Bankers & Shippers Insurance Co. of New York v. Holiday Rambler Corp.

420 So. 2d 1350, 1982 La. App. LEXIS 8123
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedOctober 13, 1982
DocketNo. 82-165
StatusPublished

This text of 420 So. 2d 1350 (Bankers & Shippers Insurance Co. of New York v. Holiday Rambler Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bankers & Shippers Insurance Co. of New York v. Holiday Rambler Corp., 420 So. 2d 1350, 1982 La. App. LEXIS 8123 (La. Ct. App. 1982).

Opinion

CUTRER, Judge.

This appeal arises out of a subrogation suit for property damages incurred as a result of a fire which destroyed a travel trailer owned by Michael Barner. Bankers & Shippers Insurance Company of New York (Bankers) paid Barner for the fire loss under their contract of insurance. Barner subrogated his claim to Bankers which filed the suit in question.

Bankers sued Holiday Rambler Corporation (Holiday), the manufacturer of the trailer, and Cenia Camping Center, Inc. (Cenia), the seller, for the fire loss. The trial court dismissed the suit as to Cenia. The trial judge found Bankers had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Holiday had installed a defective copper flare connection leading into the central heating unit of the trailer. The trial judge further found this connection was the most probable cause of the fire which destroyed the trailer. Judgment was rendered in favor of Bankers and against Holiday in the amount of $17,000.00. Holiday appeals. We affirm.

FACTS

On October 13,1978, Michael Barner purchased a thirty-two foot Imperial Limited [1352]*1352Travel Trailer from Cenia. The trailer was manufactured by Holiday. Major appliances in the trailer were operated on either an external electrical hookup or a self-contained L.P. gas system. Gas was carried to each appliance through %" copper tubing and connected to the appliance by flare fittings and brass connectors. Each fitting and connection combination was checked for leaks at Holiday’s plant in Indiana and at Cenla’s sales lot in Alexandria, Louisiana. No gas leaks were found.

The trailer had been parked by Barner near his mother’s home. On May 1, 1979, the trailer was completely destroyed by fire. No one was inside the trailer when the fire started. Barner was a short distance away placing laundry in his mother’s car when his mother spotted smoke coming out of the top of the trailer. After an unsuccessful attempt at controlling the flames with a garden hose, Barner removed the L.P. gas bottles from the front of the trailer to prevent any explosion. The trailer and Barner’s possessions were lost. Bankers paid its policy limits to Barner and was subrogated to Barner’s rights of recovery and brought suit.

Experts appeared for both sides at trial on the merits. The trial court concluded after hearing all of the evidence:

“... plaintiff did produce a preponderance of evidence so as to convince the court that the flare connection leading to the central heating unit was defective, and that this connection most likely caused the fire which destroyed the mobile home.”

The issue presented on appeal is whether the trial judge was clearly wrong in his conclusion that the defective flare caused the fire.

BANKERS’ BURDEN AT TRIAL

The principal issue at trial and the question upon which this decision must rest is whether Bankers established that the flare connection was defective and whether the defect was the most probable cause of the fire. A plaintiff suing a manufacturer on the basis of a claimed injury resulting from a defect in a product has the burden of proving the product was defective and the defect caused plaintiff’s injury. Weber v. Fidelity & Casualty Insurance Co. of N.Y., 259 La. 599, 250 So.2d 754 (1971). A plaintiff is not required to prove any specific act of negligence on the part of the defendant. However, a plaintiff is required to prove a defective product manufactured by defendant caused plaintiff’s loss and the causation must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence. Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Adams, 381 So.2d 923 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1980). A preponderance of the evidence exists when the evidence, direct or circumstantial, taken as a whole shows that the fact of causation sought to be proved is more probable than not. Jordan v. Travelers Insurance Company, 257 La. 995, 245 So.2d 151 (1971).

While the existence of a defect is most often proven by direct evidence, causation may be proven by circumstantial evidence. Taken as a whole, circumstantial evidence must exclude other reasonable hypotheses with a fair amount of certainty. This does not mean the evidence must negate all other possible causes. It suffices if the circumstantial proof excludes other reasonable hypotheses only with a fair amount of certainty, so that it will be more probable than not that the harm was caused by the tortious conduct of the defendant. Otherwise, the mere identification in the record of any other possible cause, even those not shown to be causally related, would break the chain of causation. Boudreaux v. American Insurance Company, 262 La. 721, 264 So.2d 621 (1972); Naquin v. Marquette Casualty Company, 244 La. 569, 153 So.2d 395 (1963).

SCOPE OF REVIEW

The existence of a defect and the question of causation are both factual determinations. The appeal court should not disturb the findings of the trier of fact in [1353]*1353the absence of manifest error. Canter v. Koehring Company, 283 So.2d 716 (La.1973). Manifest error means clearly wrong. Arceneaux v. Domingue, 365 So.2d 1330 (La.1979).

"... Where, as here, there is conflict in testimony as to the cause of the fire, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact by the trial court will not be disturbed even though this court may feel other evaluations and inferences are as reasonable."

Cormier v. Foremost Ins. Co., 405 So.2d 610, 612 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1981).

With these principles in mind we will examine the record to determine if the trial court was clearly wrong in its interpretation of the evidence presented.

EXISTENCE OF THE DEFECT

Bankers alleges that the flare connection in the L.P. gas system leading from the gas bottles to the central heating unit of the trailer was defective and this defect caused the fire. For Bankers to be successful in this suit it must prove both the defect and the causal link between the defect and plaintiff’s injury. Five experts appeared at trial. Four of these were of the opinion that the copper tubing which was connected to the central heating unit was insufficiently flared to insure a good seal. The other expert concluded that the flare was sufficient and did not leak.

In the flaring procedure the end of the copper tubing is spread out to match the shape of the bevelled connection which is attached to the appliance; in this case, the central heating unit. All of the major appliances in Barner’s trailer could be operated on L.P. gas and each appliance was attached to the gas system by a flare connection. After the fire all flare connections on the appliances in the trailer (air conditioner, refrigerator, stove top/oven, water heater and central heating unit) were retrieved. Each of the experts agreed, and the trial judge noted that even the untrained eye could tell, that the flared end of the copper tubing which attached to the central heating unit was smaller, or flared less, than any of the other connections to the other appliances.

Holiday’s expert, Professor A.J. McPhate, of Louisiana State University, explained a basic trade-off which was made when any flare is created. The tubing must be spread wide enough to insure sufficient surface contact with its counterpart in the connection but the tubing cannot be spread so much as to weaken its structural integrity.

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Related

Weber v. Fidelity & Casualty Insurance Co. of NY
250 So. 2d 754 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1971)
Arceneaux v. Domingue
365 So. 2d 1330 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1978)
Boudreaux v. American Insurance Company
264 So. 2d 621 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1972)
Naquin v. Marquette Casualty Company
153 So. 2d 395 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1963)
Cormier v. Foremost Ins. Co.
405 So. 2d 610 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1981)
Jordan v. Travelers Insurance Company
245 So. 2d 151 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1971)
Canter v. Koehring Company
283 So. 2d 716 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1973)
Western Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Adams
381 So. 2d 923 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1980)

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Bluebook (online)
420 So. 2d 1350, 1982 La. App. LEXIS 8123, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bankers-shippers-insurance-co-of-new-york-v-holiday-rambler-corp-lactapp-1982.