Barnett v. Short

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Missouri
DecidedAugust 23, 2022
Docket4:22-cv-00708
StatusUnknown

This text of Barnett v. Short (Barnett v. Short) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Barnett v. Short, (E.D. Mo. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION DEWEY AUSTIN BARNETT, II, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. 4:22-cv-00708-SEP ) BRENDA SHORT, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) MEMORANDUM AND ORDER Before the Court is the motion of Plaintiff Dewey Austin Barnett, II, for leave to commence this civil action without prepayment of the required filing fee. Doc. [2]. Having reviewed the motion and the financial information submitted in support, the Court has determined that Plaintiff lacks sufficient funds to pay the entire filing fee, and will assess an initial partial filing fee of $1.00. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 28 U.S.C. § 1915(B)(1) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his or her prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial partial filing fee of 20% of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prisoner’s account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s account for the prior six-month period. After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly payments of 20% of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s account. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The agency having custody of the prisoner will forward the monthly payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the prisoner’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is fully paid. Id. Plaintiff has not submitted an inmate account statement as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). Nevertheless, having reviewed the information contained in the motion, the Court will require Plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $1.00. See Henderson v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 484 (8th Cir. 1997) (when a prisoner is unable to provide the court with a certified copy of his inmate account statement, the court should assess an amount “that is reasonable, based on whatever information the court has about the prisoner’s finances”). If Plaintiff is unable to pay the initial partial filing fee, he must submit a copy of his inmate account statement in support of his claim. LEGAL STANDARD ON INITIAL REVIEW Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it is frivolous or malicious, or if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief, which is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief” is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. The court must “accept as true the facts alleged, but not legal conclusions or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir. 2016); see also Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73 (8th Cir. 2016) (court is not required to “accept as true any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”). When reviewing a pro se complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must give it the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal construction” means that, “if the essence of an allegation is discernible . . . then the district court should construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within the proper legal framework.” Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir.2004)). However, even pro se complaints are required to “allege facts, which if true, state a claim as a matter of law.” Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980); see also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 2004) (federal courts not required to “assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger complaint”). And “procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation” need not be “interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.” See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993). THE COMPLAINT Plaintiff is a self-represented litigant who is currently incarcerated at the Eastern Reception, Diagnostic and Correctional Center. At all relevant times, however, he was an inmate at the Jefferson County Jail in Hillsboro, Missouri. Plaintiff brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming Jail Administrator Brenda Short, Correctional Officer Christopher Rulo, and the Jefferson County Jail as defendants. Doc. [1] at 2-3. Jail Administrator Short and Officer Rulo are sued in their official capacities only. The complaint contains unrelated claims regarding sexual harassment, the denial of legal research material, the denial of religious material, failure to protect, and tampering with legal mail. In the “Statement of Claim,” Plaintiff first accuses Officer Rulo of sexually harassing him. Doc. [1] at 13. More particularly, he states that on March 12, 2021, Officer Rulo “exploited his position” by strip-searching Plaintiff. Second, on October 9, 2020, Plaintiff asserts that his right “to access the courts and [have] access to adequate legal materials” was violated when he was not allowed a copy of Black’s Law Dictionary. Doc. [1] at 14. He explains that the jail did not have a copy, so he had it “sent directly from the [manufacturer].” Doc. [1] at 14-15. However, Plaintiff claims that Jail Administrator Short “overstepped her authority” by denying him the right to have it, even though “[h]aving legal materials sent directly from the [manufacturer] is a well-established policy ordained by other jails.” Doc. [1] at 14.

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Bluebook (online)
Barnett v. Short, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/barnett-v-short-moed-2022.