on which the petitioner’s 8 judgment of conviction became final by either the conclusion of direct appellate review or 9 the expiration of the time for seeking such review. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). For a 10 Nevada prisoner pursuing a direct appeal, a conviction becomes final when the 90-day 11 period for filing a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States expires 12 after a Nevada appellate court has entered judgment or the Supreme Court of Nevada 13 has denied discretionary review. Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1053 n.1 (9th Cir. 2008); 14 Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 2005); Nev. Sup. Ct. R. 13. The 15 federal limitations period is tolled while “a properly filed application for State post- 16 conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is 17 pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). No statutory tolling is allowed for the period between 18 finality of a direct appeal and the filing of a petition for post-conviction relief in state court 19 because no state court proceeding is pending during that time. Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 20 1003, 1006-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 n.1 (9th Cir. 21 2006). 22 III. DISCUSSION 23 Barral’s conviction became final when the time expired for filing a petition for writ 24 of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court on December 25, 2018. The federal 25 statute of limitations began to run the following day: December 26, 2018. The federal 26 statute of limitations expired 365 days later: December 26, 2019. Accordingly, Barral filed 27 2 1 his Petition three years and eight months after the AEDPA limitation period expired. 2 In his response to the order to show cause, Barral argues that the state district 3 court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his criminal case, and because subject matter 4 jurisdiction can never be forfeited or waived, the claims in his Petition can be raised 5 anytime. (ECF No. 6 at 3.) To support his subject matter jurisdiction argument, Barral 6 makes the following contentions: (1) NRS § 171.010, the statute giving Nevada state 7 district courts their jurisdictional authority, was nullified in 1957 when the Nevada 8 Legislature enacted the Nevada Revised Statutes and invalidated all preexisting statutes, 9 including NRS § 171.010, (2) NRS § 171.010 is invalid under NRS § 220.170(3) given 10 that it does not reference the original Statutes of Nevada, and (3) the Nevada Revised 11 Statutes lack an enactment clause and are thus unconstitutional and void. (Id. at 3-5.) 12 Barral also contends that “once [he] filed his motion to correct illegal sentence any 13 restrictions on time went away because it was a proper post-conviction remedy.” (Id. at 14 6.) Next, Barral contends that he is entitled to equitable tolling because (1) he has been 15 diligently pursuing the claims in his Petition since September 2018 when he started 16 conducting his own legal research through the help of his mother and then later through 17 the prison’s law library, (2) he was unaware of AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations, 18 and (3) he did not learn of the legal basis for his claims until after extensive research. (Id. 19 at 7–8.) Finally, Barral contends that this Court should entertain his Petition given his 20 novel subject matter jurisdiction argument. (Id. at 8-10 (citing Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1 21 (1984) (“[W]here a constitutional claim is so novel that its legal basis is not reasonably 22 available to counsel, a defendant has cause for his failure to raise the claim in accordance 23 with applicable state procedures.”).) This Court finds that these arguments lack merit. 24 First, regardless of NRS § 171.010, the Nevada state district court had jurisdiction 25 over Barral’s underlying criminal case under the Nevada Constitution. See N.V. CONST. 26 art. VI, § 6. Second, NRS § 171.010 does not address the state district court’s jurisdiction; 27 3 1 rather, it provides criminal liability for persons committing offenses within Nevada. Third, 2 even if Barral’s motion to correct his sentence amounts to an application for other 3 collateral review under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), it was filed on November 9, 2020, after 4 the AEDPA clock had already expired. As such, Barral’s motion to correct his sentence 5 could not have tolled an already expired limitations period. See Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 6 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001).

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