Baron v. Staff Benefits Management, Inc.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: December 22, 2025
• Docket: 24-4233
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 22 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ROBERT J. BARON, No. 24-4233 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 3:22-cv-00691-LL-DDL v. MEMORANDUM* STAFF BENEFITS MANAGEMENT, INC.; FRANK CRIVELLO; ANTOINETTE BRYANT; MATT DOBRY; DOES, 1-20,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Linda Lopez, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 17, 2025**

Before: PAEZ, CHRISTEN, and KOH, Circuit Judges.

Robert J. Baron appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing

his employment action alleging discrimination and retaliation claims based on his

race and national origin. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). de novo the district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6). Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 737 (9th Cir. 2001). We

reverse and remand.

The district court dismissed Baron’s Title VII retaliation claim without

explanation. However, Baron sufficiently alleged that he submitted complaints

about his supervisor’s discriminatory behavior, and that he was terminated within

hours of doing so. See Lui v. DeJoy, 129 F.4th 770, 782 (9th Cir. 2025)

(explaining that to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a

plaintiff must show that (1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) he suffered an

adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the

two); Reynaga v. Roseburg Forest Prods., 847 F.3d 678, 693 (9th Cir. 2017)

(explaining that submitting complaints about a coworker’s racially disparaging

comments is a protected activity under Title VII); Little v. Windermere Relocation,

Inc., 301 F.3d 958, 970 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[T]ermination of employment is an

adverse employment action.”); Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054,

1065 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[C]ausation can be inferred from timing alone where an

adverse employment action follows on the heels of protected activity.”).

The district court dismissed Baron’s Title VII discrimination and § 1981

claims for failure to state a claim. However, Baron sufficiently alleged that his

supervisor discriminated against him and terminated his employment because of

2 24-4233 his race and national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (prohibiting employers

from discriminating against any individual “because of [their] race, color, religion,

sex, or national origin”); Hawn v. Exec. Jet Mgmt., Inc., 615 F.3d 1151, 1155-56

(9th Cir. 2010) (explaining that to establish a prima facie case of discrimination

under Title VII, “plaintiffs must offer evidence that gives rise to an inference of

unlawful discrimination”; if they do so, the burden shifts to the employer to show a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action (citation omitted)).

Baron also sufficiently alleged that his supervisor terminated Baron’s employment

because of his race. See Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media,

589 U.S. 327, 341 (2020) (explaining that to state a § 1981 claim against a private

defendant, a plaintiff must allege that, but for race, he would not have suffered the

loss of a legally protected right).

Having dismissed all the federal claims, the district court declined to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Baron’s state law claims under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(c)(3). Because we reverse dismissal of the federal claims, we reinstate

Baron’s state law claims. See Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1079 (9th

Cir. 2004).

We reject as meritless Baron’s contentions that the district court improperly

denied his applications to proceed in forma pauperis and his motion to appoint

counsel.

3 24-4233 We reject as unsupported by the record Baron’s contention that the district

court violated his constitutional rights or engaged in other wrongdoing.

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal, see Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009), or facts not

presented to the district court, see United States v. Elias, 921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th

Cir. 1990).

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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