Barnes v. Royal Health Care LLC

357 F. App'x 375

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
• Decided: December 21, 2009
• Docket: 08-5239-CV
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff, Wayne C. Barnes, pro se, appeals from an order of the district court granting summary judgment for Royal Health Care LLC (“Royal Health”). Barnes asserted claims alleging employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., as well as a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. We review summary judgment decisions de novo. Woodman v. WWOR-TV, Inc., 411 F.3d 69, 75 (2d Cir.2005).

The district court determined that Barnes’s claims were precluded by the doctrine of res judicata. We find no error in that determination. “To determine the effect of a state court judgment, federal courts ... are required to apply the preclusion law of the rendering state.” Conopco, Inc. v. Roll Int’l, 231 F.3d 82, 87 (2d Cir.2000). “Under New York law, a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action.” Giannone v. York Tape & Label, Inc., 548 F.3d 191, 193 (2d Cir.2008) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). “ ‘Under New York’s transactional approach to [res judicata], once a claim is brought to a final conclusion, all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions are barred, even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy.’ ” Id. at 194 (quoting In re Derek Josey, 9 N.Y.3d 386, 389-90, 849 N.Y.S.2d 497, 880 N.E.2d 18 (2007)) (alterations in original).

In a previous action in New York state court, Barnes asserted tort claims arising from his employment and subsequent termination by Royal Health. The state court granted summary judgment for Royal Health. Barnes did not assert in that action the federal claims he now asserts in federal court, though he could have. See Woodford v. Cmty. Action Agency of Greene County, Inc., 239 F.3d 517, 525 (2d Cir.2001) (noting that state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over Title VII and ADEA claims). Because those federal claims also arise from his employment and subsequent termination by Royal Health, he is therefore now precluded entirely from pursuing them in this action. See Giannone, 548 F.3d at 193.

Barnes attempts to avoid this result by arguing that his federal employment discrimination claims were unexhausted at the time he commenced his state court action, and that he therefore could not have asserted them in that action. However, he could have either (1) commenced his state court action and then stayed the proceedings pending the outcome of his Title VII EEOC charge; or (2) amended his state court complaint to include his Title VII claim once he received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. See Woods v. Dunlop Tire Corp., 972 F.2d 36, 39-41 (2d Cir.1992).

We have considered all of Barnes’s remaining arguments, and determine that they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.