Kelly, J.
Willie L. Barner and her husband, Jesse Barner, plaintiffs and appellants, appeal in separate cases from a jury verdict and judgments for defendant. The husband was not in the automobile with his wife at the' time of the collision and bases his cause of action on loss of companionship of his wife and her services as a housekeeper, dam[503]*503ages to Ms automobile, and medical and hospital expenses.
On August 30, 1949, about 9:30 p.m. Willie L. Barner drove her car eastward along a neighbor’s private driveway. Plaintiff testified that at the point where the driveway entered into Sumpter road she brought her car to a stop before entering the Mghway; that she noticed the reflection of defendant’s headlights on the other side of the brim of the hill to the north, over 2,000 feet distant. She testified that she turned south on Sumpter road and after driving 165 feet south at a speed of not more than 10 miles per hour her car was struck in the rear by the car driven by defendant and appellee.
Defendant testified that he was traveling south on Sumpter road at a speed between 40 and 45 miles per hour and that when a car driving north and approaching him dimmed its lights he dimmed the lights on his car. He said:
“Bight after that I seen an object coming out of the driveway, and I was almost on top of the car,— maybe 1, 2, 3 car lengths, I don’t know. I swerved my car to the left, jammed the brakes on, and I saw this car coming, and the only thing I could do was avoid a head-on and wheeled my wheels to the right again, and had my brakes on. From then on I don’t remember. I was knocked out, and the next thing I woke up in the hospital. I hit the steering wheel.”
The only other witness to the collision was a Mr. Van Loon, who was driving north on the same road on which plaintiff and defendant were proceeding in a southerly direction. He testified:
“I saw the accident involved in this case. At the time I was traveling north on Sumpter road in a 1947 Ford. I was driving about 35 miles per hour and just before the accident happened, I passed a [504]*504car going in a southerly direction. I dimmed my lights and the car dimmed his lights.
“Q. Then what if anything occurred?
“A. Shortly after we dimmed our lights, just a fraction of a second this other car come out from the side of the road. I never seen it. It was out in the road in front of this other car. It seemed to me to he coming right out of a field.
“Q. Was it in motion at the time?
“A. I would say it was; yes, sir. It just came out in front of other fellow’s headlights that was coming the other way at me.”
Witness Van Loon estimated that defendant was driving at approximately 35 miles per hour just previous to the impact. He testified that after the collision he brought his car to a stop within 35 or 40 feet, returned to defendant’s car and found defendant unconscious behind the wheel; that he did not remain at this car because the windshield was not broken and he did not feel that the defendant was too seriously hurt; that he ran down the road to where plaintiff’s car was in the ditch with both doors open but no one in the car; that he then heard plaintiff screaming on the porch of a home nearby and when he approached her and asked if she was hurt she said that her leg was hurt but that that was all.
Appellants contend that the verdict is contrary to the great weight of the evidence. There is nothing in the record to sustain such a contention. The only disinterested witness sustains defendant’s testimony that plaintiff turned onto the road in front of defendant’s car in such a manner as to make the collision inevitable.
Appellants also contend that the trial judge did not properly instruct the jury. Court Rule No 37, §9 (1945), provides:
[505]*505“The court shall instruct the jury as to the law applicable to the case whenever a verdict is to he rendered, and in his charge may make such comment on the evidence, the testimony and the character of the witnesses as in his opinion the interests of justice may require.”
The trial judge in his instructions analyzed the testimony of plaintiff to show that if such testimony was correct the defendant would have to he traveling at between 130 to 160 miles per hour. He reached this conclusion on the testimony of plaintiff that the collision occurred approximately 165 feet from where plaintiff turned from the driveway onto the road; that at that time she saw the lights of the defendant’s car approximately 2,000 feet away and that her car was traveling at about 10 miles per hour at the time of the impact.
An examination of the entire charge, however, discloses that the trial judge repeatedly instructed the jury that they were the triers of the facts; that they should come to their conclusion solely from the evidence and -the testimony presented, and that they were not to consider his statements in regard to the matter of speed, et cetera, as his expression of opinion, hut as a method the jury might use in considering all the evidence in the case. Prom a reading of the whole charge it is apparent that the trial court did not exceed his authority in the comments made by him in his instructions to the jury.
