OPINION
ONION, Presiding Judge.
This appeal is taken from a conviction for driving a motor vehicle on a public highway while intoxicated. Punishment was assessed at a year and six months in jail and a fine of $50.00.
The effect of appellant’s initial complaint on appeal, where he is represented by retained counsel, is that he was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel and that he represented himself without the obligatory warnings and admonishments.
The complaint and information were filed May 7, 1975. The cause was thereafter passed several times apparently at appellant’s request. On September 11, 1975, appellant’s retained counsel was allowed to withdraw on the stated ground of conflict and antagonism between attorney and client and the case was passed again to allow appellant to hire another attorney. On November 11, 1975, before the trial began, the record reflects the following:
“THE COURT: Mr. Barbour, the State has announced ready in your case, your case has been set several times before and you have indicated at this time that you want to represent yourself and that you do not intend to employ a lawyer, is that the way you feel?
“MR. BARBOUR: I was advised by an attorney to represent myself.
“THE COURT: Whatever advise you received, at this moment, do you intend to represent yourself?
[372]*372“MR. BARBOUR: Yes, Your Honor. “THE COURT: What is the highest grade of education that you have attained?
“MR. BARBOUR: Bachelor of Arts, University of Southern California.
“THE COURT: How are you employed? “MR. BARBOUR: Unemployed, Your Honor.
“THE COURT: What is your major type of employment when you are employed? “MR. BARBOUR: Real estate broker, life insurance and disability insurance and casualty insurance, but all in the state of California.
“THE COURT: How old are you?
“MR. BARBOUR: Fifty-four.
“THE COURT: Were you born in the United States?
“MR. BARBOUR: Yes.
“THE COURT: Do you speak the English language and understand the English language?
“MR. BARBOUR: Yes.
“THE COURT: All right. Just have a seat. If you want to get a cup of coffee and be back in about thirty minutes, sir, we will be ready to start.”
There was no further inquiry into the matter nor any further investigation into the question of indigency. Likewise, there was no warning to appellant as to the wisdom or practical consequences of the choice of representing himself.
The record reveals that appellant was totally unacquainted with trial procedure and represents a classical example of why a layman accused, regardless of his level of education, should not attempt to represent himself. The trial court was constantly interrupting the trial attempting to explain procedure to the appellant and telling him what he could and could not do.
From the evidence, mostly from appellant’s own testimony, we glean the following facts. Appellant lived in California for 27 years where he stated he was a real estate broker and was in the insurance business prior to his return to Texas. Just when he returned to Texas was not revealed. He did state after returning his last employment was for six months in 1974 and that prior to that time he was convalescing while being supported by his wife. He related that at the time of his arrest he was on his way to a disability hearing at the Veterans Administration. At the penalty stage of the trial appellant stated he had no income and “his wife was taking care of things.”
It is well settled that the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution extends to the states as a matter of due process the Sixth Amendment provision of the same Constitution that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to the assistance of counsel for his defense. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963); Webb v. State, 533 S.W.2d 780 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), and cases there cited. The constitutional right is applicable to both felony [Gideon v. Wainwright, supra] and misdemeanor cases [Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972)]. Article I, § 10, of the Texas Constitution also provides for the right to counsel for an accused in a criminal prosecution. These provisions have been interpreted as requiring the appointment of counsel where the accused is indigent. Gideon v. Wainwright, supra; Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra. The appointment of counsel for indigents is also required by statute. See Article 26.04, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P.
It is well established that an accused may waive his right to counsel. Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra; Webb v. State, supra; Ex parte Ross, 522 S.W.2d 214 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Smith v. State, 513 S.W.2d 586 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); King v. State, 473 S.W.2d 43 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); Carey v. State, 455 S.W.2d 217 (Tex.Cr.App.1970); Sanchez v. State, 454 S.W.2d 210 (Tex.Cr.App.1970). For a waiver of counsel to be valid, it must be voluntarily and knowingly made. Parker v. State, 545 S.W.2d 151, 155 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Ex parte Ross, supra; Webb v. State, supra; Smith v. State, supra; Lewis v. State, 501 S.W.2d 88 (Tex.Cr.App.1973).
[373]*373Waiver may be defined as “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). A waiver of the right to counsel will not be presumed from a silent record. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516, 82 S.Ct. 884, 890, 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962); Ex parte Auten, 458 S.W.2d 466 (Tex.Cr.App.1970); Baker v. State, 519 S.W.2d 648 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Bray v. State, 531 S.W.2d 633 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976). A waiver will not be “lightly inferred,” and courts will indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. Johnson v. Zerbst, supra.
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OPINION
ONION, Presiding Judge.
This appeal is taken from a conviction for driving a motor vehicle on a public highway while intoxicated. Punishment was assessed at a year and six months in jail and a fine of $50.00.
The effect of appellant’s initial complaint on appeal, where he is represented by retained counsel, is that he was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel and that he represented himself without the obligatory warnings and admonishments.
The complaint and information were filed May 7, 1975. The cause was thereafter passed several times apparently at appellant’s request. On September 11, 1975, appellant’s retained counsel was allowed to withdraw on the stated ground of conflict and antagonism between attorney and client and the case was passed again to allow appellant to hire another attorney. On November 11, 1975, before the trial began, the record reflects the following:
“THE COURT: Mr. Barbour, the State has announced ready in your case, your case has been set several times before and you have indicated at this time that you want to represent yourself and that you do not intend to employ a lawyer, is that the way you feel?
