Barbara Stennes-Cox v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC

Ninth Circuit

Barbara Stennes-Cox v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC

700 F. App'x 731

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedNovember 1, 2017

Docket16-35251

StatusUnpublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 700 F. App'x 731 (Barbara Stennes-Cox v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Barbara Stennes-Cox v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, 700 F. App'x 731 (9th Cir. 2017).

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Opinion

MEMORANDUM **

Gary Dean Maxfield appeals from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging a Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) claim for rescission. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Serra v. Lappin, 600 F.3d 1191, 1195 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm.

The district court properly, dismissed Maxfield’s action as time-barred because Maxfield did not send a notice of rescission to defendants within three years of consummation of the loan. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (providing a right of rescission within three years of the date of the consummation of a loan if the lender fails to make required disclosures to the borrower); Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 790, 792, 190 L.Ed.2d 650 (2015) (a borrower may exercise right of rescission by notifying the lender of borrower’s intent to rescind within three years after the transaction is consummated); Miguel v. Country Funding Corp., 309 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[Section] 1635(f) is a statute of repose, depriving the courts of subject matter jurisdiction when a § 1635 claim is brought outside the three-year limitation period.”). We reject as without merit Max-field’s contention that the subject loan transaction was not consummated.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in taking judicial notice of documents filed with the county recorder’s office. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b) (court may take judicial notice of a fact that is “not subject to reasonable dispute because it ... can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned”); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (setting forth standard of review and stating that court may take judicial notice of matters of public record).

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal, See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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MEMORANDUM **

Gary Dean Maxfield appeals from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action alleging a Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) claim for rescission. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Serra v. Lappin, 600 F.3d 1191, 1195 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm.

The district court properly, dismissed Maxfield’s action as time-barred because Maxfield did not send a notice of rescission to defendants within three years of consummation of the loan. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (providing a right of rescission within three years of the date of the consummation of a loan if the lender fails to make required disclosures to the borrower); Jesinoski v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 790, 792, 190 L.Ed.2d 650 (2015) (a borrower may exercise right of rescission by notifying the lender of borrower’s intent to rescind within three years after the transaction is consummated); Miguel v. Country Funding Corp., 309 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[Section] 1635(f) is a statute of repose, depriving the courts of subject matter jurisdiction when a § 1635 claim is brought outside the three-year limitation period.”). We reject as without merit Max-field’s contention that the subject loan transaction was not consummated.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in taking judicial notice of documents filed with the county recorder’s office. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b) (court may take judicial notice of a fact that is “not subject to reasonable dispute because it ... can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned”); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (setting forth standard of review and stating that court may take judicial notice of matters of public record).

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal, See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

**

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

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700 F. App'x 731, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/barbara-stennes-cox-v-nationstar-mortgage-llc-ca9-2017.

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