Appellants complain of the trial court’s charge to the jury covering the rule of assured clear distance ahead. The court instructed the jury in this respect that:
“It [assured clear distance ahead] means that a man must drive at such a rate of speed that within his vision he can see objects that are ahead of him
[506]*506in such a way that he can bring his car to a stop before he hits those objects. That is the rule of law as to the assured clear distance ahead, and the obstacle in the road ahead of a driver can he another automobile going in the same direction that he goes. That rule as to the assured clear distance ahead does not mean that a driver on the road can never catch up to and pass from the rear a car ahead of him. He has that right to catch up with a car ahead of him. He has that right to catch up with a car ahead of him, and he has the right to pass that car under the rules that are laid down in the law. But the rule of assured clear distance ahead means the distance between the driver and an obstacle on the road in front of him. The rule as to assured clear distance ahead never comes into being until there is a visible object on the road in front of the driver. There never was an opportunity in this case for the rule of assured clear distance ahead to come into being until this plaintiff drove her car out upon the road in front of the defendant. The sudden emergency created by somebody coming out upon the road ahead of you is not a case which involves the rule of assured clear distance ahead at all. It is a rule which involves another duty, and a quite different duty. The duty that was imposed upon him under those circumstances was to see her as soon as a reasonably prudent man would have seen her, and to stop his car and prevent a rear-end collision if a person of reasonable prudence could and would have stopped his car and avoided a collision.
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Kelly, J.
Willie L. Barner and her husband, Jesse Barner, plaintiffs and appellants, appeal in separate cases from a jury verdict and judgments for defendant. The husband was not in the automobile with his wife at the' time of the collision and bases his cause of action on loss of companionship of his wife and her services as a housekeeper, dam[503]*503ages to Ms automobile, and medical and hospital expenses.
On August 30, 1949, about 9:30 p.m. Willie L. Barner drove her car eastward along a neighbor’s private driveway. Plaintiff testified that at the point where the driveway entered into Sumpter road she brought her car to a stop before entering the Mghway; that she noticed the reflection of defendant’s headlights on the other side of the brim of the hill to the north, over 2,000 feet distant. She testified that she turned south on Sumpter road and after driving 165 feet south at a speed of not more than 10 miles per hour her car was struck in the rear by the car driven by defendant and appellee.
Defendant testified that he was traveling south on Sumpter road at a speed between 40 and 45 miles per hour and that when a car driving north and approaching him dimmed its lights he dimmed the lights on his car. He said:
“Bight after that I seen an object coming out of the driveway, and I was almost on top of the car,— maybe 1, 2, 3 car lengths, I don’t know. I swerved my car to the left, jammed the brakes on, and I saw this car coming, and the only thing I could do was avoid a head-on and wheeled my wheels to the right again, and had my brakes on. From then on I don’t remember. I was knocked out, and the next thing I woke up in the hospital. I hit the steering wheel.”
The only other witness to the collision was a Mr. Van Loon, who was driving north on the same road on which plaintiff and defendant were proceeding in a southerly direction. He testified:
“I saw the accident involved in this case. At the time I was traveling north on Sumpter road in a 1947 Ford. I was driving about 35 miles per hour and just before the accident happened, I passed a [504]*504car going in a southerly direction. I dimmed my lights and the car dimmed his lights.
“Q. Then what if anything occurred?
“A. Shortly after we dimmed our lights, just a fraction of a second this other car come out from the side of the road. I never seen it. It was out in the road in front of this other car. It seemed to me to he coming right out of a field.
“Q. Was it in motion at the time?
“A. I would say it was; yes, sir. It just came out in front of other fellow’s headlights that was coming the other way at me.”
Witness Van Loon estimated that defendant was driving at approximately 35 miles per hour just previous to the impact. He testified that after the collision he brought his car to a stop within 35 or 40 feet, returned to defendant’s car and found defendant unconscious behind the wheel; that he did not remain at this car because the windshield was not broken and he did not feel that the defendant was too seriously hurt; that he ran down the road to where plaintiff’s car was in the ditch with both doors open but no one in the car; that he then heard plaintiff screaming on the porch of a home nearby and when he approached her and asked if she was hurt she said that her leg was hurt but that that was all.
