Bankers Life and Casualty Company v. Superintendent of Insurance

2013 ME 7, 60 A.3d 1272, 2013 WL 117038, 2013 Me. LEXIS 7
CourtSupreme Judicial Court of Maine
DecidedJanuary 10, 2013
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 2013 ME 7 (Bankers Life and Casualty Company v. Superintendent of Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Judicial Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bankers Life and Casualty Company v. Superintendent of Insurance, 2013 ME 7, 60 A.3d 1272, 2013 WL 117038, 2013 Me. LEXIS 7 (Me. 2013).

Opinion

SAUFLEY, C.J.

[¶ 1] Bankers Life and Casualty Company appeals from a judgment entered in the Business and Consumer Docket (Hor ton, J.) that affirmed a decision of the Superintendent of Insurance ordering Bankers Life to pay restitution and a civil penalty of $100,000 after a Bankers Life agent engaged in deceptive insurance sales practices in multiple transactions with an elderly woman. See 24-A M.R.S. §§ 12-A(1), 1420-K, 1445, 2155 (2012); see also 6 C.M.R. 02 031 917-1 § 6(A) (2007). We are not persuaded by Bankers Life’s challenges to the Superintendent’s application of the law, findings of fact, and exercise of discretion, and we affirm the judgment affirming the Superintendent’s decision.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶ 2] The Superintendent of Insurance has licensing and oversight authority over insurance companies and agents who sell insurance and annuity products to the public. See generally 24-A M.R.S. §§ 209 to 211, 1401 to 1420-P, 1441 to 1450 (2012). The Superintendent alleges that Bankers Life, through its agent, sold unsuitable annuities to an elderly client.

A. Applicable Statutes and Regulations

[¶ 3] Bankers Life and its agents functioned as “insurance producers” at the relevant time because they were “required to be licensed under subchapter II-A [24-A M.R.S. §§ 1420 to 1420-P] to sell, solicit or negotiate insurance.” 24-A M.R.S. § 1402(5); see also 24-A M.R.S. §§ 2, 1413(1), 1420-A(12) (2012). Producers may be subject to discipline, including civil penalties, for “[u]sing fraudulent, coercive or dishonest practices, or demonstrating incompetence, untrustworthiness or financial irresponsibility in the conduct of business in this State or elsewhere.” 24-A M.R.S. § 1420-K(1)(H). An insurer such as Bankers Life “[i]s responsible for injuries to consumers resulting from the actions of its appointed producers to the *1274 extent of restitution, reimbursement of money or payment of interest to the consumer” and also “[i]s accountable and may be penalized by the superintendent, as provided for in this Title, for the actions of its producers.” 24-A M.R.S. § 1445(1)(C), (D); see also 24-A M.R.S. § 4 (2012).

[¶ 4] The regulations of the Bureau of Insurance require producers and insurers to take steps to ensure the “suitability” of recommendations made to individuals about offered annuities “so that the insurance needs and financial objectives of consumers at the time of the transaction are appropriately addressed.” 6 C.M.R. 02 031 917-1 §§ 1(A), 6(A) (2007). In particular, the regulations require that a producer “have reasonable grounds” for the belief that an annuity is suitable based on the financial information that the consumer discloses. Id. § 6(A). An insurer or a producer business entity such as Bankers Life must have in place “a system to supervise recommendations,” including the recommendations of its insurance producers, “that is reasonably designed to achieve compliance with this regulation.” 6 C.M.R. 02 031 917-2 § 6(D)(1), (2) (2007). This system must include “[m]ain-taining written procedures” and “[c]on-ducting periodic reviews of its records that are reasonably designed to assist in detecting and preventing violations of this regulation.” Id. § 6(D)(1)(a), (b), (2)(a), (b).

B. Factual Background

[¶5] In the fall of 2007, Matthew F. Juliano, an insurance agent for Bankers Life, met with a seventy-five-year-old woman who had recently been treated for cancer to discuss issues related to Medicare, health, and prescription insurance; long-term care insurance; and IRA and CD options. As a result of that meeting and additional meetings with Juliano and his colleague Timothy E. Farren, a unit sales manager for Bankers Life, the woman purchased three Bankers Life annuities by liquidating three certificates of deposit, selling her General Electric stock, and rolling over an individual retirement account annuity. 1

[¶ 6] These sales involved several irregularities. First, Juliano’s “fact finder,” which summarized the woman’s financial situation and was required to be submitted for his supervisor Eugene Gagnon’s suitability review, failed to quantify many items, including the amount of the woman’s credit card debt. Although the fact finder stated that the woman believed she needed $20,000 in funds to be “totally liquid and accessible,” the entire CD proceeds and all but $15,000 of the stock proceeds were invested in annuities, leaving $6,000 after taxes for her use. Bankers Life did not require that the fact finder be updated as new products were purchased through Bankers Life and did not require the woman’s signature on the form before transactions could be effectuated. All of this occurred despite a Consent Agreement entered into with the Bureau in 2005 that required Bankers Life’s regional director and an independent monitor to conduct ongoing review of suitability training and compliance procedures with periodic reporting. 2

*1275 [¶ 7] Second, the suitability of the IRA annuity rollover was questionable because the Bankers Life annuity had lower guaranteed long-term minimum interest rates than the IRA annuity that the woman had previously held, had more stringent limits on the funds available for withdrawal, and would not mature for ten years — longer than the likely life expectancy for this seventy-five-year-old cancer survivor. 3

[¶ 8] Third, Juliano was not required to supply, as part of Gagnon’s review, the mathematical comparisons he used to justify his recommendations. When he spoke with the woman, Juliano improperly compared the short-term, more favorable introductory guaranteed minimum interest rate for the Bankers Life IRA annuity with the standard guaranteed minimum interest rate of the IRA annuity that it was proposed to replace.

[¶ 9] Fourth, the timing of the General Electric stock sale at the end of the calendar year was questionable. The sale generated $39,000 in capital gains and increased the woman’s tax liability by two tax brackets for that year, which affected the calculation of certain Medicare premiums. Bankers Life’s standard sales presentation states that taxes are a consideration that agents take into account, but none of Bankers Life’s agents followed up to ensure that the woman obtained professional advice, and none believed that follow-up was required.

[¶ 10] Finally, when all of the sales and purchases were complete, the woman’s access to funds was diminished and delayed. She became distressed because she did not have immediate access to the cash necessary to cover expenses related to her house. Nor was she able to make the charitable donations that she had described to Juliano or to pay off her credit card debt.

[¶ 11] Underlying these irregularities was the reality that Juliano did not have a clear understanding of the office’s organizational structure. For instance, Juliano did not know for sure whether Farren or another unit sales manager was his direct manager.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2013 ME 7, 60 A.3d 1272, 2013 WL 117038, 2013 Me. LEXIS 7, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bankers-life-and-casualty-company-v-superintendent-of-insurance-me-2013.