Home/W.D. North Carolina/Barber v. Kimbrell's, Inc.

Barber v. Kimbrell's, Inc.

424 F. Supp. 42, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12102
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. North Carolina
DecidedNovember 29, 1976
DocketC-C-74-95
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 424 F. Supp. 42 (Barber v. Kimbrell's, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Barber v. Kimbrell's, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 42, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12102 (W.D.N.C. 1976).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND JUDGMENT

McMILLAN, District Judge.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Polly Ann Barber filed this action on May 3, 1974, seeking civil penalties under the Consumer Credit Protection Act (“Truth-in-Lending Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 1601, et seq. On June 11, 1975, a class was certified under Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, consisting of the plaintiff and persons who, between July 16, 1973, and May 3, 1974, had entered into consumer credit transactions at the downtown Charlotte Kimbrell’s furniture store. Class notice was given; Some opted out; the class numbers approximately 740 members. Furniture Distributors, Inc., also a North Carolina corporation, was added as a defendant on April 15, 1975; discovery proceeded; motions of defendant Furniture Distributors, Inc. for summary judgment were made and denied; and the case was heard on June 7, 1976, on cross-motions of the various parties for summary judgment.

*44 The court finds that the defendants have violated the “Truth-in-Lending Act,” and are liable to the individual plaintiff and to the members of the class she represents.

PURPOSES OF THE TRUTH-IN-LENDING ACT

The Truth-in-Lending Act was adopted in 1968. It does not regulate interest rates. Instead, its purpose is to require that lenders provide consumers with information, clearly and understandably stated, so that they can determine what they are paying for the credit extended to them, and so that they can compare costs of credit available from various sources and shop around intelligently for the best terms. It requires that certain specific information be given in the documents covering the transaction, and it provides penalties for failure to disclose the necessary information. See 15 U.S.C. § 1601 and annotations. The decided cases talk in terms of the duty to “ ‘assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms’ to consumers,” Gardner, et a 1. v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, et al, 150 U.S.App.D.C. 329, 464 F.2d 838, 841 (1972), or “to protect consumers by providing them with accurate information so they could shop for credit,” Bostwick v. Cohen, 319 F.Supp. 875, 877 (N.D.Ohio 1970). As the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in White v. Arlen Realty Co., 540 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1975), the Act is intended to prevent the public from misleading and confusing credit disclosures and to insure full, complete, accurate and uniform consumer credit disclosure, to make possible informed comparison shopping for credit.

The Supreme Court of the United States said in Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 93 S.Ct. 1652, 36 L.Ed.2d 318 (1973):

“. . . [Consumers remain] remarkably ignorant of the nature of their credit obligations and of the cost of deferring payment. Because of the divergent . practices by which consumers were informed of the terms of the credit extended to them, many consumers were prevented from shopping for the best terms available . . . [S]uch blind economic activity is inconsistent with the efficient functioning of a free economic system such as ours, whose ability to provide desired material at the lowest cost is dependent on the asserted preferences and informed choices of consumers. The Truth-in-Lending Act was designed to remedy the problems which had developed.” Pp. 363-364, 93 S.Ct. pp. 1657-1658.

JURISDICTION

The court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter under 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e); the suit was brought within the time limitation; the case is at issue and is properly before the court on the pending motions; the class has been properly notified; counsel have been fully heard in argument and in brief; and the case is ready for decision.

THE FACTS ABOUT POLLY ANN BARBER’S CASE

On July 16, 1973, the named plaintiff, Polly Ann Barber, entered into a retail installment contract at the downtown Charlotte Kimbrell’s furniture store, for the purchase of a green velvet sofa bed, a four-piece walnut bedroom suite and a box spring and mattress. At the time she owed Kimbrell’s $65.00 from a previous credit purchase which had been subjected to a previous finance charge. The old balance was added to the price of the new purchases in an “add on” transaction and the old and the new balance were consolidated into one “PURCHASE MONEY SECURITY AGREEMENT,” to be retired by the payment of twelve equal monthly installments. Ms. Barber executed the agreement.

A photocopy of the instrument (“PURCHASE MONEY SECURITY AGREEMENT”) is attached and is the next page of this opinion. - It bears the legend “APPENDIX ‘A’ ” at the bottom.

*45

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
424 F. Supp. 42, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12102, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/barber-v-kimbrells-inc-ncwd-1976.