Appellants contend that the verdict is contrary to the great weight of the evidence. There is nothing in the record to sustain such a contention. The only disinterested witness sustains defendant’s testimony that plaintiff turned onto the road in front of defendant’s car in such a manner as to make the collision inevitable.
Appellants also contend that the trial judge did not properly instruct the jury. Court Rule No 37, §9 (1945), provides:
[505]*505“The court shall instruct the jury as to the law applicable to the case whenever a verdict is to he rendered, and in his charge may make such comment on the evidence, the testimony and the character of the witnesses as in his opinion the interests of justice may require.”
The trial judge in his instructions analyzed the testimony of plaintiff to show that if such testimony was correct the defendant would have to he traveling at between 130 to 160 miles per hour. He reached this conclusion on the testimony of plaintiff that the collision occurred approximately 165 feet from where plaintiff turned from the driveway onto the road; that at that time she saw the lights of the defendant’s car approximately 2,000 feet away and that her car was traveling at about 10 miles per hour at the time of the impact.
An examination of the entire charge, however, discloses that the trial judge repeatedly instructed the jury that they were the triers of the facts; that they should come to their conclusion solely from the evidence and -the testimony presented, and that they were not to consider his statements in regard to the matter of speed, et cetera, as his expression of opinion, hut as a method the jury might use in considering all the evidence in the case. Prom a reading of the whole charge it is apparent that the trial court did not exceed his authority in the comments made by him in his instructions to the jury.
Appellants complain of the trial court’s charge to the jury covering the rule of assured clear distance ahead. The court instructed the jury in this respect that:
“It [assured clear distance ahead] means that a man must drive at such a rate of speed that within his vision he can see objects that are ahead of him
[506]*506in such a way that he can bring his car to a stop before he hits those objects. That is the rule of law as to the assured clear distance ahead, and the obstacle in the road ahead of a driver can he another automobile going in the same direction that he goes. That rule as to the assured clear distance ahead does not mean that a driver on the road can never catch up to and pass from the rear a car ahead of him. He has that right to catch up with a car ahead of him. He has that right to catch up with a car ahead of him, and he has the right to pass that car under the rules that are laid down in the law. But the rule of assured clear distance ahead means the distance between the driver and an obstacle on the road in front of him. The rule as to assured clear distance ahead never comes into being until there is a visible object on the road in front of the driver. There never was an opportunity in this case for the rule of assured clear distance ahead to come into being until this plaintiff drove her car out upon the road in front of the defendant. The sudden emergency created by somebody coming out upon the road ahead of you is not a case which involves the rule of assured clear distance ahead at all. It is a rule which involves another duty, and a quite different duty. The duty that was imposed upon him under those circumstances was to see her as soon as a reasonably prudent man would have seen her, and to stop his car and prevent a rear-end collision if a person of reasonable prudence could and would have stopped his car and avoided a collision. But the plaintiff must prove that the circumstances were such that an ordinarily prudent person would have seen her in time so that by the exercise of that ordinary prudence he could and would have stopped before he hit her. And if the plaintiff has not proved [by] a fair preponderance of the evidence that such reasonable person exercising such reasonable care could and would have seen her after the time when she got into the highway, and up to the time when the collision took place, and would have stopped and [507]*507have prevented a collision, then the evidence does not warrant a finding that this defendant was guilty of negligence on his part in the way he handled himself and his car after she got out into the road in front of him. I again suggest for your reasonable consideration that the time was short between the time when she got upon the road and the time when the collision took place; not measured in minutes not measured in half-minutes; but measured in seconds. It could have been 10 seconds. It could have been 15 seconds. That is something for you to determine. But the duty of the defendant to see the plaintiff and bring his car to a stop before running into the rear end of her car did not arise until she got out on the road and until a reasonably prudent person would have seen her, and it could only have been performed in the prevention of an accident if a reasonable person, after having made that discovery, could and would have stopped without touching her car. Those are the only 2 grounds upon which plaintiff claims actionable negligence in this case. You conclude that the defendant was actionably negligent if you find he was going unreasonably fast, or if you find that after he discovered her on the road that he did not do what a reasonably prudent man would have done under all the circumstances.”
We do not think this instruction created reversible error.
Judgments affirmed. Costs to appellee.
Butzel, C. J., and Bushnell, Boyles, Reid, and Dethmers, JJ., concurred with Kelly, J.