Barbour v. Democratic Executive Committee

269 S.E.2d 433, 246 Ga. 193, 1980 Ga. LEXIS 1041

• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
• Decided: July 15, 1980
• Docket: 36599
• Status: Published

Opinions

Marshall, Justice.

On May 28, 1980, the appellant filed an application with the Crawford County Democratic Executive Committee to be certified as a candidate for the office of Sheriff of Crawford County. On June 5, the committee denied the appellant’s application on the ground that he had been convicted of felony involuntary manslaughter in 1960. On June 10, the appellant filed a complaint for writ of mandamus in the Crawford Superior Court, seeking to compel the committee to certify him as a candidate for sheriff in that the State Board of Pardons and Paroles had in 1975 granted the appellant a pardon. This pardon expressly relieves the appellant of all legal disabilities resulting from his 1960 involuntary manslaughter conviction. On July 7, the superior court entered an order ruling that, notwithstanding the appellant’s pardon, he remains disqualified to seek the office of sheriff. We granted the appellant’s application for expedited appeal, but we affirm.

Code Ann. § 2-501 (Art. II, Sec. II, Par. I of the Ga. Constitution of 1976) does provide that persons convicted of various offenses — including any crime involving moral turpitude, punishable by the laws of this state with imprisonment in the penitentiary — shall not be permitted to hold any office, unless such persons shall have been pardoned. However, Code Ann. § 2-5808.1 (Art. IX, Sec. I, Par. IX, of the Ga. Constitution of 1976) authorizes the General Assembly to provide by law for higher qualifications for sheriffs. This the General Assembly has done through the enactment of Code Ann. § 24-2801 (Ga. L. 1977, pp. 1171, 1172, as amended). Code Ann. § 24-2801 (c) (1) (F) provides, “No person shall be eligible to hold the office of Sheriff who does not have all of the following qualifications: . . . Have not been convicted of a felony offense or any offense involving moral turpitude contrary to the laws of this State or any other State, or the United States.”

Reading Code Ann. §§ 2-501 and 24-2801 (c) (1) (F) in pari materia, we conclude that it was the intent of the General Assembly to prohibit a convicted felon from running for the office of sheriff even though such person might obtain a pardon for the felony. See Op. Atty. Gen. 80-56. We further conclude that the General Assembly is authorized under Code Ann. § 2-5808.1 to make such provision.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except Clarke, J., who concurs specially, and Jordan, P. J., Nichols and Hill, JJ., who dissent. Decided July 15, 1980 Rehearing denied July 29, 1980. Brown, Katz, Flatau & Hasty, S. Phillip Brown, for appellant. Mincey & Kenmore, David Mincey, Jr., Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, Michael J. Bowers, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees.