Baptiste v. City of Las Cruces

848 P.2d 1105, 115 N.M. 178
CourtNew Mexico Court of Appeals
DecidedFebruary 10, 1993
Docket13206
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 848 P.2d 1105 (Baptiste v. City of Las Cruces) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Mexico Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Baptiste v. City of Las Cruces, 848 P.2d 1105, 115 N.M. 178 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993).

Opinion

OPINION

HARTZ, Judge.

Pursuant to the New Mexico Tort Claims Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 41-4-1 to -4-29 (Repl.Pamp.1989), Plaintiff sued the City of Las Cruces and its animal control officer (ACO), Elizabeth Carver, for false imprisonment and false arrest allegedly resulting from the issuance of a citation by Carver. The Defendants sought dismissal of the charge on several grounds, including failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See SCRA 1986, 1-012(B)(6). To establish this last ground, Defendants relied on a three-step analysis: (1) they are immune from suit under the Act unless immunity is waived by a provision of the Act, NMSA 1978, § 41-4-4(A); (2) the Act waives immunity for liability for false imprisonment and false arrest only if caused by law enforcement officers acting within the scope of their duties, NMSA 1978, § 41-4-12; and (3) a Las Cruces ACO is not a “law enforcement officer” as defined in the Act, NMSA 1978, § 41-4-3(D) (Cum. Supp.1992).

At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the parties stipulated to the admission of Exhibit 1, a document setting forth the duties and qualifications of an ACO. 1 This consideration of evidence outside the pleadings converted the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment pursuant to SCRA 1986, 1-056. See Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Sydow, 97 N.M. 51, 54, 636 P.2d 322, 325 (Ct.App.1981). Defendants were entitled to judgment only if there was no genuine issue as to a material fact. See SCRA 1-056(C). Finding that Carver was not a law enforcement officer, the district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Plaintiff appeals. We reverse because on the present record there is a genuine issue of fact regarding whether a Las Cruces ACO is a law enforcement officer under the Act.

Section 41-4-3(D) states:

[L]aw enforcement officer means any full-time salaried public employee of a governmental entity whose principal duties under law are to hold in custody any person accused of a criminal offense, to maintain public order or to make arrests for crimes, or members of the national guard when called to active duty by the governor[.]

We read this language in light of the traditional duties of law enforcement officers, see Anchondo v. Corrections Dep’t, 100 N.M. 108, 110, 666 P.2d 1255, 1257 (1983); Vigil v. Martinez, 113 N.M. 714, 720, 832 P.2d 405, 411 (Ct.App.1992), and with regard to the legislative intent “to include within the definition of law enforcement officer * * * only those persons whose principal duties include those of a direct law enforcement nature.” Anchondo, 100 N.M. at 111, 666 P.2d at 1258. “Principal duties” are “those duties to which employees devote the majority of their time.” Id. at 110, 666 P.2d at 1257; accord Vigil v. Martinez, 113 N.M. at 720, 832 P.2d at 411.

We look to the duties of a Las Cruces ACO to determine whether an ACO comes within the statutory definition of “law enforcement officer.” Exhibit 1 contains the following pertinent information:

POSITION TITLE: Animal Control Officer
POSITION SUMMARY: Answers complaints regarding animals and insures compliance with City ordinances.
SPECIFIC CERTIFICATION AND/OR LICENSE REQUIREMENTS: Valid New Mexico Class V Operator’s License; free of felony convictions; Radio Operator’s License.
EDUCATION — MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS: High school diploma or equivalent.
EXPERIENCE — MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS: Two and one-half (2%) years experience in working with domestic animals on farm, in zoo, in veterinarian clinic, etc.
ABILITIES AND SKILLS — MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS: Must be able to write clear and accurate reports.
JOB DESCRIPTION: Answers complaints regarding animals. Picks up dead or injured animals or strays, including cats, dogs and other animals. Visits homes to inspect license, vaccination certificates and sick dogs or cats. Institutes quarantines in dog bite cases. Investigates complaints concerning treatment of animals or noncompliance with animal ordinances. Prepares cases and appears in court in legal action. Issues citations in cases or violations of ordinances. Maintains records and prepares periodic and special reports. May be required to destroy animals in the field. Performs other duties as assigned. WORKING CONDITIONS — Works outside in all kinds of weather. May be exposed to the possibility of bruises, cuts and animal bites. Requires moderately light physical effort.

For an ACO to come within the statutory definition of “law enforcement officer,” the ACO’s principal duties under law must be “[ (a) ] to hold in custody any person accused of a criminal offense, [(b)] to maintain public order or [(c)] to make arrests for crimes[.]” Section 41-4-3(D). It suffices if an ACO’s principal duties are either (a) or (b) or (c). We will not distort the plain language of the statute to adopt Defendants’ contention that the statutory definition requires an ACO’s principal duties to be either both (a) and (b) or both (a) and (c). 2 Plaintiff makes no claim that an ACO’s principal duties include holding persons in custody or making arrests. Thus, the sole question is whether an ACO’s principal duties under law are “to maintain public order.”

The Tort Claims Act does not define the phrase “maintain public order.” We note, however, that the statutory definition of law enforcement officer distinguishes between the duty “to maintain public order” and the duty “to make arrests for crimes.” Section 41-4-3(D). This distinction clarifies that the task of maintaining public order can be accomplished without the power to arrest.

Some additional guidance is provided in decisions from other jurisdictions. The Georgia Supreme Court said, “ ‘Public order’ means the tranquility and security which every person feels under the protection of the law, a breach of which is an invasion of the protection which the law affords.” Board of Comm’rs of Peace Officers Annuity & Benefit Fund v. Clay, 214 Ga. 70, 102 S.E.2d 575, 577 (1958). Another court has written, “A breach of the peace is described as ‘a violation of public order; the offense of disturbing the public peace.’ ” State v. Mancini, 91 Vt. 507, 101 A. 581, 583 (1917). This statement suggests that the terms “public order” and “public peace” capture the same concept and a violation of either is a breach of the peace. We thus consider the following dictionary definition of “public peace”: “The peace or tranquility of the community in general; the good order and repose of the people composing a state or municipality.

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Bluebook (online)
848 P.2d 1105, 115 N.M. 178, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/baptiste-v-city-of-las-cruces-nmctapp-1993.