Bank of New York Mellon v. Maucha

CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedAugust 30, 2024
DocketCivil Action No. 2023-0915
StatusPublished

This text of Bank of New York Mellon v. Maucha (Bank of New York Mellon v. Maucha) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bank of New York Mellon v. Maucha, (D.D.C. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, : : Plaintiff / Counter-Defendant, : Civil Action No.: 23-915 (RC) : v. : Re Document Nos.: 9, 12 : PAUL MAUCHA, : : Defendant / Counter-Plaintiff. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DENYING DEFENDANT/COUNTER-PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO DISMISS; GRANTING PLAINTIFF/COUNTER-DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTERCLAIM

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter arises out of a dispute over property between the property owner Bank of

New York Mellon (“BNYM”) and an individual who resided on the property, Paul Maucha. In

April 2023, BNYM sued to eject Maucha from the property. Compl. ECF No. 1. Maucha—who

is proceeding pro se and who was recently convicted of wire fraud, conspiracy to commit wire

fraud, and engaging in monetary transactions in criminally derived property, Judgment at 1–2,

United States v. Maucha, No. 21-cr-332 (D.D.C. June 14, 2024), ECF No. 216—responded by

filing a document which the Court construed as both a motion to dismiss the complaint and a

counterclaim against BNYM, see Countercl., ECF No. 8; Def.’s Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 9.

BNYM now moves to dismiss the counterclaim. Pl.’s Mot. Dismiss Countercl. (“Pl.’s Mot.”),

ECF No. 12. For the reasons described below, BNYM’s motion to dismiss the counterclaim is

granted, and Maucha’s motion to dismiss is denied. II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

BNYM is the owner in fee simple absolute of the “multi-million dollar single-family

home” at 5721 Potomac Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20016. Pl.’s Mot. at 1; see also

Compl. ¶ 1. Before his arrest, Maucha lived at the property for over fifteen years and was

“intermittently paying an $1,000/month pittance in rent.” Pl.’s Mot. at 1. According to BNYM,

he was able to do so “because he signed a sham lease with the former owner on the eve of

foreclosure, then spent more than a decade engaged in spurious legal wrangling to stay in the

house for little or no rent to the detriment of” BNYM. Id. Over the years, Maucha also “claimed

housing code violations” and “demanded repairs” but then “threatened to kill anyone that

[BNYM] sent out to inspect the property.” Id. at 1–2.

Maucha no longer resides at the property. See Judgment at 3, United States v. Maucha,

No. 21-cr-332 (D.D.C. June 11, 2024), ECF No. 216 (committing Maucha to a 135-month term

of incarceration). In his stead, however, BNYM alleges that “squatters” now occupy the

property. Pl.’s Mot. at 2. BNYM further alleges that those squatters “more likely than

not . . . filed the Counterclaim on Maucha’s behalf.” Id.

B. Procedural Background

On April 4, 2023, BNYM filed suit in federal court seeking to eject Maucha from 5721

Potomac Avenue. Compl. ¶¶ 21–24. BNYM’s complaint also seeks to recover mense profits

Maucha received as a result of allowing other “unknown persons to occupy the [p]roperty for

years.” Id. ¶¶ 25–28. On November 28, 2023, Maucha filed a counterclaim that accuses BNYM

of fraud, requests dismissal of BNYM’s complaint, and demands $10 million “plus the costs of

all actions and any other relief a Jury may find.” Countercl. at 2–3. Because the Court

2 construed Maucha’s counterclaim as, in part, a motion to dismiss, BNYM filed a brief opposing

dismissal. Pl.’s Opp’n Mot. Dismiss (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 10. Maucha did not file a reply.

On December 19, 2023, BNYM moved to dismiss Maucha’s counterclaim. Pl.’s Mot. at

1. Maucha’s response was due on January 2, 2024, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1), (d); D.D.C.

LCvR 7(b), but he did not file one. Thus, on June 6, the Court issued an order advising Maucha

of his obligation to respond to BNYM’s motion. Order at 1, ECF No. 13. The Court warned

Maucha that if he “fail[ed] to submit a memorandum responding to [BNYM’s] motion [by July

5], the Court may treat the motion as conceded, grant the motion, and dismiss his counterclaim.”

Id. at 1–2. On July 5, Maucha filed a motion for an extension of time, in which he requested an

additional six months to respond to the motion to dismiss. Def.’s Mot. Extension Time, ECF No.

14. The Court granted in part and denied in part Maucha’s request. Order at 1–2, ECF No. 16.

Relevantly, the Court gave Maucha an additional thirty days in which to file an opposition. Id. at

1. The Court again cautioned Maucha that “if he neither responds nor moves for an extension of

time by [August 12], the Court may treat [BNYM’s] motion to dismiss as conceded and dismiss

Mr. Maucha’s counterclaim.” Id. at 2 (cleaned up). Despite that warning, Maucha has neither

responded to the motion to dismiss nor sought further extension of the deadline.

III. ANALYSIS

Under Local Civil Rule 7(b), if any party fails to file a response to a motion within “14

days of the date of service or at such other time as the Court may direct . . . the Court may treat

the motion as conceded.” D.D.C. LCvR 7(b). This rule “is a docket-management tool that

facilitates efficient and effective resolution of motions by requiring the prompt joining of issues.”

Fox v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 389 F.3d 1291, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 2004). In Fox v. Strickland, 837 F.2d

507, 509 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (per curiam), the D.C. Circuit held that a district court must take pains

3 to advise a pro se party of the consequences of the failure to respond to a dispositive motion. See

also Neal v. Kelly, 963 F.2d 453, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1992). “That notice . . . should include an

explanation that the failure to respond . . . may result in the district court granting the motion and

dismissing the case.” Fox, 837 F.2d at 509.

The Circuit has addressed challenges to the compatibility of Local Civil Rule 7(b) with

various Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Winston v. Strawn, LLP v. McLean, 843 F.3d 503,

506 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“Local Rule 7(b) cannot be squared with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

56.”); Cohen v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of the Dist. of Columbia, 819 F.3d 476, 481 (D.C. Cir.

2016) (“Applying Local Rule 7(b) to grant an unopposed motion to dismiss under Federal Rule

12(b)(6) risks circumventing the clear preference of the Federal Rules to resolve disputes on their

merits.”). However, Cohen ultimately “reaffirmed that, in the context of a motion to dismiss, it

‘[has] yet to deem a straightforward application of Local Rule 7(b) an abuse of discretion.’”

Voacolo v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg, Ass’n, 224 F. Supp. 3d 39, 42 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Cohen, 819

F.3d at 480); see also Woodhouse v. Ayfi Grp., No. 22-cv-1834, 2022 WL 22625187, at *1

(D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2022).

This case presents such a situation. BNYM filed its motion to dismiss in December

2023.

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