“MR. BARBOUR: I was advised by an attorney to represent myself.
“THE COURT: Whatever advise you received, at this moment, do you intend to represent yourself?
[372]*372“MR. BARBOUR: Yes, Your Honor. “THE COURT: What is the highest grade of education that you have attained?
“MR. BARBOUR: Bachelor of Arts, University of Southern California.
“THE COURT: How are you employed? “MR. BARBOUR: Unemployed, Your Honor.
“THE COURT: What is your major type of employment when you are employed? “MR. BARBOUR: Real estate broker, life insurance and disability insurance and casualty insurance, but all in the state of California.
“THE COURT: How old are you?
“MR. BARBOUR: Fifty-four.
“THE COURT: Were you born in the United States?
“MR. BARBOUR: Yes.
“THE COURT: Do you speak the English language and understand the English language?
“MR. BARBOUR: Yes.
“THE COURT: All right. Just have a seat. If you want to get a cup of coffee and be back in about thirty minutes, sir, we will be ready to start.”
There was no further inquiry into the matter nor any further investigation into the question of indigency. Likewise, there was no warning to appellant as to the wisdom or practical consequences of the choice of representing himself.
The record reveals that appellant was totally unacquainted with trial procedure and represents a classical example of why a layman accused, regardless of his level of education, should not attempt to represent himself. The trial court was constantly interrupting the trial attempting to explain procedure to the appellant and telling him what he could and could not do.
From the evidence, mostly from appellant’s own testimony, we glean the following facts. Appellant lived in California for 27 years where he stated he was a real estate broker and was in the insurance business prior to his return to Texas. Just when he returned to Texas was not revealed. He did state after returning his last employment was for six months in 1974 and that prior to that time he was convalescing while being supported by his wife. He related that at the time of his arrest he was on his way to a disability hearing at the Veterans Administration. At the penalty stage of the trial appellant stated he had no income and “his wife was taking care of things.”
It is well settled that the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution extends to the states as a matter of due process the Sixth Amendment provision of the same Constitution that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to the assistance of counsel for his defense. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963); Webb v. State, 533 S.W.2d 780 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), and cases there cited. The constitutional right is applicable to both felony [Gideon v. Wainwright, supra] and misdemeanor cases [Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972)]. Article I, § 10, of the Texas Constitution also provides for the right to counsel for an accused in a criminal prosecution. These provisions have been interpreted as requiring the appointment of counsel where the accused is indigent. Gideon v. Wainwright, supra; Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra. The appointment of counsel for indigents is also required by statute. See Article 26.04, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P.
It is well established that an accused may waive his right to counsel. Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra; Webb v. State, supra; Ex parte Ross, 522 S.W.2d 214 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Smith v. State, 513 S.W.2d 586 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); King v. State, 473 S.W.2d 43 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); Carey v. State, 455 S.W.2d 217 (Tex.Cr.App.1970); Sanchez v. State, 454 S.W.2d 210 (Tex.Cr.App.1970). For a waiver of counsel to be valid, it must be voluntarily and knowingly made. Parker v. State, 545 S.W.2d 151, 155 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Ex parte Ross, supra; Webb v. State, supra; Smith v. State, supra; Lewis v. State, 501 S.W.2d 88 (Tex.Cr.App.1973).
[373]*373Waiver may be defined as “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). A waiver of the right to counsel will not be presumed from a silent record. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516, 82 S.Ct. 884, 890, 8 L.Ed.2d 70 (1962); Ex parte Auten, 458 S.W.2d 466 (Tex.Cr.App.1970); Baker v. State, 519 S.W.2d 648 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); Bray v. State, 531 S.W.2d 633 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976). A waiver will not be “lightly inferred,” and courts will indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. Johnson v. Zerbst, supra. And a heavy burden rests upon the prosecution to demonstrate an intelligent, voluntary and knowing waiver of constitutional rights, particularly as applied to the right to retained or appointed counsel. Ex parte Bird, 457 S.W.2d 559 (Tex.Cr.App.1970).
In Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra, the United States Supreme Court wrote:
“We hold, therefore, that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.”
In light of the record before us, we cannot conclude from the evidence that an affirmative waiver is reflected or that the State sustained the heavy burden which rests upon it to demonstrate such a waiver. See Parker v. State, supra.
It has, of course, been held in this State that a trial court may not force an accused to accept an attorney if he wishes to waive representation and defend himself. Webb v. State, supra, and cases there cited. And the United States Supreme Court in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 803, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), held that a defendant in a state criminal trial has a constitutional right to proceed without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so. The court noted as it did in Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 63 S.Ct. 236, 87 L.Ed. 268 (1943), that the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel implicitly embodies a “correlative right to dispense with a lawyer’s help.”
In Faretta the Court wrote:
“When an accused manages his own defense, he relinquishes, as a purely factual matter, many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel. For this reason, in order to represent himself, the accused must ‘knowingly and intelligently’ forgo those relinquished benefits . . . Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation, he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that ‘he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.’ ”
In Webb v. State, supra, this court stated:
“When an accused makes known his desire to represent himself, the court should take care to ascertain that he fully understands the consequences of waiving his right to representation of counsel and proceeding to represent himself.”
In the instant case, not only does the record fail to reflect a voluntary and knowing waiver of the right to counsel, retained or appointed, but the record does not reflect that the appellant was made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation so as to establish that the appellant knew what he was doing and that his choice was made with his “eyes open.”
Therefore, the cause is reversed and remanded.