Barker v. Home-Crest Corp.

805 S.W.2d 373, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 81
CourtTennessee Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 25, 1991
StatusPublished
Cited by21 cases

This text of 805 S.W.2d 373 (Barker v. Home-Crest Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Tennessee Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Barker v. Home-Crest Corp., 805 S.W.2d 373, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 81 (Tenn. 1991).

Opinion

OPINION

ANDERSON, Justice.

In this worker’s compensation action, the trial court approved a settlement awarding permanent partial disability benefits to the employee for a condition known as carpal tunnel syndrome. The dispute which we address arises over which of two insurance companies providing successive coverage for the employer should be liable for the settlement. The resolution of the dispute depends on when the accidental injury occurred. The appellant, CNA Insurance Companies, contends that it was a gradual injury, occurring over a period of time, and that the accidental injury did not occur until the injury prevented the employee from working. The appellee, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, argues that the accidental injury occurred when the condition was diagnosed, and any symptoms that occurred after that time were merely a manifestation of an already present and existing injury. The trial court held the accidental injury occurred when it was diagnosed, and that CNA Insurance Companies, who had coverage at that time, was responsible.

We disagree with the trial court and hold that the carpal tunnel syndrome condition was a gradual injury, and that the *374 accidental injury occurred on the date the employee’s condition was sufficiently severe to prevent her from working. Accordingly, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, the insuror when the employee stopped working, is liable for the agreed permanent partial disability settlement.

FACTUAL HISTORY

CNA Insurance Companies (“CNA”) provided worker’s compensation insurance coverage to the defendant employer, Home-Crest Corporation (“Home-Crest”), at all relevant times before June 17,1988. After June 17, 1988, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (“Liberty”) provided the same coverage to Home-Crest.

The plaintiff, Ella Jean Barker (“Barker”), was first employed by Home-Crest in April of 1986. On May 24, 1988, she was referred to Dr. Clifford Posman, an orthopedic surgeon, by Dr. Roger Carrera, the physician for Home-Crest, for symptoms of numbness and tingling in the hands, and pain in the mid-back. No time from work had been missed as a result of these symptoms. Barker thought the problem was caused by sanding kitchen cabinets at work with a 10-pound vibrating “jitterbug” sander. Dr. Posman agreed, thought the history was consistent with an overuse problem related to her occupation, and diagnosed the problem as a probable carpal tunnel syndrome. He prescribed a night brace and referred her for EMG studies of both extremities.

On June 21, 1988, Dr. Posman saw Barker again and injected the carpal tunnels with Kenalog 10 and gave her new night splints. The nerve conduction studies showed evidence of bilateral ulnar nerve disfunction, and his diagnosis was bilateral severe carpal tunnel syndrome. On July 12, 1988, Barker reported that her hands were better since she had the cortisone injection. Dr. Posman’s impression then was “resolving carpal tunnel syndrome.” Thereafter, he saw Barker twice in August and once in September for a back injury. In October he saw Barker for both her back and her wrist symptoms of tingling and numbness, and recommended surgery for her carpal tunnel problem.

Finally, Barker’s condition became so painful she could not continue working. She returned to Dr. Posman, and he performed surgery on March 7, 1989. The surgical procedure was an incision of the carpal ligaments in the arm, which expose the median nerves, and drain the compression of the nerves by releasing the ligament and the tissues around the nerve.

Dr. Posman continued to follow her after the surgery, again treating the carpal tunnel syndrome with cortisone and with splints. He assessed her disability at 20 percent to the body as a whole as a result of the carpal tunnel syndrome in both the right and left hands, and felt that any activity requiring repetitive hand movements should be restricted.

At trial, on February 21, 1990, the trial court approved an agreed settlement of 50 percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole, amounting to $43,000.00, including medical expenses, and held that the defendant, CNA, was liable for the settlement award as a result of an accidental injury sustained by Barker during CNA’s coverage period ending June 17, 1988.

ACCIDENTAL INJURY

Our review of findings of fact by the trial court is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of the correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e); Lollar v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 767 S.W.2d 143 (Tenn.1989). “This standard differs from that previously provided and requires this Court to weigh in more depth factual findings and conclusions of trial judges in workers’ compensation cases.” Humphrey v. David Witherspoon, Inc., 734 S.W.2d 315 (Tenn.1987).

The appellant, CNA, argues that Barker suffered a gradual injury — a nerve injury which developed over a period of time — and that the accidental injury did not occur until Barker became disabled, and she did not become disabled until she stopped *375 working and surgery was performed. The appellee, Liberty, argues that the accidental injury occurred on and prior to May 24, 1988; that it was diagnosed at that time; that Barker sustained a disabling injury at that time; and that anything that occurred after that time symptom-wise was merely a manifestation of an already present and existing injury.

Our analysis begins with an examination of the origin of the gradual injury rule, and the problem of fixing the time of the injury. Professor Larson comments:

This repeated-trauma or cumulative-trauma doctrine appears to have originated with the House of Lords decision in Burrell & Sons, Ltd. v. Selvage [90 L.J. 1340 (H.L.1921) ], in which compensation was awarded for the disabling cumulative effect of a long series of cuts and scratches leading to infection and arthritis....
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The practical problem of fixing a specific date for the accident has generally been handled by saying simply that the date of accident is the date on which disability manifests itself. Thus, in [Ptak v. General Elec. Co., 13 N.J.Super. 294, 80 A.2d 337 (1951)], the date of a gradually acquired sacroiliac strain was deemed to be the first moment the pain made it impossible to continue work....

IB Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law § 39.40 and § 39.50 (1987), citing in accord Brown Shoe Co. v. Reed, 209 Tenn. 106, 350 S.W.2d 65 (1961). See also Note, Workmen’s Compensation—Gradual Inju ries, 29 Tenn.L.Rev. 477 (1962).

This Court, in Brown Shoe Co. v.

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Bluebook (online)
805 S.W.2d 373, 1991 Tenn. LEXIS 81, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/barker-v-home-crest-corp-tenn-1991.